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PftSFACS
The title of my thesis may lead the reader to expect to find in it rather
more and different things than there actually are. Because of this I think it
advisable to outline son® of the restrictions which have been imposed upon it
and some of the reasons which explain these.
The first and most important restriction lies in the fact that it is
mainly confined to the exposition and elucidation of Vico's theories. There
is little philosophical discussion of the tenability and value of his ideas
and such as I have been able to include i3 largely to be found in the brief
concluding section. 1 have found it necessary to omit altogether any compari¬
sons of Vico with latter-day thinkers of his type, e.g. Hegel, Spengler and
Toynbee.
A variety of reasons have contributed towards this. Hie first is the
obscure, diffuse and often muddled nature of "Hie New Science", which is
notoriously difficult to understand. In part this problem arises not so
much from the difficulty of the ideas as from the fact that there are so many
of them. But this alone would not be a reason for puzzlement. It becomes so
when allied to a second factor: the difficulty of understanding the meaning of
some of Vico's principal pronouncements about the nature of the enterprise
carried out in "The New Science" and about the relationships between at least
some of its main theories.
It is admitted on all hands that Vico's language is obscure. I should
not want to dispute this and, indeed, have hsd to go to some lengths to try to
2
clear up a few of these obscurities. It is also alleged sometimes that some
of trie difficulties of understanding 'The Now icience" arise from philosophical
1
confusions. This is a much more disputable claim, ut will become clear in
the following work that I hold that Vico was by no means so confused in his
grasp of his own doctrines as the general obscurity of "The New icience"
might suggest. Certainly I do not think that he was guilty of one or Wo basic
philosophical confusions which, if located, would provide the clue to the un¬
ravelling of most of the difficulties of his work. Nor do 1 think that those
mistakes which he does make are so fundamental that he is left with nothing
of importance to say once they have been rectified.
An alternative explanation of the difficulties one encounters in trying
to find a consistent interpretation of "The New Science" is that Vico's general
pronouncements about his theories are not precise enough. Their lack of
precision allows of a variety of interpretations, 021 some of which Vico can come
to appear guilty of great philosophical confusion. Jn the other hand when one
investigates Vico's doctrines in their actual application one is able to reject
most of the interpretations which leave Vico open to the charge of philosophical
confusion.
In such a situation one promising approach has seemed to me to be to
examine first of all Vico's theoretical account of his doctrines, trying to come
to some rather general conclusions as to the possible interpretations they allow,
then to decide between these and render them more precise by considering them
in Weir actual application. The thesis therefore falls into three sections.
In the first there is an examination of some of Vico's theoretical pronounce-
^See Croce's "The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico" pp. 36-41.
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merits, together with an attempt to elucidate some of the key terms he uses,
lost of the conclusions arrived at here are highly provisional. In the
second some of these doctrines are reconsidered in their practical application
and an attempt i3 raade to come to more precise conclusions concerning their
nature. In the third a brief philosophical discussion is offered of a few
aspects of Vico's work.
It will be seen from this that my thesis is largely exegetical. This
is unfortunate in th: t it has necessitated the omission of any critical evaluation
of many of Vico's theories. Nevertheless it has been rendered necessary by a
second factor - the state of Vichian studies today. Although I have listed in
the Bibliography a few books which I have consulted, there is not to be found
in any of these a detailed examination of any of Vico's texts, lost of them
offer very general accounts of Vico's theories and while these are often
interesting the degree of textual reference offered and the lack of discussion
of these references make it impossible to decide whether or not these accounts
are correct. This is true even of the most ambitious of these works, that
by Croce, in which the reference system only correlates the contents of each
chapter in toto with selected pages from Vico. As a result I have found
that iry attempt to clarify even a small, number of Vico's theories ha3 involved
much rather tedious textual examination; I have been able to take nothing
for granted. This explains also why it is that in the actual thesis very few
references are made to those other works on Vico. 1 have simply not found
the detailed enough to be helpful in the questions which I felt had to be
answered. Yet without a close textual examination of these questions I
see no way in which one will ever le able to decide vhat Vico is saying
and whether he is worth studying.
These two reasons, the obscurity of Vico's texts and the lack of a detailed
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exposition of any of them, explain also why this thesis is confined to an exami¬
nation of only one of Vico's works, the 1744 edition of "The New Science". I
have eschewed entirely any investigation of the development of Pica's doctrines
not because 1 think that this would not throw valuable light on the nature of
his doctrines but because there exist no adequate examinations of Vico's other
works; the use of any of them would therefore have required the sane sort of
textual examination as that I have tried to provide of "The New Science". To
provide this for more than one of Vico's works would, in my view, be beyond
the scope of one thesis.
In fact, even in its treatment of this one text of Vico's ay account is
highly selective. This selective treatment I would also justify by reference
to the above two reasons. I hold myself responsible, however, for the actual
selection of themes and material for discussion. It might be further helpful
to explain the principles upon which I have done this.
in "The New Science" Vico tries to give some account of what he is trying
to do, the problems he faces and hcaw he hopes to deal with therm. This is offered
mainly in Book I, in Sections II and IV, entitled "Elements" and "method" res¬
pectively. The Elements are divided into two sets. In one of these Vico presents
principles which, he claims, underlie the whole of "The New Science", in the
other he puts forward more specific principles relevant only to limited parts
of the work. Though Vico failed to adhere strictly even to this simple scheme,
it is nevertheless a useful division, raking the provisional assumption that
Vico at least knew which were the most basic and general of his doctrines, I
have chosen to deal in the first instance with those which are contained in the
principles which underlie the whole of "The New Science". This explains why it
is that the theories dealt with in the first part of ny thesi3, theories about
the nature of hupin activity, the relation of society to individual, the
possibility of laws of l-iistorical evolution, are those covered in the first
twenty-two elements.
Apart from these very general theories Vico offers a large number of rather
more specific theories - theories about the nature of early language, or the
nature of different kinds of thinking or different kinds of human institutions
at different periods of historical evolution. These theories are often very
interesting in themselves. Some of them are referred to, others outlined, in
the second part of the thesis. But here no attempt at a comprehensive or
continuous account of them has been attempted. In the second part, where I have
tried to investigate actual applications of the most general principles, I have
not hesitated to use these rather more specific principles and theories as
examples of tire more general in their actual application, stating only those
more specific ones which, for a variety of reasons, I have found specially
suitable for this purpose.
As a result a large number of highly interesting theories in "The New
Jcience" have received little or no mention at all, while others have been
described only to the degree necessary for their use as illustrations of mere
general theories. If at times this seems unjust to Vico I would defend my
procedure by pointing out that even this one work, "The New Jcience", contains
so many different theories that it could profitably be the subject of a large





The Importance of the Blemgrfla
In "The New Science" Vico tries to establish that there is a general,
pattern to which, under certain conditions, the histories of all nations will
conform, i.e. he trie3 to establish the laws which govern the historical
develop/rent of nations. The work itself is divided into five books. Book
I is intended primarily to be an account of the general philosophical principles
underlying the enterprise. Book II is an actual account of seme history, mainly
of Home and to a lesser extent of Greece, given as an example of how the history
of a nation should be written if it is to be seen as an instance of a general
pattern. Book III, concerned with the interpretation of the Homeric poems, is
an example of Vico's conception of the correct way to deal with historical
evidence. Book IV i3 a general summary of the actual pattern which Vico claims
to have established as a result of his enquiries. Book V gives some indications
as to how to construe periods of history nearer to Vico's own time in conformity
with the over-all programme, it also suggests how, since these are instances of
the sane general pattern as the histories of Book II, the different histories
can throw light on one another.
Vico does not manage to adhere strictly to the intentions which underlie
this scheme. Gven so it is impossible to understand what he is doing, and even
more what he thought he was doing, without an investigation of Book I in which
part of the philosophical account is given.
fwo things stand out in Book I. The first is a section (II) c agisting
of one hundred and fourteen J-eaeats which, Vice says, "course through our
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•Science and animate it in .all its reasonings about the co .on nature of nations".
Unfortunately, it is difficult not only to understand many of these elements but
also to see how to take them if they are to fulfil the function here suggested
by Vico.
The second feature f Book 1 which stands out is the rent importance Vico
attaches to a certain epistemological principle, the principle that what "men had
p
made .... men could hope to know", it is clear, as I shall shortly show, that
Vico thinks that there is some intimate connection between this principle and at
least some of the more important elements. But the nature of this connection is
far fr obvious.
This obscurity is something which I have not found satisfactorily explained
by Vico's commentators. Their approach often is to discuss first the epis¬
temological principle as a principle in itself and then go on to discuss the other
doctrines of "The New Science" as though it is quite clear in what sense they
follow from, or are connected to, the epistemological principle. But this
sense is rarely explicitly discussed or brought to light and it is certainly
not at all obvious.
.hat I wish to do ultimately is to investigate the relation between
"The New Science" and Vico's epistemological principle. To do this it will
be necessary to conduct an investigation into the Jlements which not only,
as Vico says, "animate" the reasonings of "The New Science" but also, a3 I
i:.o. U9. 2N.o. 331.
shall show, throw light on the meaning of Vico's epiatemologlcal principle
and help to reveal in what sense it is basic to Vico's whole enterprise.
Before going on to discuss some of the more important elements 1 should like
to offer some considerations to give some initial plausibility to this approach.
it is com; only acknowledged by commutators thst Vico's main epistCLological
principle is basic to The Hew Science" and, indeed, ss X mentioned above, many
co;; entators co once with a discussion of it. Nevertheless, it is an oddity
which seems to have escaped explicit mention that not only does Vico hi self
not begin with a statement of the principle but also that it is rarely stated
in The New Science" .id that nowhere in that large work is there any full
discussion of its importance, it is not, however, the case that Vic w s
uninterested in the principle or that he failed to realise it3 1 >ortance.
The contrary is mply attested by the fairly full, and certainly direct, dis¬
cussion he gave it in his earlier work, "Be i.atiauissima Italorum Gapientia".
Nevertheless, the com entators who have discussed Vico's views here have not
see.ved to find it remarkable that, while tliey can do full justi.ee to the earlier
view of the principle rs stated in the above work, they have c onsiderably less
direct material on which to work when it comes to discussing vico's iter vie, .
xet this paucity of later material should have occasioned so.e surprise since
vico himself expressed tie wish thot posterity should judge him by the contents
of "The hew science" which, he held, in its second form superseded all his
, 1
previous works.
The paucity of later discussion of the principle might be ex lained
by the suggestion that by the time of writing "The New dcience" Vico no longer
attached to the principle the importance he had earlier given it. But this
"The Autobiography of Giambattista vico", p. 191.
suggestion can be immediately discounted since, few though the references to it
are in "The hew Gcience", in each V'ico pubs the natter in such a light that there
can be no d ubting that he hi self still t ok it to be in so/re sense a very basic
principle in his work/
it is time to turn to Vice's first important statement of the principle
in "The Mew science1', and it is necessary here to note the point at which it
is introduced. . s already mentioned "The Jew dcience" does not begin with this
principle. Instead, it starts with a secti n of some forty paragraphs, entitled
"xdoa of The ..ork", intended as an Introduction and taking; the form of allegedly
explicatory comments upon an allegorical picture in which Vico represents the
..sain theories of "The New science". This section is meant to be a summary of
"The dev. dcience"; but the coSensation involved in this undertaking is so great
that the su.w ary can only j roperJy be understood with the aid of an explication
of the rest of "The New defence" rather than, as Vico doubtless intended, an
understanding of the rest of "The Mew dcienee" being aided by the summary. For
this reas . • x propose to devote i detailed comment to this secti n in itself.
Book x proper, of "The Mew Science", entitled "istablisiuaant of Principles",
also fails to coj—encc with the basic epistemological principle. Instead it
begins with ; Chronological Table, in which Vico sets down separate chronological
histories of various nations, each treated as a history in itself, most detail
being given in the case of the histories of Greece and Rome with which Vico
was most fa. iiliar.
dome of the datings, and, indeed, the very interpretation of the events
"'"This is evident even from Vico's brief account of it in his Conclusion,
"it is true th t man have the selves .Wide this world of nations (and we took
this as the first incontestable principle of our science ....V' .i.d. 1108.
Mere one notes his description of it s "the first incontestable principle
of ur science..."
M
set down in this Table are considered by Vico, justifiably, to be highly
controversial, section 1 of Book 1 which follows the Chronological Table there¬
fore consists of a series of paragraphs explaining the reasoning behind Hie
scheme set out in the Table. In all this, however, we are being given an
example of historical argument. Nothing philosophical is introduced until we
reach Lao cone uiuing parcigr; ;h of tiie section. erex vie writes:
"It can be seen by our reasoning in these Notes that
all that has come down to us from the ancient gentile nations
for the times covered by this Table is most uncertain
For thi3 reason we trust we shall offend no man's right if
we reason differently and at time3 in direct opposition to
the opinions hich have been held up to now concerning the
beginnings of the humanity of the nations. By so doing we
shall reduce these beginnings to scientific principles, by
which the facts of certain history may be assigned their
first origins, on which they rest and by which they are
reconciled. For up to now they do not seem to have had any
common foundation nor any continuous sequence nor any
coherence among themselves. 1
It is enough here to note Vico's claim that his reasonings will differ
from those of other historians in that they will bring "scientific principles"
into history (though in what capacity is obscure) and that by their aid "con¬
tinuous" and "coherent" history will result.
Vico now passes on to -lection II, entitled "Elements", justifying their
introduction at this point in the following way:
"in order to give form to the materials hereinbefore set
in order in the Chronological Table, we new propose the followirc
axioms, both philosophical and philological, including a few
reasonable and proper postulates and some clarified definitions,
i nd just as the blood does in animate bodies, so will these
elements course through our >cience and animate it in all its
reasonings about the com on nature of nations."2
fhe elements are set out at this point because they are to "give form"
to the history which, in the Chronological fable, Vico has schematically out-
"Hl.d. 118. 2H.S. 119.
lined, for us. Vica now sets out the one hundred and fourteen elements 'which
comprise lection 11.^ Their statement is followed by lection III entitled
"Principles" and it is not until we reach this point that the basic epi3topo¬
logical principle is explicitly stated.
Thus far Vico has introduced the elements which "give form" to the
historical material schematically set down in the Chronological Table. He
repeats this notion in the opening paragraph of lection 111:
"Now, in order to make trial whether the propositions
hitherto enumerated as elements of this Science can give form
to the materials prepared in the Chronological Table at the
beginning, we beg the reader to consider whatever has been
written concerning the principles of any subject in the whole
of gentile knowledge, human and divine. et him then see if
it is inconsistent -with these propositions, whether with all
or some or one. For inconsistency with one would amount to
inconsistency with all, since each accords with all. Certainly
on making such a comparison he will perceive that it is a
tissue of confused memories, of the fancies of a disordered
imaginationj that none of it is begotten of intelligence,
which has been rendered useless by the conceits enumerated
in the Axioms (125, 127). For on the one hand the conceit
of the nations, each believing itself to have been the first
in the world, leaves us no hope of getting the principles of
our Science from the philologians. And on the other hand the
conceit of the scholars, who will have it that what they know
must have been eminently understood from the beginning of the _
world, makes us despair of getting them from the philosophers...."
Clearly enough, Vico is here posing the question how he can justify the
choice of elements which he has just outlined as against any other set. For,
though this is not stated here, it would seem that other sets would "give
form" to other chronological schemes of the sort Vico castigates and rejects
3
as unhistarical throughout "The New Science".
in the above argument Vico's reply takes the form of a challenge: that
the principles of others be compared to his to see whether "they are inconsistent
-hho. 120-329 . 2N.3. 330. 3N.S. 125, 126.
with these propositions, whether with all or sortie or one. For inconsis¬
tency with one would amount to inconsistency with all, since each accords with
all".
Confident that no other set of principles will survive this test, Vico
then proceeds to the claim that inconsistency with his own 3et will render
any other such set unsound. Now on the face of it this procedure seems
invalid, for Vico appears to be arguing that the principles of others are not
acceptable if they are inconsistent with his whereas the acceptability of his
own i3 still supposed to be in question, Vico seems to be making the mistake
of arguing from the alleged self-consistency of his own set of principles
to their acceptability, i.e. to be taking their self-consistency to be a
sufficient condition of their acceptability rather than merely a necessary
condition.
This supposition seems further strengthened by the fact that, in the
paragraph quoted above1, Vico next proceeds to give an account of the under¬
lying reasons why other systems are liable to be disorderly, by referring
to the two vices he labels "the conceit of the nations" and "the conceit of
scholars". Broadly speaking, the conceit of the nations consists in the ten¬
dency of historians to be nationistically biased in their approach to their
2
subject matter , while the conceit of scholars consists xn the tendency of
philosophers to read back into history truths known to themselves and thus
to treat of earlier peoples anachronistically, as being capable of grasping
3
these truths , The upshot of these errors, Vico claims, is that we can look
neither to historians nor to philosophers for "the principles of oar Science".^
But the only reason which has so far been offered why we should refuse to
accept such tendencies on the part of historians and scholars is that they
conflict with the recommendations of Vico13 own principles. 5o, once again,
Vs. 330. 2N,3. 125. 3N.o. 127, 12B. Vs. 330.
Vico's procedure appears question-begging in that he seems to be assuming
the acceptability of his own principles in order to reject those of others
where, in fact, the acceptability of his own is still the point to be
justified.
But that Vico's procedure is only apparently illegitimate corns out
in his next paragraph. If we can trust neither philosophers nor historians
in this matter, whom can we trust; In onaver Vico brings in the first full
statement of his basic epistemological principle. He writes:
"But in the night of thick darkness enveloping the
earliest antiquity, so remote from ourselves, there shines
the eternal and never-failing light of a truth beyond all
question: that the world of civil society has certainly
been made by men, and that its principles are therefore to
be rediscovered within the modifications of our own human
mind. Whoever reflects on this cannot but marvel that the
philosophers should have bent all their energies to the study
of the world of nature, which, 3ince God had made it, He
alone knows; and that they should have neglected the study
of the world of nations or civil world, which, since men
had made it, men could hop® to know ........"1
The clear implication here is that Vico's procedure is based upon "a
truth beyond all question" and that an appeal to it can justify his 3et of
principles and invalidate those of others, unfortunately, this is all Vico
says about the connection between his elements and the basic epistenx>logical
principle. Even so it is apparent that there must be some close relation
between the two, otherwise acceptance of the elements would not be involved
in acceptance of the epistemological principle, it is equally apparent that
M.S. 331. 1 have modified the translation of Bergin and Fisch in one
respect here. They translate the phrase "ritruovare i principi dentro le
modification! ,..." by "its principles are therefore to be found within the
modifications ...." The above translation of "ritruovare11 as "rediscover"
seems more accurate. The importance of this will appear in later discussions
of this passage.
there cannot be the same close relation between the basic apistopological
principle and the principles of other thinkers, otherwise the latter, were
they internally consistent, would also be vindicated by it.
It is useless to try to be more specific about the nature of the con¬
nection involved for there are a number of ways in which one might construe
this and nothing in these passages to indicate which is the correct way of
doing so. It will become apparent later that there is no single way to des¬
cribe the relation between the elements and the epistamological principle
because the character of the different elements varies and the different
kinds stand in different relationships to the principle. For example some
elements give us what are really principles for historical interpretation and
amongst these are those referred to as "the modifications of our human mind",
in the epistemological principle. It would certainly be true here that if one
accepted the ba3ic epistemological principle and agreed to identify some of
the elements with those modifications one could not refuse their claim to
be legitimate principles of interpretation. Other elements, however, give
an account of Vico' s conception of knowledge and so explain the sense in which
"men could hope to know ...." These elements offer a definition of a key con¬
cept in the epistemological principle. Obviously they also are intimately
connected to it, though in a different way from the first kind of elements
mentioned above, which are rather instances of one of the kinds of things
referred to in it.
These suggestions would certainly comply with the claim that there is
some close and important relationship between the elements and the epi3temological
principle and would help explain why Vico should take acceptance of the latter
to justify that of the former. In the context of the structure of the initial
sections of "The New Science" as I have so far outlined them, the claim is given
additional plausibility by its ability to explain the circumstances I have
already mentioned, that in "The New Science" the basic epistemological principle
is so rarely stated and is not, as one might expect, stated at the beginning.
For if, for example, some elements were specific instances of "the modifications
referred to in the epistemological principle, one could see that though rarely
stated in its most general form the latter was being given expression through
the more specific propositions of the "Elements" in a way which related it
to the context of actual historical investigation. Repeated statements in its
most general form would be superfluous and Vico's procedure easier to understand
These considerations suggest that it would be a mistake to begin an
examination of "The New Science" with a discussion of Vico's basic episfcemo-
logical principle treated independently of the Elements with which, it would
seem, it is in some way intimately connected. I therefore propose to begin my
own examination with a discussion of some of the principal elements in the hope
that by understanding them we shall be able to throw more light on the main
epistemological principle,
CHAPTER II
Vico's Division of The Elements
The elements are introduced explicitly to "give form" to the materials of
the Chronological Ta, le. ~ This suggests that their use is to be confined to the
production of some scheme for Hie dating of events in obscure periods of history.
In Hie next sentence, however, Vico gives us a simile which indicates that their
function is far wider than this. "And just as the blood", he writes, "does in
animate bodies, so will these elements course through our Science and animate it
in all its reasonings about the common nature of nations." The simile is
undoubtedly obscure and might stand a number of interpretations which it would
be premature to discuss here. But on any interpretation one would have to
acknowledge that Vico is according to the elements a basic function in the
reasoning which occurs in "The New Science".
One must not be misled by this into thinking that the elements are all of
one type, Vico himself makes this clear in describing them as "axioms, both
philosophical, and philological, including a few reasonable and proper postulates
and some clarified definitions".^" This pronouncement distinguishes four types
of ele/Jients, The exact nature of the first and, to a lesser degree, of the
second of these four type3 is difficult to ascertain and will be discussed at
much , reater length as we proceed. On the other hand, the nature of the other
two types is obvious and may profitably be disposed of here.
Vs. 119.
By a "definition" Vico means nothing more than hi3 account of the meaning
of some term he is using. For the most part definitions are offered of
technical terms of Pico's own making. .hen given they are of great importance
since, as we shall see, it i3 part of Pico's project to provide a framework
for historical description and explanation which involves the use of some
categories not to be found in everyday speech. As an example, one might consider
Elements XI and XII. In Element XI Vico gives an account of the factors which
determine "the common sense of man", a notion of great importance in his scheme.
In Element XII he gives as a "definition"^" an account of the meaning of this
term.
By a postulate Vico means what we might term a particular historical
hypothesis, i.e. a hypothesis concerning what happened at some point in history.
Of course, most accounts of what happened in history might be called "hypotheses"
on the grounds that the evidence available to a historian never entails his
conclusion. But Vico reserves the term 'postulate' for accounts of what happened
in those cases ivhere there is more or less no direct evidence available to the
historian, no eyewitness accounts or reliable traditional beliefs, but where
there is the possibility of showing the postulate to be "reasonable" by showing
that it is consistent with an overall account of the period while offering a
good explanation of what would otherwise remain obscure.
As an example we may take the postulate, mentioned in Element CIII, that
"on the shore of Latium some Greek colony had been set up, which after conquest
2
and destruction by the tomans, remained buried in the darkness of antiquity".
Vico's reason for asserting this postulate is not that it is based on direct
evidence, for there is no traditional account of the existence of such a colony,
Vs. 143. Vs. 306.
but that it provides the most reasonable way of explaining a certain Greek
influence in Roman traditions and literature at a time in which all the direct
evidence goes to show the Roman3 had no intercourse with, or conscious
knowledge of the existence of, the Greeks.'1'
This short discussion of the notion of a postulate is useful in that it
servos to show that Vico's elements by no means have the single character his
own introduction of them might suggest. For a postulate of the sort just
mentioned is really a historical hypothesis. It would seem very odd to describe
2
postulates, which all have this character, as, in common with the other
elements in "The New Science", helping "animate it in all its reasonings about
3
the common nature of nations". The most that can be said for such postulates
i3 that -while helping explain soma obscure matter, they are not inconsistent
with the rest of the history provided in "The New Science". Clearly one cannot
think of them as being basic to the scheme envisaged, in the same way as the
philosophical axioms.
It is therefore not the case that the various types of element function
in the sane way, or have the same importance in "The New Science". Hence it
would not be profitable to discuss them all. Fortunately, in making a choice
of elements to discuss, we are helped by the fact that Vico himself provides
some rather random remarks as to how he conceived their natures. Following
these remarks we can come to a rough classification of the various elements.
The first, and most coherent, set of remarks provided by Vico in this
matter occur under Element XXII. Here he suggests that the first four
propositions "give U3 the basis for refuting all opinions hitherto held about
"Hj.S, 307. *Tor other examples see M.S. 192 and 295. ^N.3. 119.
the beginning of humanity"."'' He next goes on to suggest that "the subsequent
propositions, from the fifth to the fifteenth, which gives us the basis of truth,
will serve for considering this world of nations in its eternal idea, by thi3
property .... that •Science has to do with what is universal and eternal1
Thirdly, "the last propositions, from the fifteenth to the twenty-second, will
give us the basis of certitude. By their use we shall be able to see in fact
this world of nations which we have studied in idea Finally, he
characterises "the propositions set forth above" as "general" and as "the basis
of our Science throughout ..." and distinguishes them from "those which follow"
which are "particular and provide more specific bases for the various matters
2
it treats of".
Adopting the scheme here suggested by Vico we may classify these propositions
as follows:
General Propositions. I-XX.II, These are the basis of "The New Science"
throughout.
Propositions I-IV give the basis for the refutation of wrong
opinions concerning the "antiquity" of
humanity.
" V-XV give the basis of truth, considering the
world of nations in its eternal idea,
" XVI-XXII give the basis of certitude, following in
fact what has hitherto been seen in idea
only.
The elements from XXIII to CXIV cannot be so neatly grouped. Vico, however,
does make comments after most of them which suggest how he construes the function
of the element, or of a group of elements, in his Science, It is -worth while to
classify these also according to his indications, partly because I shall want to
refer to some of them and also because a summary is the most economical way of
revealing their varied nature. This classification works out as follows:
"Hl.S. 163. ^N.S. 164.
Particular Propositions XX1II-CXIV. These give "more specific bases for
the various matters treated of".~
Propositions XXIIX and XXIV prove the truth of sacred (i.e. Hebrew)
history against secular history and provide
a basis for distinguishing between these.
" XXV demonstrates that the flood was a world-wide
event.
" XXVI and XXVII make it evident that "the entire original
human race was divided into two species: the
one of giants, the other of men of normal
stature", and identify the former with the
gentiles and the latter with the Hebrews.''-
" XXVIII-XXX "establish the fact that the orld of peoples
began everywhere with religion. This will be
the first of the three main principles of
twis ocience".^
n XXVIil-XXXVIIX (i.e. a section including the last three
propositions above) reveal "the beginnings
of divine poetry or poetic theology".0
" XXXI—XXfVII give "the beginnings of idolatry".0
» XXXIX gives "the beginning of divination".
ii XL gives "the beginnings of sacrifice..."^
» XL1-XLII postulate the spreading of the original
neople and giants throughout the world.
ii XLI1-1LVI reveal- the beginnings of historical mythology.
" XLVII-LXII (plus I-XXU) cover the divisions of poetic
theory. Of these, propositions XLVII-XLIX
explain the origin of poetic characters^ and
propositions LVI-LXII establish that verse
speech preceded prose speech.^-®
11" LXI1I states an important etymological principle.
" LXIV states an important relation between "the 0




2N.3. 166 and 168. 3N.a. 169. Vs. 172. 5W.S. 176. 6N.3.
3
.1. 203. 9N.3. 209. 10H.S. 235. "^N.S. 237. ^.S. 238
XX
Present "the principles of the ideal
sternal history",
show that inland nations were founded before
maritime nations.--
give principles for the etymology of foreign
'words, differing from that of native words.3
3tates a postulate necessary for Roman history.^1
presents an axiom to decide whether man is
"naturally sociable".^
presents an axiom to prove "that providence .,,,
is the ordainor of the natural law of nations".1'
presents an axiom "which might have been laid
down among the general axioms ,.
present axioms which criticise the systems
of "Grotius, welden and Pufendorf".
9
give the principles of "strict law",
gives the principle of human law.
" CXI and CXIXT are particular applications of the general
propositions X and X to the question of the
natural law of nations.-5-^
» CXII-CXIV give the principles of "mild law".11
" CIX-CXIV establish the fact that "the natural.law of
nations was ordained by providence"."1"
It is obvious from the above classification of elements that these
"particular propositions" cannot be so neatly grouped as the more general, and
that in nary ways they represent a very nixed bag. Proposition CVI, for example,
is explicitly stated by Vico to be a "general proposition" and so, from that
point of view, is more properly thought of along with the first twenty-two. On
the other hand, propositions CXI and GXIII are "more detailed applications" of
the general propositions XX and X while the same might be said of the whole
^.S. 294. 2N.S. 293. 3N.d. 304. Vd. 307. 5N.S. 309 . 6N.d. 312.












body of propositions from LXV to XCVII. For these present the principles of the
ideal eternal history as, in a sense, it is claimed, is also done by the general
propositions V to XV, which "will serve for considering this world of nations
in its eternal idea","*" and the other general propositions XVI to XXIX, by the
uso of which "we 3hall be able to see in fact this world of nations which we
have studied in idea Yet others among them present, as we have seen,
particular historical hypotheses.
In view of the mixed nature of the second set of elements, it will not,
for iiy purpose, be profitable to make detailed comments on them all as, I think, it
Win be in the case of the first twenty-two. with regard to the later
propositions I shall be more selective, discussing them only where I think this
will throw more light on the general ones which look, prima facie, to be the
only ones which could accurately be described as coursing "through our .clence"






In Vico*s classification it is suggested that the first four elements
form a group which "give us the basis for refuting all opinions hitherto held
about the beginnings of humanity"."*" But "the refutations" themselves "turn
upon the improbabilities, absurdities, contradictions and impossibilities of
these opinions"."*" This distinction between "the basis" of refutation, provided
by the elements, and what the refutations themselves "turn upon", suggests that
the elements themselves do not normally give us critical criteria, i.e. an
account of those conditions to which history must conform, and the defects from
which it must be free, if it is to be acceptable. The latter are described by
the notions of "improbabilities, absurdities, contradictions and impossibilities"
and Vico seems to assume that one knows how to handle these concepts, for they
are given no explication in the elements nor, indeed, in "The New Science" as a
whole.
..hat the first four elements do, instead, is provide an explanation how
history comes to be liable to be erroneous, that is liable to include
"improbabilities, absurdities, contradictions and impossibilities". This can
best be seen if we turn to these first elements themselves,
element I states: "Because of the indefinite nature of the human mind,
2
wherever it is lost in ignorance, man makes himself the measure of all things."
"^.S. 163. Stf.S. 120.
J. 5"
In the corollary to this, tfico asserts that this axiom "explains" how it is
that rumour becomes increasingly erroneous the further removed it is, in time
1
and place, from those events it purports to relate. Traditional accounts of
the history of former epochs are therefore liable to be erroneous. In effect,
Vico is stating a claim which would justify the adoption of a critical attitude
towards the traditional sources of historical knowledge,
Element II, having something of the same character, states: "It is
another property of the human mind that whenever men can form no idea of distant
2
and unknown things, they judge them by what is familiar and at hand". The
effect of this axiom, Vico goes on, is to point "to the inexhaustible source
of all errors about the beginnings of humanity that have been adopted by entire
nations and by all the scholars. For when the former began to take notice of
them and the latter to investigate them, it was on the basis of their own
enlightened, cultivated and magnificent times that they judged the origins of
humanity, which must nevertheless by the nature of things have been small,
crude and quite obscure",3
Here Vico is bringing in another property of the human mind to explain
historical errors, this property being the tendency to form judgments about
the historically obscure on the principle that the obscure will resemble what
is not obscure, that is, by analogy with what is familiar. As a result of
this, two types of error creep in: the conceit of nations and the conceit of
scholars. These are so Important that Vico explicates them as separate ele¬
ments,
Element III describes the conceit of the nations as the belief that "it
before all other nations invented the comforts of human life and that its
remembered history goes back to the very beginning of the world",^ In effect,
Vs. 121. Vs. 122. Vs. 123. Vs. 125.
this conceit consists in a tendency on trie part of the historian to assume for
hi3 own country a privileged place in certain historical fields.
Element IV describes the conceit of scholars who, as Vico puts it, "will
have it that whatever they know is as old as the world".4 The effect of this
axiom is to dispose "of all the opinions of the scholars concerning the match¬
less wisdom of the ancients It further condemns as impertinent all the
ystic meanings with which the Egyptian hieroglyphs are endowed by the scholars,
2
and the philosophical allegories which they have read into the Greek fables".
These are the four elements in which Vico most explicitly outlines the
basis of his criticism of the work of other historians. They are of much
greater importance than at first sight ight appear. But before discussing
this it would be well to note briefly a few of the applications Vico gave these
: rinciples.
In general Vico utilises the conceit of the nations as a source of error
far less than the conceit of scholars. The foner is mainly used in "The New
.science" to explain examples of faulty chronology. Thus Vico uses it to
explain the allegedly false belief held by the Egyptians that theirs was the
3
most ancient civilisation and, again, to explain a similar false belief held
about them;elves by the Chaldeans.4 Nevertheless, it would see-; odd, today,
to allege that this principle was one of the two great sources of historical
error, for historians now have methods available to them which should enable
them to bo completely free from this type of error. To appreciate Vico's
concern here one must remember that he was writing t a time when the main
way of arriving at a correct chronology was by means of an interpretation of
h.3. 127. ^.3, 128. 3N.S. 47. 4J.o. 49.
3.1
the traditional accounts of each n-.tion as found embodied in its literature.
But while the possibility of spotting internal inconsistencies allowed tho
critical construction of a chronological table for each nation, according to
which the temporal position of its events relative to o». another could be
assigned with reasonable accuracy, it provided no sound criteria by which to
arrive at a scale according to which the events of all nations could be assigned
positions relative to one another. Today, on the other hand, historians
have been able to arrive at something more like a scientific chronology through
their study of evidence other than literary remains find through the ability
of the physical sciences to help in establishing with accuracy the dating of
these. Thus it is now possible to establish accurate chronological tables
through the U3e of evidence and methods free from the type of error mentioned
by Vico.
In view of this one must treat Vico'3 insistence on the conceit of
nations as a prime source of historical error, as being of relevance to his
own, and not to this, age. His attachment of importance to it can be justi¬
fied on the ground that he, himself, was primarily concerned with the history
of vary obscure periods for which not even sound chronology existed, but not
on the ground, which he seems to imply, that it must always be a source of
difficulty for historians.
But we xmi3t also point out here that Vico'3 insistence on the conceit of
nations as an important source of historical error may well have to be construed
as a mark of his inability to be clear about the full import of his own
doctrines. For, as we shall see, Vico tries to produce and justify a form of
history in which what really counts is the position of events relative to one
another on a scale whose units are to be defined in terms of phases of
2.2
historic0.1 development within a nation, rather tb by any mathematical unit.
In view of this Vico's interest in the question which notion had the oldest
history, to which the conceit of nations is primarily relevant, is difficult
to explain and impossible to justify. It can be explained, perhaps, simply
by pointing out that it was very much a controversy at the time, but it cannot
be justified since Vico's principal doctrines, if accepted, render it a question
of no importance,
,hen we turn to references to the conceit of scholars the list i3 very
long indeed, A small selection of examples must suffice to illustrate it.
Vico alleges that this conceit is the source of the theory that certain
esoteric wisdom has been handed down through a succession of different masters
t become the property of different races1; he claims that it explains how the
Greeks read their own philosophical theories back into their fables and so were
led to misconceive the intellectual abilities of their ancestors, the origins
2
of their poetry and, indeed, their entire history. This, of course, is an
example drawn from a type of history particularly liable to be affected by this
error, the history of ideas, Vico shows many times how the history of ideas
has been hindered by this notion that a certain set of esoteric and philosophical
truths has been in man's possession since earliest times.
Ho. over, the principle is used more /ddely than this, por example, it
has led to misreadings in etymology with a subsequent misunderstanding of social
and political history, nachronistic interpretations of the words "people"
"wing" and "liberty", to take only threo, have led to a misunderstanding of the
3
nature of the early iloman state, and to the reading back into it of the class
structure, and constitutional and civil developments, appropriate to a later age.1
Vs. 59. Vs. 384, 416 and 426, 3M.S. 663. Vs. 666.
In general we can conclude that the examples given in the Elements by
no means reveal the full range of instances to which this rule is to be applied.
It is clear that Vico took this mistake to be behind a wide variety of examples
of false readings in history,
,.e must note that it is implicit in Vico1 s claim that these types of
error follow not from any one man's prejudice, not from any individual idio¬
syncrasy, but from natural tendencies, or properties of the mind, to which we
are all prone. For this is what is implied by deriving the two conceits from
the second axiom. The latter claims that it is a "property of the human mind"
that men judge of the unfamiliar by analogy with the familiar,1 How Vico
construes "a property" is by no means clear here but at the very least it must
be something which all men in fact, if not necessarily, .possess. This is
c nfiiroed by the fact that Vico immediately goes on to claim that this axiom
2
is "the inexhaustible source" of error as regards early history," It seems
clear that nobody so far has been free from this erroneous tendency. If this
3
is so we can also conclude, since they are derived from this axiom, that the
two conceits indicate tendencies to which all people, and therefore historians
too, are naturally prone.
If we recall the conclusion derived from the first axiom, that no
traditional historical account is per se trustworthy, and add to this the new
conclusion that the work of no historian is per se trustworthy, then what this
represents is something very uch tike Descartes' sceptical stand with regard
to sense knowledge, now applied to the field of historical knowledge, Vico
is adducing genera reasons why we can trust neither the accounts embodied in
hl.6. 122. ^.3. 123.
Q
Vico's actual claim is that "under this head" (i,e, of the second axiom) "are
to be recalled the two types of conceit ..." (N.S. 124). It is clear from
this wording that he conceives of the two conceits as more specific consequences
of the general tendency described in the second axiom.
3o
the historical sources themselves, nor the interpretation of these by later
historians, in our search for the truth about the past.
That this is the import of what he is saying can be confirmed by turning
to the passage, already discussed, in Section III on Principles, in which Vico
mentions these two conceits. Talking of the work of other historians, he there
says that "none of it is begotten by intelligence, which has been rendered
useless by the two conceits enumerated in the Axioms (125,127). For on the
one hand the conceit of the nations, each believing itself to have been the
first in the world, leaves us no hope of getting our Science from the
philologians. And on the other hand the conceit of the scholars, who will
have it that what they know must have been eminently understood from the
beginning of the world, makes us despair of getting them from the philosophers.
So, for the purposes of this enquiry, we must reckon as if there were no books
1
in the world". And just as Descartes, having produced arguments which
purported to show that no claim to knowledge was ipso facto trustworthy, argued
that what is required is that such claimsfe derived from something which "cannot
2
be false", in the argument of paragraphs 330 and 331 Vico claims that
historical knowledge must be based on a "truth beyond all question".
In the light of this we are justified in asserting that the first four
elements are intended to advance reasons why we should not repose trust
uncritically in historical accounts, either as they exist in the originals or
as worked over by later historians. To support this generalised conclusion
too much must not be put upon the fact that Vico only explicitly discusses two
3
types of error." For, if we accept that by reference to these two types of error
Sj.S, 330. ^The Second Leditation.
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This is to be explained by the fact that he seamed to find these particular
faults the most common in the works of the other historians with whom he was
concerned.
31
Vieo is trying to put ov r the general philosophical point that it is of the
very essence of historical reasoning that the acceptability of its conclusions
depends not only upon their conforming to certain criteria but also upon these
criteria being shown to be adequate for, and suitable to, the question in hand,
we must also accept that, even where a historian could show thai, he was free
from the two specific types of error described by Vico, he would not thereby
have shown his work to be acceptablej any alternative criteria might equally
not be acceptable.
Having said this, however, one must admit that it is still difficult to
be clear about the exact nature of the arguments adduced by Vico, This has
already been suggested when the doubt over the meaning of the word "property"
in the first two axioms was mentioned. If we take "property" to mean "necessary
property" then Vico would seem to be saying that it is necessarily the case
that the human ind works in these historically offensive ways. But he could
hardly mean this, since if it were necessarily the case that the human mind
worked in such a way as to make historical errors, then there would be no
possibility of eradicating this error. Therefore Vico's solution, whatever it
is, 'would itself be ruled out.
We must therefore look for a weaker reading of "property". One which
would have the requisite logical force would be that of a "tendency". For
what Vico would then be suggesting would be that we are all naturally prone
to reason in ways not acceptable as a basis for history. The cure, as we
have seen, will lie in recourse to some self-evident epistemological principle
on which a particular kind of historical reasoning can be based and by reference
to which it can be justified. Put this way, the contrast between acceptable
and unacceptable types of reasoning will be that between one's ability or
inability to justify one's criteria by reference to such a basic principle.
3 X
If we adopt this reading we may say that Vico's first four axioms argue
that the natural, unreflective ways in which people tend to think are not
adequate as a basis for history. Such reasonings must be reflectively or
consciously derived from a principle "which is beyond all doubt", lacking
this, no history is to be trusted.
It remains here only to point out that what I have said concerning the
first two elements, which are clearly on a different logical level from the
next two, is an account of only one half of their usage in Vico's hands.
The completion of the account will, best be left until those matters are reached
in which the rest of their character is revealed,1
See Chapter XVII below, in which it is shown that Elements I and II are also
instances of "the modifications" mentioned in Vico's basic epistemological
principle as being necessary for the recovery of the principles of "the world
of civil society".
CHAPTER IV
Providence. The individual And Eocietv
In the first four elements Vico has posed the historical problem* In
the next eleven general propositions he proceeds to state those principles
hich, as he most obscurely puts it, "give us the basis of truth" and "will
serve for considering this world of nations in its eternal idea by that
property of every science, noted by Aristotle, that 'science has to do with
what is universal and eternal'The only clear thing here is that Vico
obviously thinks that it is these propositions which will enable him to claim
that he is presenting a "science".
The first four of these elements form a group in that they deal with
what Vico presents as a set of inter-related ideas. The thesis they present
can therefore only be seen after a preliminary survey of the whole four.
Element V states that "To be useful to the human race, philosophy must
raise and direct weak and fallen man, not rend his nature or abandon him in
2
his corruption". On the face of it, this looks to be little more than a pious
injunction, more appropriate to a moral homily than a philosophy of history.
Some light, however, is thrown on it by the claims made in an explicatory
paragraph which succeeds it. In this, Vico begins by asserting that this axiom
"dismisses" both the theories of the itoics and the Epicureans, because "both
deny providence". But, "on the otter hand", it "admits to our school the
p iitical philosophers, and first of all the Platonists, who agree with all
the lawgivers on these three points: that there is divine providence, that
Vs. 163. Vs. 129.
human passions should be moderated and made into human virtues and that the
human soul is immortal.. Thus from this axiom are derived the three principles
of our Science", If we here ignore the final reference to "the three principles
2
of our Science", which will be discussed elsewhere, it would seem that Vico
is claiming that it should be one of the functions of philosophy to introduce
the notion of progress, though in what capacity is unstated. This I take to
be the meaning of the assertion that "philosophy must raise and direct weak
and fallen man". Furthermore, he approves of the Platonic notion of divine
providence by which this is allegedly done.
Slemsnt VI continues with a discussion of the function of philosophy
but this time, and without any indications to that effect, in a more critical
spirit. It is now stated that "Philosophy considers man as he should be and
so can be of service to but very few, who wish to live in the Republic of
Plato, not to fall back into the dregs of Romulus",
No explication at all is added to this proposition. At first sight it
appears a contradiction that in . element V Vico approves of certain philosophers,
including the Platonists and yet here he seems to disapprove of, or at least
attribute limited value to, Plato and his notion of an ideal state. The
contradiction is removed, however, if we put weight upon the notion that the
laudatory view of philosophy in the fifth proposition is a view of what
3
philosophy "must do, if it is "to be Useful to the human raca""j whereas the
critical remarks of element VI centre on a view as to what philosophy has tended
to do rather than what it ought to do.
The critical view, that philosophy has tended not to be very useful, to
■*11.S. 130, %ee Chapter XII below. 3N,3. 129,
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"be of use to but very few", is >-»xt contrasted with a view of the function
of legislation presented in dlefaent VII. This states that "legislation considers
man as he is in order t.> turn ham to good uses in humnn society. Out of
ferocity, avarice and : isbition, the three vices which run through the human
race, it creates the military, narch&nt sad. governing classes, :,n.: thus the
strength, riches and wisdom of comr.onwealths. Out of these three great vices,
>...ich could certainly destroy all mankind on toe face of ti» earth, it makes
civil happiness",*
In a corollary t this vico adds: "This axiom proves that there is
divine providence and further tnat tiare is a divine legislative* aind. For
out of the passions of men, each bent on his own private advantage, for the
sake of wide., they would live like ;dld boasts in the wilderness, it hes made
p
the civil orders by which they may live in human society."
In these passages we era introduced to the notion of legislation. Vico
conceives it as a sort of. force or pressure necessary for the creation and
support of the distinct social classes, "the civil orders" by vhich men maw-
live in human society.
In effect Vico is sup gosting that the existence of t.de latter is not to
be axpi. ined by the activities of individual man as such. He describes
individual man, the raw material, so to apeak, n which legislation has to work,
as being composed of "ferocity, avarice and ambition" and he emphasises the
anti-social nature of these viccc by his assertion that they "could certainly
destroy all mankind on the face of the earth ..."
Far from doing this, however, under the influence of legislation they
become the basis of the three useful and respectable civil orders, the military,
merchant and governing classes, vico is so struck by the outcome of this
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latter failed by half in not talcing care to give their authority the sanction
of truth by appeal to the reasonings of the philosofilers. If they had both
done this they would have been more useful to their commonwealths and they
would have anticipated us in conceiving tliis ocience".^ By implication, we
can see from this that what is going to justify the claim of "The New Science"
to be a science is that it, in doing what both philosophers and philologians
have failed to do, "will confirm ...... (its) reasonings by appeal to the
authority of the philologians, and ..... give authority the sanction of truth,
by appeal to the reasonings of the philosophers'',
In order to discover in 'what the rapprochement of philosophy and histoiy
consists we must first ascertain how /ico conceives the nature of each discipline
in its independent and pre-Vichian state. It is not difficult to come to some
general conclusions about the nature of philosophy because v ico1s remarks about
thi3 are couched in a traditional terminology. Thus he has told us that
2
"Philosophy contemplates reason, whence comes knowledge of the true ..."
This remark is to be taken as a description of /hat philosophers have hitherto
taken themselves to be doing, oince /ico would almost certainly have Plato
or Descartes in mind, we may take the axiom to mean that philosophy has been
concerned with knowledge of necessary truths by means of a purely conceptual
enquiry, that is, "by contemplating reason".
^n the other hand, '/ico's account of the work of the philologian, or
historian, is rendered obscure by his undefined use of his own terminology.
"Philology", he tells us, "observes that of which human choice is author, whence
comes consciousness of the certain". This cannot be interpreted until we under¬
stand the meanings of "consciousness" and "certain".
..e have already seen that there may be some grounds for taking "consciousness"
h.s. 140. 2N.3. 133.
A"!
to be a cognitive 3tate similar to, but on a lower apistemological level than,
knowledge. v»e have also seen that l!the certain" can be taken to be the object
of consciousness in the same sense as "the true" is the object of knowledge.
Now, in the Platonic and Cartesian models which, I have suggested, Vico
may have in mind here, the objects of knowledge, the true, consist in necessary
or eternal truths. Plato, with whom, as we have seen, Vico is to a certain
degree in sympathy, also contrasted belief in contingent fact with knowledge of
necessary truths, claiming that knowledge relates to the real as belief relates
to the phenomenal.
we can straightaway see that Vico i3 following Plato's descriptive model
in his account of the nature of philology or history to the extent that, where
Plato refused to accord the same epistemological status to the state of mind of
philosopher and non-philosopher, Vico likewise refuses to accord the same epis¬
temological status to the state of mind of philosopher and historian. Thus they
are^distinguished as "knowledge" and "consciousness" in Element X.
The similarity, however, goes further than this. Plato argues"*" that the
state of mind of the non-philosopher should be thought of as being that with
which those who could not reach philosophy must make do. Vico has suggested
that when men cannot reach truth they "try to reach the certain ..... so that
...... their wills at least may rest on consciousness". Here it is clearly
implied that consciousness is a second best to which men turn when knowledge
is unobtainable. In view of this, we are, I think, justified in taking the
notion of consciousness to be in some respects similar to the notion of belief
in Plato,
Following this line of thought, we might look for the meaning of "the
certain", the objects of consciousness, as being similar to Plato's objects
1"The Republic" Book V.
US
of belief. The latter were, of course, particular and contingent things. There
is some evidence in "The New Science" that by "the certain" Vico means "the
X
particular", a reading which would support the above identification. But
perhaps the best evidence that this is what Vico intends is to be found in the
statement of the second part of Element X that "philology observes that of which
human choice is author, whence comes consciousness of the certain". The suggestion
here is that "the certain", the objects of "consciousness", are those things which,
in some unspecified sense, are created by human choice. Clearly, if these things
are created by human choice, that is, freely created by human beings, they are
not necessary but contingent, not universal but particular.
It thus seems that, if "we take "the certain" to be particular, contingent
things, we have a sense in which the objects of knowledge and consciousness
(belief) differ in ways appropriate to their different epistemological statuses
and in terms of which the distinctions Vico is trying to draw between the nature
of the work of the philosopher, as hitherto conceived, and the historian are
intelligible, when the obscure terminology is penetrated he appears to be
saying little more than that the philosopher is, or has been, concerned to
produce knowledge of necessary, universal truths through conceptual means, and
the historian to produce belief about particular and contingent fact.
It is time now to turn to the rapprochement of philosophy and history
which, in the second corollary of Element X, Vico implies 'will be achieved in
"The New Science11. The effect of this rapprochement will be "to confirm" the
reasonings of philosophers by appeal to the authority of the historians, while
giving the latter "the sanction of truth by appeal to the reasoning of the
\)f. w.J. 321, in which Vico translates the Latin "certum" as "particu¬
larised" and points to a contrasting sense of "certum" and "commune".
u*
philosophers". Here we have rrived at the hey sense in which :'The low
science" can be called ■ philosophy of nlstoiy. in the light of the above
elucidation of ..eanin,. 3 it can be seen that what /ico is proposing is a system
of thought in which philosophical truths and particular historical facts
can be brought.into such a relationship that we shall be able to claim know¬
ledge of historical f* ct rather than .ere belief. )n tdie face of it this
would seam an impossible undertaking for if whet is created by human choice
is always particular it can never be tm object of knowledge, hence there
can be no new science. To see how 4/ico deals with this difficulty we require
further insight into trie nature of the obscure but highly important relation¬
ship between philosophical truth *nd historical fact. For this we turn to
the next elements.
Cii)
F,r a clue to the mturo of these elements -we must remember what Vice's
task now involves. Jn the one hand ho wants to produce a "science"
and he identifies the subject natter of history with that created by human
choice, clearly some kind of numan activity. In effect he has to show the
possibility of a science in respect of som part of human activities and
affairs. n the other hand, science has to do with what is universal and
eternal The conjunction of these propositions means that Vico is comvitted
to finding, in trie subject matter of human affairs, that wid.cn is universal and
ebem.-j.. These next elements must be read in the light of such an enquiry.
die ent ki states: "Human choice, by its nature most uncertain, is
made certain -and determined by the common sense of men with respect to human
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needs or utilities, which are the two origins of the natural law of nations"."*'
Her® there is a contrast between two conditions of human choice. In one
it is "uncertain" and this connects with the very "nature" of human choice.
In the otter, when it is conditioned by "the common 3ense of men with respect
to human needs or utilities", it is "made certain and determined".
To understand this we must know what is this "common sense" to which
Vico refers. The next axiom offers a definition of this notion. "Common
sense", we are told, is "judgment without reflection, shared by an entire
w . •' :f
„ -
class, an entire people, an entire nation, or the whole human race".
The first point to be noted is that the common sense is "shared by an
entire class, an entire people, an entire nation or the whole human race".
We must pay particular attention to what is here omitted. Vico does not say
that it is held by an individual even though the classes or groups he refers
to are in one sense composed of individuals. Is this merely an oversight or
has Vico omitted mention of the individual on the grounds that an individual
qua individual cannot "share" a common sense judgment in the same way as the
groups mentioned?
We may disregard the suggestion that the omission represents an over¬
sight on Vico's part. If we took this view it would be difficult to see why
he should have worded his definition in this particular way. He might just
as well have said that a common sense judgment can be held by any individual
or aggregate of individuals, without giving examples of the sort of aggregate
he had in mite.
To understand his meaning we require first some idea of the sorts of
classes he talks of in "The New Science". We have already encountered some
"Sf.S. 141. 142.
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of thesa. In Klemant VII he referred to "the military, merchant and governing
classes". In Paragraph 1108 he spoke of the fathers, the families, the
clients, the nobles and the monarchs. These examples suggest that he is
thinking of social, economic and political classes.
Three things should be noted about such classes. First, they are not
essentially organised classes; they can be organised but they need not be.
For example, in Vico's account of the course of national history, a class such
as the clients may organise themselves to put pressure on the nobles but a
class such as the monarchs, say, do not organise themselves to resist pressure
from their subjects. Second, these classes are not essentially exclusive;
again some are and some are not. One cannot be both a client and a noble but
one can be both a monarch and a member of a family. Third, one's activities
as a member of such a class are not essentially self-conscious. By this I
mean that one need not act knowingly as a member of such a class in order to
act as a member. In Vico's account the pressure put upon the fathers by the
clients is not necessarily self-conscious in this sense.
All this suggests that to be a member of such a class is to have a
certain social, economic or political role,or, what is the same thing, to act
in a certain capacity. For to have such roles it is neither necessary to
be part of organised groups nor to be confined to one kind of role nor when
acting in a certain capacity is it necessary to know that one is doing so.
If this is the correct way to take these classes thai Vico's suggestion
is that a certain kind of choice made by persons sharing the same social role
is "determined" or explained by factors ("human needs or utilities") relevant
to the social context of the role itself, taking the latter in its total
historical and social situation, rather than by personal and individual fac-
tors. Since the relevant factors are the same for all persons of a particular
social kind in a particular historical and social setting then, if these factors
really "determine" the decision taken, the decision will be the same in all
cases for persons of the same kind. We must note that Vico is not saying that
decisions made by an individual qua individual are not to be explained by
individual factors} it is decisions taken in certain social capacities which
are not to be explained by them.
We require to know Why this should be so. To have a social role, in
Vico's account of history, renders one liable to have certain beliefs, interests,
needs and problems, to feel in a certain way the effects of certain social pres¬
sures and forces (e.g. as suggested in Element VII, that of legislation) and to
help exert other pressures and forces, in common with others sharing the same
roles and capacities. The fathers will have the common problem of unruly and
dissatisfied clients, the clients a common need for an extension of their civic
and legal rights to allow them to enjoy to the full the new possibilities
opening up for them. The only problems or needs on© would have to have in any
given capacity would be those which affected one through one's role taken in
its social setting and these would be problems in relation to other social roles,
exacerbated by the basically vicious nature of those occupying the roles. Thus
in view of human nature it is common to all clients to have the problem of
deciding what to do in fact of the tyrannous conduct of the fathers: and to all
the fathers to have toe problem of deciding -what to do in facfe of their rebellious
and ambitious clients. Given that the attendant problems of, and strains be¬
tween, different social roles are always toe same, which they will be if they
are conditioned by factors intrinsic to the relationships between the roles
involved, Vico is suggesting that those who occupy those roles always corns
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to the sans decisions about these problems. If this suggestion were accepted
it would follow that any history of the same classes in different nations would
show the saiie sequence of decisions and, as a result, the sequence of changing
social relationships would exhibit the same pattern.
we can think of Vico's suggestion in the following way. Individual man
is basically vicious and dissatisfied. This dissatisfaction leads him to put
pressure on others. He exerts this through his social role. s all men are
vicious conflicting social pressures are constantly being exerted, the outcome
of which is some sort of redefinition of social roles together with their
attendant legal and civic rights and disabilities. Here we explain why there
should be any social movement and change at all by reference to man's vicious
nature, but the character of the outcome of that movement is explained by
factors pertaining to the structure of the over-all social context. By virtue
of their common sense men dictate what this outcome should be.
Vico talks of the common sense as a sort of judgment, "judgment without
reflection", iy suggestion so far is that the nature of such judgnients is
dictated ("determined") by factors related to one's social, economic or poli¬
tical position, and they result in a redefinition of the structure of the social
context in such a way as to alleviate some of the discontent involved, The
sort of redefinition Vico has in mind is revealed by his reference to "the
common sense of men with respect to human needs or utilities" as "the two
origins of the natural Law of nation". By this latter phrase Vico does not
mean to refer merely to enacted law,"*" but to the whole legal order or system,
including common law based upon customary procedures, i.e. including customary
"*oee the revised translation of "The lew Science" by Bergin and Fisch,
Introduction, p. xxxii, Cf. also Chapter VII below.
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rights, privileges and responsibilities. In effect he is thinking of the
structure of a way of life.
<\e must note also the determining factors, the "human needs or utilities".
I have suggested that these are the needs or utilities of people inherent in,
i.e. as conditioned by, their social position. It must not be thought that
these are sons sort of objective or impersonal needs which datemine people's
choice irrespective of their wishes and purposes, for the situation in which
they exist is none other than the world of human wishes, purposes and activities.
..hat Vico is insisting on is the importance of realising the effect of the over¬
all social structure upon the character of these wishes and purposes. The
"needs and utilities" of the situation are therefore what people see to be
needful or useful from the point of view of their social roles. This is really
the point of the obscure notion of a common sense. Vico is saying that social
structure and change in social structure are to be explained by what strikes
people as necessary or useful in the social situation in which they find them¬
selves; and the relevant and effective aims and purposes here are those which
one holds in common with others in the same situation. In effect, the course
of history, insofar as that is identified with the history of social, economic
and political structure, is determined by social, economic and political (Vico*s
useful generic term is "human") pressures exerted in the common pursuit of
certain purposes and aims for the fulfilment of certain "human" necessities
and utilities, moreover, as we shall see, the same factors which are relevant
to the explanation of a change in social structure are relevant to the explana¬
tion of the new structure. In other words we understand the new structure by
understanding the needs and utilities it satisfies.
It would be a mistake to take Vieo's remarks here on too narrow a basis,
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I.e. as relevant only to the changing relationships between different social,
economic and political classes. In Vice's sequence a common sense jud&rent
can be held by "an entire class, an entire people, an entire nation or the
whole human race".1 s suggested these are not exclusive divisions. At a
certain stage in history one xnay be a umber of a class, a nation and the
whole human race at once. It is clear that those common sense judgments one
then shares in one's national or one's human capacity will not be concerned
with the question how to regulate or modify social, political or economic
inter-relationships, fhey will be judgments about the national duty or what
is owing to people aua human beings irrespective of distinctions of class.
It is important to notice that these more general coke,on sense judgments,
or the kinds of activities in which they result, form a framework within
which the lass general operate. Thus, today, judgments about one's rights
as a human being provide a context without which we could not understand the
nature of judgments about social or economic redefinition.
An example of this occurs in connection with Vico's own account of the
accruing of monarchic powers to the heads of families in early societies.
According to this, early man's acutely developed powers of imagination and
poorly developed reason soon lead him to conceive of a realm of cruel gods who
control his destiny. Under these circumstances everyone will see, i.e. form
the common sense judgment, that the only thing to be dons is to placate these
gods with gifts and sacrifices and to try to read their wishes by the art of
divination. A science of divination and a class of priests will arise as
a result of the attempt to do this. At this period of history the basic social,
"Hfieo is hers using "human" in a more limited sense than teat just
mentioned, to refer to the characteristics of a people at their highest state
of development, i.e. in tee age of reason.
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economic and political unit is the family. Such an institution can only arise
when some men conceive that its acceptance will be pleasing to the gods. In
these circumstances it is natural for the fathers of these families to
gather to themselves the roles of sage (reader of the auspices), priest
(preparer of sacrifices) and lawgiver and thus to strengthen their social,
political and economic position, in this way clas3 inter-relationships are
strengthened and supported by common sense judgments of a much more general
nature. It is these circumstances which explain why in the later class struggles
between fathers and their dependents, the latter are necessarily in the
position of legal underdogs.
It is not yet clear in what sense common sense judgments are "without
reflection". There is no suggestion in "The New Science" that men tales
decisions without in sone way being aware that ther do so. So it is improbable
that Vico thinks of such judgments as merely instinctive. An alternative
suggestion is that when a decision is taken by virtue of one's common sense,
i.e. when it is made in a certain capacity, then the nature of the decision
or choice i3 not determined by, say, one's individual intelligence or the
level of one's reflections on the matter, but by factors (the "human needs
or utilities") which lie in the total social situation itself. This would
certainly explain why t/ico thought that, even in the case of the rudest and
most unthinking periods of human history, all men of certain types will, in
the saire kind of situation, hold the same beliefs and purposes and try to act
in the same way.
If this is correct Vico is introducing a deterministic element into
the explanation of human affairs. It is necessary to note the extent of the
proper application of this element. In the first place it does not apply to
SI
individual activities as such. It is not ..hat one individual will decide
to do that is determined, but the kind of thing. The exact arrangements
a monarch will make to strengthen his own position will vary in the case of
different monarch3 but the decisions of all monarcha will have the same general
character - they will try to render their subjects weak by debasing them.
Nor does the above apply necessarily to all the decisions of any
individual. Only those decisions which are in fact, even if unknowingly,
taken in a certain capacity are determined and then, of course, only in their
general outlines.
decision is determined by his social position that the activity of the
whole individual i3 determined. For example, Vico does not take himself to
be committed to the view that one's individual motives are deterrrdned by
one's role. This comes out in a striking passage in which Vico talks of
the relation between personal desires and the resultant activity?
"But men, because of their corrupted nature, are
under the tyranny of self-love, which compels them to
make private utility their chief guide. Seeking everything
useful for themselves and nothing for their companions,
they cannot bring their passions under control to direct
them towards justice, .-*e thereby establish the fact that
man in the bestial state desires only his own welfare;
having taken wife and begotten children he desires his
own welfare along with that of his family; having entered
upon civil life he desires his own welfare along with that
of his city; when his rule is extended over several peoples
he desires his own welfare along with that of the nation ....
In all these circumstances man desires principally his own
utility..,"1
Thls quotation makes it abundantly clear that one's desires are
inspired by self-interest, a variation of the theme that man is "weak and
h.S, 341.
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fallen", which has already been mentioned. one13 desires are therefore not
determined in the s&raa way as the ludgraents of common sense, i.e. by factors
pertaining to one's social position. But through one's various social
capacities, one's position as sorrier of the family, the city or the people,
one1s self-interest carries with it an identity of interest with others who
share tie same social standing. It is not the case that one is under some
external necessity to seek certain things, but, through one's various social
roles, one cones to have an Identity of interest with other equally self-
interested individuals.
If this is correct Vice's suggestion amounts to this. The reasons
why there should be change at all are to be found in the self-interested
nature of the individual, his "ferocity, avarice and ambition". Individual
activities, explicable by these factors, represent the efficient cause of
change. But, given that there is a movement for change, the effective aims
involved in this movement are datereined by factors such as needs, interests,
bonds, stresses and pressures which subsist in the over-all context and which
affect on® through one's various social roles. The notion of a comma sense
is brought in to explain how men should always choose to act in the same
way when faced with these factors.
It is important next to notice that Vice's suggestion of a common
sense thought of as a choosing faculty has no explanatory value. This is
because the onus of the explanation of any choice of social purpose or aim is
horn© by the above factors which affect one through one's social roles. In
other words, the fact that one had a purpose in common with others would be
fully explained by showing that on© hed interests in common with them, that
one faced the same social problems and was open to the same pressures and
stresses. If factors of this sort are accepted as being adequate to explain
s°i
one's own cnoice of action then they must also be adequate to explain a
similar choice exercised by somebody else in the same sort of situation,
nothing therefore is added by way of explanation by the introduction of a
common sense. For the latter amounts to little more than a faculty for
making the decisions one does in face of the problems one encounters in one's
various social capacities.
It is important also to notice a grave confusion which attaches to
Vice's account of providence in its immanent aspect as a result of this. The
first point to note here is th: t in these theoretical pronouncements Vico
fails to distinguish adequately between the purpose and the outcome of a
certain kind of social pressure. In Paragraph 1108 he made the point that
the outcome of men's individual purposes could not be thought of as the
realisation of those purposes. This is explained by the fact that man lives
necessarily in a social context; the outcome of activities initiated through
individual self-interest is therefore determined by the social context, an
important feature of which is the various social purposes and ends of men.
.hat Vico is eventually going to argue is that if we know the nature of all
these social features we caa predict their outcome. This is a plausible
contention which will bear soiie examination, what is relevant here, however,
i3 the notion that a knowledge of social purposes will be helpful in deter¬
mining the outcome of social activity.
But in laragraph 1108 Vico makes the mistake of assuming th-t whatever
the outcome of purposive social etivity this position must be the realisation
of some single purpose. Since there are often no social classes which aim at
the particular position which ensues he is then able to bring in providence
in its immanent aspect as the possessor of that single purpose of 'which thi3
6o
outcome could be taken to be the realisation. Vico thus makes the mistake
of thinking that because any redefinition of social relationships is at
least partly explained by reference to the pursuit of various social purposes
it follows that the redefinition itself is the realisation of a purpose.
fne emptiness of the notion of a co..w.on sense as a choosing, faculty
helps to explain how this mistake came about. Vico is keenly alive to the
need bo exclude any occult aspect from his account of social progress. He
insists strongly in barograph 1103 thr t providence works through "the particu¬
lar ends that men had proposed to themselves", making these "means" to its own
wider ends. These wider ends .re, of course, none other than the judgments of
the common sense. Apart from such judgments as are held by a class or
social group, Vico asserts, as we have seen, that they can also be held by
"an entire nation or the whole human race". Thus if wo thought that by
adducing the faculty of the common sense we could explain how various groups
came to have purposes in con...,on, it would be tempting to tliink of social
organisation and reorganisation at the widest level as the realisation of
purposes produced by the common 3ense of these widest of ail groups, we would
then see the total outcome of the redefinition of social relationships as the
realisation of a judgment of the common sense of ono entire nation or the
whole human race.
but if, as suggested, this whole notion of a common sense is empty and
superfluous then the notion of an immanent providence, insofar as it is iden¬
tified with it, is also empty and superfluous, it follows also that there
.-.ill be some ■ spect of the way in which Vico wants to explain the nature of
social relationships and social change which is superfluous. This is to be
found in his assumption that the outcome of purposive behaviour necessarily
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be itself thought of as the realisation of a single purpose. This is clearly
unacceptable.
To see th t Vico is guilty of the above confusions we nay turn first to
the following example in which the emptiness of the notion of a com on sense
is revealed by its very absence. Vico thinks that at the stage of history in
which aristocratic commonwealths invariably spring up certain social factors
are always present. He writes:
"For at the point whan the com. onwealths were to spring
forth, the matter was all prepared and ready to receive the
form, and there issued from them the format! of the common¬
wealths composed of mind and body. The prepared materials
were wen's own religions, their own languages, their own
nuptials, their own names (clans and houses) their own arms
and hence their own magistrates and finally their own
laws ".2
All the factors which are relevant here are social rather than individual
and there is no mention at all of the com .on sense, i.e. of any single purpose
directed at the production of a commonwealth. Vico is quite certain that
should the above social, economic and political factors be present the stage
of the aristocratic coiij onwealth will result. The com.on sense is not required
to explain the change, which we can understand without having to think of it
as the realisation of some single purpose. Such an explanation as would be
provided by the latter is therefore superfluous.
This contention can be supported also by the following reason, if
Vico's suggestion is empty then it must be the case that if the course of
a nation's history is determined in its general outlines one can show that
at any stage in its history there is only one direction in which it can
"S/ico refers to 'il formato' here. This has the meaning of form,
shape or nature or, as I have been referring to it, structure.
2'l.w. 630.
proceed and that direction is necessitated by factors other than the possession
of a common sense. That Vico himself believed this will become apparent
later when it will be shown that from a knowledge of such factors he tried
to deduce the course of a nation's history."*"
1 conclude that the notion of a common sense as a sort of faculty is
empty and its introduction based upon a mistake. Through It vico tried to
provide a mechanism which would explain why, when the determining conditions
were the seme, the sequence of decisions taken in the history of different
nations would be the same. But if the conditions alluded to are really
sufficient to determine the sequence of decisions there is no need for such
a mechanism. Its work has already been done by the conditions themselves.
once this confusion has been removed we are in a position to see that
when Vico calks of a common sense this is a 'way of referring to those social
purposes which it is necessary to bring in to help explain social pressures
and forces. .hen he says that a common sense is shared by a class or a
nation this is a way of saying that people sharing a social or national
capacity will have some identity of interests, problems and, in general,
outlook. In saying that their choice is determined by "human needs or utili¬
ties" he is saying that their purposes and aims are determined by what they
take to be necessary or useful in their various capacities, similarly when
he talks of that aspect of providence in ibs immanent sense which is closely
related to the common sense we may take him to be talking in the above ways,
what we must reject, however, is the suggestion that any utcome of the
interplay of the various social factors must necessarily be thought of as
1
dee Chapter XVII below.
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the realisation of so ; one purpose held either by one of the pressure groups
themselves or, in lieu of these, by divine providence.
(iii)
.e may now consider .lament will, which must be read in the light of
Vico' 3 attempt to find in the subject matter of human affairs that which is
"universal and eternal". The axiom states: "Uniform ideas originating among
entire peoples unknown to each other must have common ground of truth"/
Vico then claims that "This axiom is a great principle which establishes
the common sense of the human race as the criterion taught to the nations
by divine providence to define what is certain in the natural law of nations.
And the nations reach this certainty by understanding the underlying unity
which, despite variations of detail, obtains among the;; all in respect of
this law. Thence issues the mental dictionary for assigning origins to all
the diverse articulated languages. By means of this dictionary is conceived
the ideal eternal history which determines the histories in time of all the
2
nations "
To clarify the axiom itself we might begin by as icing what are the
•ideas' to which it refers. From the corollary, in which the common sense
of the hum n race i3 referred to as a criterion, and from what e have just
discovered concerning the nature of common sense wo con begin by assuring
that the ideas referred to are none otiier than these judgments. In this case
what the axiom asserts is that where we can find "uniform" judgments of the
common sense, i.e. the sa..e or sirid lar kinds of social needs and aims origina-
^71.3. 144.
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d.J. 145, I have modified the translation of Bergin and risch here,
translating "intendere" as "to understand" in place of their "to recognise"
and 'i'unita" as "unity" in place of their "agreements", fhe latter seems
to me particularly misleading.
ting among different peoples independently of one another, we are entitled
to assume they have a "common ground of truth".
.<e have seen from certain identifications and equivalences made by
Vico that by "truth" he means "universal and eternal" truths. In now claiming
that where we can find identical judgments originating independently among
different peoples we are entitled to assume a "common ground of truth" he
can tiiere fore only mean that we are entitled to assume that we have discovered
"tire universal and eternal".
Put thus ~ rifacie the -.oat plausible interpretation of the axiom would
be that it represents the application to the subject matter of the kinds of
human activity, and specifically to that of a kind of human ideas, of one of
the ain presuppositions of the physical sciences. For a presupposition of
the latter is that where invariable correlations can be discovered between
the behaviour of phenomena under a wide enough variety of conditions we are
entitled to assert that what we riave discovered are universal and necessary
laws concerning the nature of the phenomena in question. In a somewhat
similar way Vico1 s axio may be read as the claim that where we can find an
underlying pattern of agreement or similarity in the conditions under which
the different kinds of social needs and aims arise and determine the different
kinds of social activity and institutions we are entitled to assert that what
we have discovered is nothing other than a system of universal and necessary
laws concerning the nature of the subject ratter in question.
This is a very broad reading of the axiom. It suggests that Vico
thinks we can discern an actual pattern to the kinds of human activities
and thinking where tire axiom itself talks merely of finding "uniform" ideas,
it suggests also that we can discover the laws of this pattern where the
axiom balks only of their having "a comwon ground of truth". let it is
a plausible reading and fits in well with at least one possible reading of
the claims and axioms which follow.
This can be s..own by a brief consideration of the paragraph which
succeeds the axiom."*" In this the following distinct claims are made:
(i) The axio;. establishes common sense as "the criterion" by which
may be defined "what is certain" in the natural law of nations.
(ii) This "certainty" is reached by understanding the "underlying unity"
which obtains between nations in respect of their natural lav/,
(iii) From this understanding of the "underlying unity" we can derive
a "mental dictionary" for assigning origins to all the various languages,
(iv) By means of this dictionary we arrive at "the ideal eternal
history which determines the histories in time of all the nations".
These claims can be read in a way which supports, and is supported by,
the interpretation of die/rent XIII under consideration. In the latter the
axiom is taken to state the philosophical rule whereby we are entitled to
assert a universal and necessary status for statements of invariable cor¬
relations between kinds of facts, i.e. in Vico's terminology, by which we
may convert "the certain" (particular fact) into the truth (that which is
universal and eternal). To do this v/e require to know which are the kinds
of facts in question. The first of the above claims can be taken to assert
that these are the judgments of the cami;on sense, i.e. the social needs and
alas of the human race.
The second claim asserts that this subject matter is readied when we
understand "the underlying unity" which obtains between the natural law of the
different nations. This can be taken to state that the method is that of
comparative analysis applied, of course, to these judgments, in effect this
is one of the methods by which the scientist tries to discover physical laws,
applied to a different subject matter.
In the third claim it is asserted that we shall by this means discover
a "mental dictionary" and, in the fourth, that from this we shall reach the
"ideal eternal history which determines the history in time of all nations".
The notion of a "mental dictionary" may here be obscure but in asserting that
from it we shall reach the "ideal eternal history" Vico is making a claim that
can be understood in the light of the interpretation of He ent Xlll under
consideration. For the "ideal eternal history" which is reached will be none
other than the system of laws, universal and necessary, which we may derive
from our comparative study of common sense as it appears in the histories of
various nations.
Yet although Vico's language lend3 itself to such an interpretation I
think this is an incorrect way to interpret him. i*y principal reason for
taking this view is that the suggested method is not carried out in practice
by Vico when he co.es to give an account of the history of the various nations.
The essence of the above interpretation lies in the suggestion that a
pattern of laws, the "ideal eternal history" can be abstracted from history,
by a comparative analysis of the various histories, in which we try to find
what is common to them, ^n this view the establishment of the "ideal eternal
history" must be thought of as a second-order activity, subsequent to and
dependent upon the writing of acceptable history.
I shall show later that this is not how to take the notion of an
"ideal eternal histoiy", as revealed by Vico's practice. In the latter it has
the character of a deductive model which underlies the writing of acceptable
history. On this view we reach the laws of human histoiy when we discover a
deductive model which underlies acceptable histories of all nations, i.e.
when we can find a model in relation to which the histories of all nations
may be looked upon as instances.
These two theories are t us from one point of view incompatible. In the
first the construction of an "ideal eternal history" is a second-order activity,
subsequent to the construction of actual histories. In the second the construc¬
tion of an "ideal eternal iiistory" is a condition of writing acceptable history
and so is part of a first-order activity.
It is of fundamental importance to an understanding of "The New Science"
that we should be able to decide between these possibilities. The question
how one is to arrive at the "ideal eternal histoiy" will have repercussions
first upon its relation to empirical fact and thence upon the logical status
to be accorded it, one's interpretation of the whole of "The lew Science" and
one's assessment of Vico as a. thinker cannot fail to be affected by these issues.
In considering what one should conclude here, I shall assume what I shall
later establish, i.e. that, as mentioned above, Vico's practice conforms to
the second type of account. '" In this case, three possibilities present them¬
selves. ..e may hold first that the first type of account, the abstraction
account, represents the correct way to take element fill and its corollaries.
In this case we must conclude that Vico had an incorrect theoretical grasp
of his actual practice. Second, we may bold that the abstraction account,
which prima facie seams most plausible, is an incorrect presentation of Vico's
"Shis is established in a discussion running through chapters ill to
CIV. The final position i3 summarised in Chapter fVlI.
meaning in Element XIII and its corollaries, and rests upon a misreading of
Vice's loose and largely undefined terminology. This interpretation would
be more flattering to Vico as a thinker, though not as an expositor, than the
former. To 3how that there is any possibility of this view being correct it
would be necessary to suggest an alternative reading of the passages whose
interpretation has lent prima facie support to tine abstraction theory and
show that these can support the deductive theory. Third, we may hold that
the truth lies somewhere between the two, which is ay own conclusion. To
establish at just which point between the two the truth lies requires taking
into account much more of "The Hew science" than has so far come under
1
consideration. But to show that such a view is even possibly correct it
would be necessary to go part of the way towards establishing the second
possibility, i.e. it would be necessary to suggest a reading ol Element
IIII and its corollaries which is to some extent consistent with the deductive
account.
The following suggestion would have this character. The abstraction
theory is rendered plausible by two features. The first is that Vico has
so far made no mention of a deductive model underlying the interpretation of
acceptable history. If we accept that he does believe that there is such a
relation beWeen model and history and that he believes further that the same
2
modal underlies our understanding of all histories there would be no need
for the use of the abstraction method to derive the pattern underlying these
histories. Vico talks of "understanding the underlying unity" which obtains
between the different histories. In the abstraction account I suggested this
x3ee Chapter XVIII below.
^This position is established in Chapter XVIII.
could mean some tiling like "deriving by comparative analysis". It could equally
well mean "understanding the different histories as instances of the same model",
which would be consistent with the deductive account.
Second, the abstraction theory takes Vico's account whereby we first
"reach ..... certainty" by understanding tho underlying unity, from which
issues "the mental dictionary" and then the "ideal eternal history", to
involve successive steps of the same kind, i.e. it tak®3 Vico's suggestion to be
that first we abstract what is common to the judgments of the common sense,
then we derive a "mental dictionary for assigning origins to all the various
languages" and from this we derive the "ideal eternal history", i.e. the laws
of historical., social progress. But this only seems plausible if one assumes,
as one obviously ought not, that Vico is engaged in the same sort of procedure
as a contemporary social scientist might be, i.e. that he is looking for
statistical correlations derived from history without being too .much concerned
with questions about the acceptability of the history from which such correla¬
tions are to be derived.
If we repair Vico's omission here by introducing the notion of a deductive
model as a basis for the interpretation of historical evidence the passage allows
of a different reading. The deductive model will try to establish a sequence
of common sense judgments as the basis for the interpretation of any history.
Element will itself can be taken to claim that where this sequence can be con¬
firmed to arise in the case of all histories we are entitled to claim that it
embodies the laws to which those histories conform. The steps mentioned in
the corollary may be taken as an expansion of this account. In effect they
can be read as follows:
(i) »<e know that it is the common sense which determines ("defines")
the natural law of nations.
lo
(ii) (Practically a repetition of the element itself.) ,<e are entitled
to claim that we have found the law of the sequence of social aims and needs
when vie find a sequence which is instantiated in all histories.
(iii) <«e have found this when we find that sequence which provides a
"mental dictionary'1 suitable to understanding the history of all languages.
(iv) Because it provides a key for the understanding of the history of
all languages we can confer the status of historical laws upon the original
model.
This account suggests that Vlco is thinking of the pattern of history,
the "ideal eternal history" rather as a sort of Platonic essence which governs
the history of each nation. e discover the essence via en we find the pattern
by which we can make sense of the history of each nation and of the historical
evidence relating; to that history.
Such an account is at least consistent with the passages under consideration.
One could hardly 3ay it was established by them but Pico's terminology is so
opaque that no account could legitimately claim to be established by them.
The deductive account is, however, supported by a further factor, iico
talks of "Hie New Science" as involving a rapprochraent between oie work of the
historian and that of the philosopher. He implies that the philosophers will
give "certainty to their reasonings by appeal to the authority of the philo-
logians" and the latter will give "their authority the sanction of truth by
1
appeal to the reasoning of the philosophers".
It is now pertinent to ask: -what would be the nature of this rapprochement
on the two views under consideration? .hat, for example, could the philosopher
be doing on the abstraction account? Truth here would be a set of laws induc-
N.3, 140.
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tively established. The philosopher might therefore be thought of as a social
scientist. But what are "the reasonings" to which he would thus be giving
"certainty"? There appears to be no place for them.
Second, as we have mentioned, the work of the philosopher, taken now
as social scientist, seems to presuppose that of the historian. How then can
that of the former give "the sanction of truth" to that of the latter? it
is difficult to see any answer to these questions on this view.
The deductive account can ansv/er these questions, The function of
"the reasonings" of the philosopher is to provide a deductive model, which
underlies the writing of history. This is "given certainty", i.e. given
particularity, by appeal to the authority of the philologiarts 5 in other
words, we find instances of the pattern in specific histories. These "confirm"
the pattern and thereby establish that it contains laws. Thus the philologlana
give their authority "the sanction of truth", i.e. show them to be instances
of historical laws.
In the deductive account one can thus find a function for the various
elements involved in the rapprochement of philosophy and philology, in which
the essence of "The New Science" is said to lie. One cannot do this in the case
of the abstraction or purely inductive account. This factor therefore lends
considerably more support to the former viaw than to the latter.
An important difference between the two accounts would be that from their
very nature one would expect something more like a unified pattern or system
of laws to result from the successful implementation of the deductive account
and laws rather more independent of one another from Hie abstraction account,
A better understanding of Vico's views in thi3 respect will be afforded by a
consideration of the last two general philosophical elements. These throw
light on how the subject matter of "The Hew Science" is to be construed if it
is to be susceptible of the proposed (problematic) treatment. Conversely
they also throw light on the nature of the treatment itself.
CHAPTER VI
The Nature of Human Institutions
Element XIV states that "the nature of things is nothing but their
coming into being at certain times and with certain modifications. Whenever
the time and modification Is thus and so, such and not otherwise are the
thing3 that come into being".1
Element IV continues: "The inseparable properties of things must be
due to the modification or mode with which they are born. By these properties
2
we may therefore tell that the nature or birth was thus and not otherwise".
Before attempting to discuss the nature of the philosophical points
enbodied in these elements, we must try to explicate their meaning, we nay
start by recalling that when Vico refers to "things" he is thinking of "human
things", that is, types of social activities and ways of behaving, in short,
human institutions in the broad sense. In Element XIV he is therefore asserting
that the nature of human institutions is identical with the time at which, and
the modification or mode with which, they arise. He introduces this intimate
connection by asserting first that whenever a certain time and modification or
mode obtains then and only than can s certain institution arise. Time and
modification are thus presented as the sufficient and necessary conditions for
human institutions.
Vs. 147. Vs. 143.
In Element IV, this intimate relation is re-emphasised. Here we are
told that if we know what properties or characteristics an institution has
we can tell under what conditions it came into being, for it3 "inseparable"
properties must be due to its modifications or modes. The effect of the two
elements taken together is thus to assert that given the nature of the insti¬
tution we can tell at what tine and with what modifications it arose, while
given the tins at which, and the modifications with which, it arose we can
bell its nature.
On the face of it Vico seems to be making the mistake of conflating a
logical with a genetic account. For it is clear that when he talks of "the
1 2
nature of things" he is referring to their "inseparable properties". This
is supported by the fact that, a3 we have seen, he is trying to give tin account
of their necessary and sufficient conditions, on the other hand, when he talks
of "the times" in which they are born he appears to be talking of dateable
states of affairs, and hence of contingent facts. But since there is no contra¬
diction in the supposition that a certain institution might have arisen at either
of two different dateable times, which on Vico's account ought to be impossible,
ha would seem to be conflating the two types of account.
To see that this is not what Vico is doing we must look more closely at
some of the key concepts involved, bearing in mind the context of these particular
elements - in particular that they have bean brought forward in close proximity
to a discussion of "the common sense of man".
he must begin by considering what Vico means by "the tin®3" and "the
modifications or modes", asking first what he intends by the latter. His .eaning
here is very obscure. The terms he uses are 'guise' in Element IIV and "modifi-
cazione o guisa" in Element IV. The Italian "guise* is unfortunately ambiguous,
XN.3. 147. 2N.O. 148.
having the meanings of 'fashion1 or 'guise' which are adopted respectively
in the two editions of the translation by Bergin and Fisch, or 'mode' or
•method', on the other hand, in element aV we are given 'guisa' and
'fflodificazione' as alternatives in such a way that they might be intended
as synonyms, it is therefore necessary to seek one of the meanings of 'guisa'
which might plausibly be looked upon as a synonym for 'modificazione'.
Here we are helped if we recall that one of our purposes in investi¬
gating these axioms w s to discover what 30rt of thing Vico was thinking of
when, in hi3 basic epistemological principle, he referred to "the modifications
V
of our own human mind". if we may conjecture that these are the same as the
"modifications" referred to in the fifteenth element then we may take the latter
term to be short for "modifications of our own human mind". What we therefore
require is a rendering of 'guisa' in which the latter might plausibly be sub¬
stituted for 'modifications* in the above phrase. Here the word 'mode' seems
most appropriate in that philosophical sense in which it has traditionally
been related to the notion of 'substance', in vhich sense the distinctions have
[3®®? 9
often been related to the notion of the xnind and its various qualities.
Too much must not be put upon this line of argument. It provides us
with no wore than a clue with which to look for Vico's meaning, for the notion
of a 'mode' or 'modification' is far from unambiguous. At the same time it
does justify us in looking for these modes or modifications among the sorts of
ways in which the human mind works.
In this case the obvious place in which to look for these modifications
^Ti.S. 331.
2Cf. Descartes' "Principles of Philosophy", principles II and XXXII.
is in the judgments of the comsion sense of nen, with which Vico has just
been dealing. As we have seen, the common sense of men determines men's
choice by seeing certain things to be either necessary or useful,"'" i.e.
social aims and purposes are determined by sen's conception of what is
socially necessary or useful. The "certain modes", or modifications, may
therefore be taken to be certain ways of thinking, the needs, utilities,
purposes and aims which explain why certain institutions have been created.
Adopting this preliminary reading we might put Vico's suggestion thus.
The nature of human institutions is to be found in their rationale, that is,
in those needs and utilities the satisfaction and securing of which is aimed
at in their adoption. Their nature, in other words, cannot be explicated or
understood, except in terms of the specific human and social context in which
they arose and those human and social needs they were thought to fulfill.
This may still seem rather tenuous and unconvincing, .hat, after all,
is one to make of the notion of "the time" of their arising? This surely
implies a dateable event and, as suggested above, it is only a contingent
matter that an event should occur on one day rather than another. How can
such a contingent factor be brought into an account of the "inseparable",
and therefore necessary, features of an institution?
These difficulties vanish if one reapplies oneself to the c mtext of
Vico's remarks. He is talking of institutions in the broadest possible sense,
that is, not merely as formal organisations for the achievement of certain
specific ends (as in the case of a political institution such as a monarchy)
but also as accepted habits of social behaviour and accepted modes of social
relationship; and he is making it a necessary feature of these that they rest
h.s. 141.
upon widely held beliefs that what they achieve ought to be achieved, Now it
makes no 3ense to try to put a specific date on the arising of such beliefs.
They are rather beliefs which tend to arise over a certain length of time. In
this sense they are best thought of as dispositions. Therefore when Vico talks
of "the times" in which institutions arise, he is not thinking so much of a
specific, dateable event as of a period of tin® over which developed the notion
of the desirability of such an institution.
For an example to corroborate this we have not far to look. In Element
XIX Vico briefly set3 forth his account of the laws of The Twelve Tables,
It reads; "If the laws of the Twelve Tables were customs of the peoples of
Latiura, originating in the age of Saturn, remaining unwritten elsewhere (in
Latium) but set down by the Romans in bronze and guarded with religious care
by Roman jurisprudence, then this oaw i3 a great witness of the ancient natural
law of the nations of Latium".'*" Here it is quite clear that one sort of
institution with which Vico is concerned is a customary code of conduct. He
is not concerned about dating it so much as with locating it in an era ("ths
age of Saturn") in which it arose. It Is in any case obvious that a custom is,
by definition, a mode of conduct whose adoption comes about gradually, not
something whose adoption can ever be the result of a single dateable event. In
fact, here and elsewhere Vico plays down the importance of the writing down of
the Laws of the Twelve Tables, which would be such a dateable event, and treats
the latter as important only in the sense that through this writing down
present historians are in possession of a source by which they can recover what




But even the sense of "times" as periods of tine, though a part of
what Vico means, does not give us his full sense* The first part of Slement
XIV stated that "the nature of things is nothing but their coming into being
at certain times and with certain modes". <.e have argued that part of the
sense of this is that the nature of an institution is necessarily related
to its rationale. <,e cannot therefore avoid the conclusion that its nature
is also necessarily related to the times in which it arose, .»e must now ask
ourselves: why should it be the case that an institution which cannot be
understood without reference to its rationale also cannot be understood with¬
out reference to its "times"? hut this way we can see that one possible answer
would be to claim that "times" and rationale are themselves necessarily con¬
nected, Xhi3 provides the clue needed and introduces one of Vico's greatest
insights - the sense of the importance of what Sir Isaiah Berlin has called
"historical perspective".
m have already seen that it is with the lack of this that Vico re¬
proaches other historians and philosophers when he nominates the two conceits
as unacceptable features of their work.'*' For, at least in the case of the
conceit of scholars, their mistake has been to attribute to former peoples
beliefs and conceptions which it was impossible for them to have understood.
Hie presupposition of this kind of charge, which occurs very frequently in
"The New Science", is that at certain times people are able to understand
and hold certain conceptions and beliefs and at others they are not.
If we accept Vico's claim here the consequence is that, in accusing
Vs. 123 and 125.
some historian of attributing to some people or nation a conception they
could not have had at the time, he is in effect asserting that they were not
at the stage of development necessary for 3uch a conception.And if one
were to enquire what sort of development was here i n question it would seem
that it would be that of the various idea3, concepts and conceptual schemes
necessary to, or involved in, the performance of certain kinds of activities,
rhus Vico's criticism implies that there is such a thing as the development
of ideas.
In elements XIV and XV Vico is connecting the properties of institutions
with their rationale and their rationale with their "times" by arguing that
certain properties can only exist at certain times and then must exist.
Clearly the sense of "times" appropriate to this claim is that which we have
just uncovered, in which "the time" of an institution refers to its place
in a necessary order of development. For only if we are willing to accept
that there is a necessary order attached to the development of ideas can we
rule out the possibility of certain conceptions and ideas arising at certain
stages of history or, conversely, argue that som must obtain at certain stages.
It is now possible to explicate more fully the claims embodied in the
two axioms here being considered. The first claim asserts that there is a
necessary connection between an institution and certain common sense judg¬
ments, i.e. certain social aims and purposes. Vico sees the relation between
the two as so intimate that he is willing to assert that the presence of either
necessitates that of the other. The effect of this is to break down any sug¬
gestion that we are dealing with two types of entity, common sense wisdom and
human institutions. What we are dealing with may rather be thought of as a
"4-1,3, 329 presents a convenient example of this.
complex situation in which we may distinguish, but not isolate, two facets.
It follows that the subject matter of history, i.e. human institutions,
cannot be fully described without reference not only to the sorts of things
people have done but also to the kinds of needs, purposes and, in general,
final ends which are a necessary part of different kinds of human activity.
Ordinarily one might tend to think of the historian as being concerned with
two distinct things, explanation and description, i.e. with giving an account
of what happened and why it happened. The effect of Vico's thesis is to
deny this and to allege that description and explanation go together in his¬
tory because the facts with which the historian deals are complex.
Vico's second claim asserts that certain ideas and therefore certain
institutions can arise only at certain "times", i.e. at certain stages in the
order of development of human ideas and institutions, and then must arise,
ouch a conception can only be maintained if we are willing to hold that there
is a necessary temporal order attached to the stages of development of the
different kinds of human activity, i.e. if we are willing to argue that the
earlier stages of such an order of development provide the necessary and suf¬
ficient conditions of the later. There is no doubt that Vico was fully aware
that this was what wa3 involved in his notion of a pattern.1 It is one of
the central conceptions behind his idea of "an ideal eternal history traversed
in time by the history of every nation in its rise, progress, maturity, decline
and fall".1
v.e take this second t lie sis to be equivalent to the assertion that insti¬
tutions are necessarily historical. The understanding of the nature of any
institution involves an understanding of those reasons why an institution of
1Cf. N.3. 343 and 349.
Si
that type could and must occur in one type of social context and at ono stage
of historical development and not in any other.
This conclusion has an important bearing upon the interpretation of
Element XIII and its corollaries. Vico is now saying that not only must we
look for the necessary and sufficient conditions of institutions in the over¬
all social context of human needs and aims but we must look upon these con¬
ditions as being themselves historically conditioned. Clearly an account of
all the relevant conditioning factors must be found in le"ideal eternal
history".
xt i3 difficult to see how this requirement could be assured in an
"ideal eternal history" derived in accordance with the abstraction account.
For the latter offers no guarantee that its lavs are not derived from unhis-
torical accounts, for example of the kind against which Vico is always pro¬
testing. It is therefore possible that,although correctly derived, they will
not include any account of those historical conditioning factors which are
necessary to the understanding of institutions."
No such difficulty need be encountered on the deductive account. Here
our very understanding of the histories which are to support our claim to have
discovered laws will be conditioned by the deductive model and the latter can
be constructed in accordance with the necessity to allow for the historical
nature of the conditioning factors.
These considerations do not suffice to establish that the correct way
to take ilement fill is in accordance vdth the deductive as against the abstraction
account. 'They do, however, show that Vico is still vitally concerned with the
2
question how history should be written ; and they suggest that it would be
^This point is expanded in Chapter X below,
^This confirms what was established in Chapter III above.
odd that such a concern should allow Vico to adopt a method of establishing
the laws of the development of human institutions in which, as in the attrac¬
tion account, no guarantee is offered that proper weight will be placed upon
the necessarily historical nature of the conditioning factors.
CHAPTER VII
The Idea of a i-ental Dictionary
The idea of a mental dictionary is introduced by Vico in the corollary to
.lament XIII, This is an important conception in Vico's science and it is
necessary to try to understand exactly how it functions.
According to the deductive account of s/ico's enterprise, which I am advocating,
the suggestions in the corollary to llement Till are to be taken in the following
way. There is a access ry connection between social needs and utilities and "the
natural law of nations", ..e can find the laws which govern the development of
these if ..e can find a sequence or pattern for both which is instantiated in all
national histories, ..e can know that such universal instantiation is achieved
when we find a pattern which provides a "mental dictionary" suitable for under¬
standing the history of all languages. Finally "by means of this dictionary .,,,
the ideal eternal iiistory is conceived which gives us the history in time of all
nations". In this account the ability of some deductive pattern to provide a
"mental dictionary" suitable to understanding all languages, and thence all actual
histories, is the criterion which establishes it as the "ideal eternal history",
Tiie first step in this sequence of thought is the suggestion that social
needs and utilities determine the natural law of nations. ;.e have already seen
that they determine the character of institutions. It is necessary to see how
these claims connect with each other.
In understanding the claim that these social factors deter, ine the natural
law of nations we must be careful not to Misinterpret the notion of the natural
law of nations. V'ico's views about this are expressed in the ;.ore specific
axioms CIV to CXiV. In the last of these axioms Vico discusses the term 'natural
law' in the sense in which he does not intend to use it. This is the sense in which
it has con used by the natural law theorists, in particular by Crotius, belden
and jpufendorf , to mean a syste m of legal rig; its based upon the notion of a
perfect e ;uity accessible throughout all history to all societies by means of
men's ability to use their reason.The substance of Vico's objection to this
conception is implicit in his remark that it would see;:; odd that this should
be so and yet it should take a consl. rabls tirre in a nation's history ( two
thousand years", by Vico's method of counting) before philosophers should appear
who .-Ajre capable of explicating the nature of these rational Laws. Clearly this
is another case of the conceit of scholars and of the wholly unhistorlcal view
against ..hich Vico is protesting.
The alternative sense, in hich Vico dbes intend bo use the phrase, is
partly expressed in clement CV. "The natural law" Vico claims, "is coeval witn
the customs of the nations, conforming one ith another in virtue of a common human
sense, without any reflection and without one nation following the example of
2
another". it is clear that the e is here a very close connection between custom
and natural law and it -right look as though natural law is just a particular
type of custom backed by sanctions. This is suggested by an earlier remark of
Vico's, in which he says: "In the first place, trie natural law of nations was
ordained by custom (which.... commands us by pleasure like.a king) and not by law
( hid.... commands us by force Like e tyrant). For it began in human customs
sprinting from the common nature of all nations (which is the proper subject of
our defence) and it preserves human society". Here the notion of sanctions
appears, these being pleasure and force, which might be looked upon as internal
h.S. 329. 2H.S. 311. 3ti.S. 309.
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and external sanctions, Vico seems to identify law with custom when the sanction
is internal, and when he is referring to early societies. He distinguishes them
in the case of later societies in which the sanction is external.
But the differences are le3S important than the similarities and lie only in
the nature of the sanctions. vJiere the sanction is the same Vico refuses to dis¬
tinguish them.
The important similarity lies in the fact that they are identically related
to the "common human sense". In other words they equally represent nodes of conduct
determined by social needs and utilities and social pressures which aim at securing
these. They differ in degree and not in kind.
Thus when Vico asserts in the corollary to iSlement XIII that the common sense
dictates or determines the natural law he intends the latter to be taken in a very
general sense as referring to the various kinds of human custom and activity taken
as a system, sometimes externally enforced and sometimes not. The important point
here is that they should be customs or modes of activity whose nature is sufficiently
explained by the general character of the social and historical context in which
they arise, I have taken these to be institutions, a notion which embraces both
customary and legally enforced kinds of activity. In the light of what Vico has
said it is dear that for him the natural law is the law which is natural to a
'
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particular type of society at a particular stage of development. Instead of being
a matter of eternal and unchanging truth, as it is in the hands of the natural
law theorists, it is a law which is constantly altering and developing, though
not in such a way as to preclude the possibility of finding the pattern of its
alteration.
The next step in Vico's argument is to suggest that whan we understand
the underlying unity in the natural law of all nations we can reach a "mental
dictionary for assigning origins to all the divers articulated languages", I
S6
shall consider this notion by looking at what Vico has to say about it in another
of the general elements (XXII) and in some of the more specific elements (LXIII to
LXV).
In Clement XIII Vico writes:
"There must in the nature of human things be a mental language
common to all nations, which uniformly grasps the substance of things
t feasible in human social life, and expresses it with as many diverse
modifications a3 these things have diverse aspects. A proof of this
is afforded by proverbs or maxims of vulgar wisdom, in which sub¬
stantially the same meanings find as many diverse expressions as there
are notions ancient and modern.
What Vico means by "a mental language" here is revealed by the example given
in the last sentence, in which he talks of "the same meanings" found in the diverse
expressions. The distinction is between the words or expressions of a language
and the meaning of those words or expressions. Vioo is asserting that though each
nation has its own system of words and expressions, its own verbal language, the ,
meanings contained in these different verbal languages are the same. In other
words, different nations have different verbal languages but identical conceptual
schemes.
The subject matter of this mental language is 3aid to be "the substance of
things feasible in human social life", a view which should not at this point be
surprising since, as we have seen, it is with "human needs or utilities"2 that
the common 3ense is concerned. In so far as there is a common sense it operates
only in respect of those "things possible in human social life".
Vico's language in this axiom .Ight lead us to think that this is intended
as some sort of a priori proposition; this at least might be inferred from his
suggestion that there "must" be such a mental language. But his presentation of
"a proof" and the nature of the proof shows that this is not so. For the latter
^.S. 161. 2N.3. 141.
is obtained by establishing th identity of meaning in the proverbs of different
nations. Empirical confirmation is thus the method of proof en the axiom
itself, that there "must .... be a . ental language common to all nations", is a
conclusion of an argument rather than an £ priori truth.
it can be seen that in presenting this somewhat Hystericus axiom Vico is
cbing no more than apply the rule embodied in element X.11I to the subject matter
cf the ..istory of hunan ourposes ana aims. ..hat he is saying .is if we c n
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establish a single pattern to the sequence of human needs, purposes, aims,
institutions and, ore generally, to the conceptual background of these as
confirmed by the histories of the different nations, we are entitled to claim
that we have discovered the laws of the development of such conceptual sahe.ne3.
Vico next advances, in the corollary of lie/cent iX.II, to the assertion that
"This common mental language is proper to our Science, by whose light linguistic
scholars will be enabled to construct a mental vocabulary common to all the
various articulate la^uages living and dead. This is a reference to that
"mental dictionary for assignin. origins to all the diverse articulated languages"
which was introduced in the corollary to flement will. .e must note the
suggestion that, by means of it, we cm assign "origins to all the divers
articulated languages". If us it is not only the case that ..e can discover
conceptual schemes common to oil nations but we can finu out how they rose.
To find out how Vieo conceives this possibility we must turn to these "ore
specific" axioms in which it is explained.
One of the principles of such an etymology is expressed in Element
Liiil. Here Vico writes:
-^.o. 162
"The human mind is naturally inclined by the senses to see itself
externally in the body, and only with great difficulty does it come to
attend to itself by .sans of reflection,
"This axiom gives us the universal principle of etymology in all
languages: -ords are c rried ovor from the bodies and from the properties
of bodies to -express the tilings of the mind and spirit. "3-
.hough the axiom itself my bo obscure, there is no doubt at all about
Vico's intention as regards the etymology of langua es. This will consist in
a genetic account in which a.connection will be traced between words which come
to have mental <md spiritual meanings and the same, or very similar, words
which earlier have ; physical meaning.
This is a very general principle and something much more specific is
repaired if it is to be of help for the task in hand. In particular, -what is
needed is some principle which will help to establish the order of development
of the ideas expressed in 'words. Vico gives this in his next two elements.
The main principle is stated in element LCiV: "The order of ideas .oust
follow the order of things." Again, we must re..e ber that by "things" Vico
means human institutions and types of sodial activity, though this alone is
cot enough to show us how to understand the axiom, we require to know also the
nature of the- relation between the order of ideas and the order of things.
Does Vico mean to express a genetic relationship between ideas =nd activities
such es, perhaps, would be contained in the suggestion that man at first are
creatures of exclusively practical interests, who later turn to thinking and
reasoning: ouch a suggestion light seem iausible in view of the fact that,
as we shall see, "Vico does give an account of history in which each historical
unit, the nation, goes through a series of sta es of develo meat in the course
of which there is a transition iron, an uw eflective and superstitious .-.ontaiity
XN.o. 236 and 237. 2h.o. 236.
to one capable of grasping the rationale of human activity.
However, that this is not what Vico means is shown by the fact that, as
we have seen, institutions ("things") are never without a rationale, that is,
they are always such that they can never be fully described without reference
to general social needs and aims. It follows that there is no stage at which
human activity can be described without recourse to the notion of its containing
an ineradicable element of "idea" in it. Therefore Vico cannot mean by this
principle to indicate a distinction between two phases of man's history, a
thinking and an unthinking phase.
His meaning can best be clarified if we remember that Vico is now trying
to arrive at the principles of etymology, through which what he wants to get at
is the history of the meanings of words, "the ideas" expressed in them. He
must therefore first of all outline the principles of those factors which
determine the meanings of word3. Thus what he is here asserting is that "the
ideas" which are later expressed in words arise first in the over-all context of
the various kinds of social activities, i.e. of human, social institutions.
Read thus, Vico is doing no more than reassert, in the context of his discussion
cf etymology, his conception of the nature of human social activity as being
essentially end-directed and purposive. The sort of idea with which such an
»•-.* ' ■%
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etymological dictionary would concern itself would be the sort of idea which
is a necessary feature of human social activity. Therefore its order of
development and the principles of its history are logically subsequent to
those principles which govern the order of development of the whole system of
human institutions. ,
Thi3 again is a very broad reading of the axiom. To confirm it we must
turn to Element LXV which follows it, paying particular attention to the example
given in its corollary.
The element itself asserts: "This was the order of human things: first
the forests, after that the huts, thence the villages, next the cities and
finally the academies."^ In the corollary Vico continues: "This axiom is a
great principle of etymology, for this sequence of human things sets the pattern
for the histories of words in the various native languages. Thus we observe
in the Latin language that almost the whole corpus of its words have sylvan or
rustic origins,. For example, "lex", First it must have meant "collection of
acorns". Thence we believe is derived "ilex", as it were "illex", "the oak"
(as certainly "aquilex" is the "collector of waters"); for the oak produces
the acorns by which the swine are drawn together. "Lex" was next "a collection
of vegetables", from which the latter were called "legumina% Later on, at
a time when vulgar letters had not yet been invented for writing down the laws,
"lex" by a necessity of civil nature must have meant "a collection of citizens"
or the public parliament, so that the presence of the people was the law that
solemnised the wills that were made "colatis comitiis", in the presence of the
assembled "comitia". Finally, collecting letters, and making as it were a
2
sheaf of them in each word, was called "legere", reading", >r(:-
Here Vico states first the sequence of "human things", in very general
descriptive terms. These are the stages of life in a rural setting, life in a
setting of considerable simplicity but with a domestic basis, life based on a
communal village organisation, life based upon a civic organisation and finally
life based upon a yet more refined type of civic organisation. The mode of
classification thus presents a temporal sequence of different systems of human
institutions, different ways of life, We must note particularly Vico's claim
that this sequence "sets the pattern for the histories of words" in the various
languages.
Vs. 239. Vs. 240.
In his example, Vico then goes on to give an account of the different
meanings which the word "lex" has had, each meaning being shown to be appropriate
to its usage in the context of a certain system of institutions or social
setting. Thus where men are living the way of life appropriate to a rural
setting, the meaning of the word is to be sought in the sort of activity in
which they would have to indulge. But where they have developed and live in
cities, its meaning will have been modified in order to be applicable in the
context of their new sorts of activities.
From this we see that the history of the meanings of words^ "follows",
i.e. is determined by, the wider context of, the history of society. We may
put Vico's point in a more general way by saying that words are used in the
context of human ideas, and ideas in the context of the sorts of things men do.
This must not be taken to suggest any distinction in principle between
languages and institutions. Language is itself an institution just as much as,
say, a certain form of landholding. But it arises in the context of the total
pattern of man's way of life and its history must therefore reflect its
relationship to this wider context.
Yet the point of Vico's remarks is not obvious. Nor does it become so
until we ask the question: how does this principle relate to the construction of
true history? rte must remember that the historian very often has nothing but
linguistic evidence to go on. •tfiat Vico is presenting is thus a philosophical
thesis about the nature and function of language and the context in wlJLeh it
operates wldch will enable the historian to know how to use the linguistic
evidence in his task of establishing the history of ideas and institutions.
ven now the difficulties of these passages are not finished. For what is
one to say of the sequence of different systems of institutions vhich Vico
adduces? Is this the product of some & priori intuition, knowledge of which
precedes historical interpretation? The dogmatic way in which Vico simply
asserts it might suggest so. fat there is another more plausible view and this
i3 the one already suggested, that it represents a sociological hypothesis
taken toy Vico to be confirmed by the historical investigations ha carries out
in "The New Science% most particularly by his etymological investigations thus
the sequence of different social systems is part of trie deductive asodel Vico
is proposing.
Shis may not seem to be supported by the first sentence of the corollary
to lament KtV. There Vico claims: "This axiom is a great principle of
etymology, for this sequence of human tilings sets the pattern for the histories of
words in the various native languages". One might read this remark as though
it suggested that the historian had first to know the pattern of the history
of institutions before he could discover the pattern of the history of words.
But one might also read it as a combination of two assertions. First, as
suggested above it claims that the pattern of human institutions provides the
context in which, language arises and functions. This is a philosophical
principle. The actual sequence of institutions it refers to, however, forms
part of a sociological hypothesis, to be "confirmed" by providing the principles
; ' Y v J ' '
for a correct etymology. On this interpretation construction of the pattern of
institutions would not require some sort of & priori intuition, .hat would
be required would be first of all philosophical insight into the relationship
between institutions and language, then the construction of a sociological
hypothesis stating a specific sequence of institutions and finally the ability
*73
to confirm this by the construction and testing of a correct etymology in
accordance with these theoretical insights,
we may again ask the question: how would we explain all this if we assumed
that the "ideal eternal history" was constructed on an indnetive basis? The
social scientist, or the historian upon whom in the first instance he would have
to rely for his material, often has nothing but linguistic evidence to go upon.
The accurate interpretation of the latter is impossible without principles
incorporating the social and historical factors which determine the development
of language. If the "ideal eternal history" is construed to be nothing more than
a pattern to be abstracted from the various histories then it 'would seem that
Vico is offering no solution to the problem, with which he is evidently very
concerned, of how to arrive at the principles which underlie the writing of
correct history, for he would be failing to suggest how we get at these principles.
The passages we have Just discussed make it quite clear that he is trying to
suggest (sociological) principles which underlie the writing of all history and
the interpretation of all historical evidence. They thus strengthen the suggestion
that the "ideal eternal history" which embodies these suggestions be thought of,
in the first instance at least, as a deductive model. If and when it is
confirmed we might think of it as containing established law#%
& + v' * s/*** ... * - . f- • • • 7
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Historical Evidence
The elements so far discussed are those "which will serve for considering
this world of nations in its eternal idea",1 The notion of an "ideal eternal
history" has been introduced and we have some idea how it is to be confirmed.
The notion of confirmation has, however, only been most generally touched upon
by Vico and in the concluding general elements he concerns himself with some
rather more direct remarks about the nature of the historical material relevant
to the instantiation of the proposed model in the various actual histories.
He does this in Elements XVI to XXll. which, he says, "will give us the found¬
ations of the certain" and "by whose use we shall be able to see in fact this
world of nations which we have studied in idea",1
The wording here is important, Vico does not say that thi3 next set
of general elements will give us the facts which we have so far studied in idea.
Nor could he possibly mean this for we have not so far studied a specific
pattern of history which could in any way be related to historical facts, what
we have been given is the idea of such a pattern, We must therefore expect the
latter to be related to a set of philosophical suggestions as to how this idea is
to be confirmed. This concluding set of general elements does not present us
with a confirmation of an "ideal eternal history" but with indications of how
to set about achieving such a confirmation i,e, how we are to set about showing
h.S. 163,
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the various histories to be instances of a pattern and what evidence is relevant
to this task.
Element XVI states: "Vulgar traditions must have public grounds of truth,
by virtue of which they came into being and were preserved by entire peoples
over long periods of time".1 In a corollary Vico adds: "it will be a great
labour of this Science to recover these grounds of truth - truth which, in
the passage of year3 and the changes in languages and customs, has come down to
2
enveloped in falsehood,"
Vico does not state here what sorts of traditions he ha3 in mind but
hi3 own. Inter use of tales about the Trojan War or about Romulus and Remus
shov that he is thinking of traditions held by a nation about its own past
history. The main claim he is making here is that what later becomes a
(partially false) tradition must initially have been founded on fact. That
this is how to take Ms claim can be confirmed by recalling Ilement I which is
3aid to explain the fact that "rumour grows in its course" but "is deflated by
2
the presence (of the thing itself)".
In effect the element presents a plea for the critical usage by historians
of national traditions. In their later forms these traditions cannot be
accepted; but if we know the principles by which they have been changed and
falsified (and it will be part of the work of the "ideal eternal history" to
provide these) we shall be able to trace the course of these changes and so
recover the original truths represented. Hence although a tradition may
■4.3. 149. 2N.o. 150. 4.3. 120 and 121.
perhaps only be committed to writing many centuries after the events it
purports to relate and although by then it may have ceased to relate the truth
of -what happened, nevertheless the tradition, in that form in which it is
finally accessible to the historian, can still be of historical value.
Element states that "the vulgar tongues should be the most weighty
witnesses concerning those ancient customs of the peoples that were in use at
the time the lan. uages were formed".^ The presupposition of this element is,
as has been mentioned, that language is one institution among others and so
shares their characteristic of being created to fulfil human necessities and
utilities, ,.e can therefore use it to confirm our account of those other
customs and institutions with which it is related for this purpose,
Vico's suggestion that language is a "witness" is important here, A
witness is not an authority but some parson or thing which is used to confirm
or refute an account - in this case the model given in the shape of the "ideal
eternal history".
For the historian language is especially important for it is one of the
few human activities of which, through writing, a permanent record has been
left. It is therefore of special value in the recovery of those other customs
and institutions in which the historian is interested, Vico is suggesting; that
it does t..is not merely by describing them, for then its value would be limited
to those comparatively few cases in which people have described in "writing the
social or political, scene j it helps also by revealing them incidentally for
in language is expressed those social ideas and conceptions which are a
Vs, 151,
necessary feature of the different kinds of human activity and institution.
Element XVill is similarly concerned with the use of the study of lan uage
in history. It states: "1 language of an ancient nation which has maintained
itself as the dominant tongue throughout its development should be a rest
witness to the customs of trie early days of the . orld,"^" Vico adds that this
axiom entitles us to use both the L- tin and the Gorman Languages to prove the
natural law of nations,
fhe suggestion that the G rman language will be of use in this as well as
the Latin language shows th?t Vico is not here adducing some new principle to
distinguish the use of classical languages from that of the "vulgar" languages
of which he has so far been speaking. He is still talking of "vulgar" language
in the sense of popular or spoken language,
..hot Vico is drawing attention to in this new element is the importance
of those languages which have remained in use throughout the development of a
nation i.e. in those cases where the natural development of the language has
2
not been affected by such external factors as conquest from abroad. In these
cases, and where the nation concerned was an ancient nation, we are in a position
to confirm accounts of early .orld history, The presupposition hero is exactly
that of the previous element.
The final elements in this section need not detain us. They state that
the "Laws of the T.elve Tables" must be used, in accordance with the above
3
r;Com.nend.?tions, as evidence for the customs of the peoples of Latium j and the
poems of Homer, which are "civil histories of ancient Greek customs", as
evidence for the customs and natural law of Greece.^1 The latter claim represents
h.s. 152.
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cf "Gommento Storico /ilia beconda ocienze Nuova" by F. Nicolini, Vol. 1
pp 77 & 78.
3N,S. 154. ^-1,3. 156.
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Vico's conclusion concerning the Homeric poems, reached by treating them, in
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accordance with the recommendation of GlaraentXVI, as vulgar traditions whose
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recovered because the sequence j£ these changes can itself be charted* re... .rev:- .' -:.rf
Those Wo elements are general not in the sense that they are necessary«iv tKJwcoD«uj
" hilt, onlv ih '.XitPCto any attempt whatsoever to confirm an "ideal eternal history" but only in
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the sense that they represent two important realms of evidence pertaining to
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Vico's own attempt to
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why the rate of succession of the different phases of the "ideal eternal history"
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was quieter, if meaaired in terms of years, in the case of the history of Greece
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than that of Rome. This again can be treated as a general element only in
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the sense that such a claim underlies wico's use of Greek and Roman historical . •i.V"'
, evidence in his attempt to confirm his account of the "iueal eternal history".
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y g.'. .f Vico*3 suggestions in this second set of general elements are of great i :
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importance in their bearing upon historical practice, for he is toiling historians■■/f
•hat they should do and, later, giving good examples of how they should do it.
C-'-t, : HAn instance of this was provided by his account of the word "lex" which we have
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Yet Uds is not the limit of his achievement. He is not only making
2 ♦- ^^-iUty.P^®^®g«already discussed. In all this he is showing outstanding oi'JLginali y.
•?r original recomtaandations to historians as to how they should proceed, he is also d
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putting iorward a conception of the relation between institutions, ideas and
languages hich provides a sound philosophical ground for his recommendations.
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it i3 also true that there is still such of value to be derived from vico's
remarks about the theoretical basis of historical procedure.
In the above account 1 have suggested that Vico thinks of evidence a3
having a primarily corroborative function, This must not be taken in too narrow
a way. o know that Vico su gests th; t i ;torical research ill "confirm" the
reasonings of the philosopher, 1 have taken this to mean that it will confirm
a deductive model. But we must note that the deductive model will be of a very
general nature. It is not to be assumed that the histories which will confirm
t;.is will be confined to the same very general scale. All that is requisite is
that the general principles supplied by the deductive model should be sufficient
for the correct interpretation of the historical evidence,
iie may take the example mentioned in the last chapter to illustrate this.
The "order of human things" given by Vico was "first the forests, after that
the huts, thence the villages, next the cities and finally the academies".~
Tiiis is a general principle embodied in the "ideal eternal history". Vico then
used this sequence to provide the principle necessary for a correct account of
the nistory of the ./or "lex". The same se uence will, of course, provide the
principle necessary for a correct account of many different ;ords. If it can
do this the principle is confirmed. It is thus clear that the histories which
c wifir it are ;t s much more specific level of detail than the rinciple itself.
There is therefore no question of the philosopher who provides the general
deductive model in any way usurping the function of empirical investigation
which belongs properly to the historian. He .-.imply provides the general principles
necessary for this investigation.
1:.-. 239.
la relation to tho above example it is worth making one further point.
The "order of human things" given by Vico represents the order appropriate to
the complete life-cycle of a nation. It is therefore the order appropriate to
the interpretation of a language which, as is suggested in element IVIII, "has
maintained itself as the dominant tongue throughout its development", I have
taken this to mean that it is appropriate to the language of a nation whose
development has not been affected by factors 3uch as foreign conquest,which
would have the consequence of introducing into the language terms not to be
explained by this general principle. If this is correct Vico might bo expected
to have thought about the principles requisite to explain words of foreign
origin. In fact mention is made of such a principle, based upon an attempt by
Vico to explain at ..hat time in the lifo-cycle of a nation its inhabitants
might have recourse to forein conquest,™ A principle hieh explained this
would again provide the historian with the key to the understanding of those
terms which were introduced into a language as a result of conquest by some
other nation.
The principle is given in Elements C to Oil and Vico's explanation of
it in a coroll: ry. dee M.S. 304 and 305.
CHAPTER IX
i'ne deductive . ■ -bhoti
There ccar/ iu "The -ew science1: ■ .a iber of other sections in
which Vico /hakes some general remarks bout the na ture of his enterprise.
None of these are as full as the "Elements" and they therefore cannot
be substituted for the latter. But they can help to throw some additional
light on what Vico is trying to do and it will be useful briefly to discuss
the most important of these sections, Part IV of Look I, which Vico entitles
"Lethod".
Unfortunately this is one of the most obscure parts of "The ew
Science". The difficulty of understanding it arises not only from the
ever-present problem of Vico's terminology but also from the fact that the
discussion of method is not at all clearly distinguished from some very
important remarks Vico makes about the nature of the proofs which are
relevant to "The Lew Science"." Nevertheless Vico does manage to commence
2
with an account of the method to be followed and it is in this context that
the following sequence of argunent is to be found.
The section opens with the claim that methodologically the enquiry must
go back to the earliest history of each nation and begin by tracing the
3
action of divine providence. Having made this oint vico so far digresses




frora his intention of discussing method as to begin to trace this action for
1 2
us. This, he next claims, will afford a :roof of divine providence.
From here Vico proceeds to mention some "logical proofs", in tracing
the action of divine providence "we reach those first beginnings beyond which
it is vain curiosity to demand others earlier. .e explain the particular
ways in which they come into being, that is to say, their nature, the
explanation of which is the distinguishing mark of science. And finally
(these proofs) are confined by the eternal properties (the things) preserve,
which could not be what they are if the thing3 had not coae into being just
as they did in those particular times, places and fashions, which is to say
with those particular natures, as we have set forth in two axioms".
Vico is here reaffirming the claim made in two elements (XIV and XV)
already considered.^ In discussing these it was suggested that the factors
which determined the nature of institutions were the social, economic and
political needs and utilities of trie various sections of society which were
themselves to be taken to be historically conditioned. If this were correct
we might expect Vico to sue est that the method by which the nature of
institutions be reached should be through an account of the development of
human ideas, he now .rites:
"In search of these natures of human things our dcienca proceeds by
a severe analysis of human thought -bout the human necessities or utilities
of social life, which are the two perennial springs of the natural law of
nations, as we have remarked in the axioms. In its second principal aspect
5
our science is therefore history of hum-in ideas
340 and 341. *XI.d. 343. 34&. ^dee Chapter VI above.
5N.S. 347.
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Unfortunately, in trying to understand Vico's suggestion here we again
run into the difficulty of his use of undefined technical terms. In this
passage the key phrase is the "severe analysis of human thought about the
human necessities or utilities", in which the notion of analysis^ is intro¬
duced but not explained. .hat is worse it does not reappear in "The dew
Science" so there is no ; ossibility of throwing light on it by a comparison
of its various uses.
>e might begin to try to understand Vico's meaning by asking what
kinds of analysis could be relevant in the light of what sense we have
so far made of Vico's theories. ..e have to consider the different meanings
the notion of analysis would have in relation to the deductive account of
Vico's theory nd in relation to the abstraction account, if the abstraction
account were correct then the most plausible way to take Vico's suggestion
about analysis would be to treat it as a reference to some sort of comparative
analysis of facts, but tiiis would be to treat Vico as a sort of social scien¬
tist and there has so far been no real evidence that this view is probable.
on the deductive account what Vieo's method would have to do would be
to show how we can arrive at a model of the sequence and nature of human
institutions via an account of the sequence of human ideas. If this were
the correct way to take Vico the notion of analysis would be equivalent to
that of deduction, in effect what Vico would be suggesting would be that,
once we had established how divine providence could produce rudimentary social
purposes and aims amongst earliest men, we could deduce the later sequence of
purposes and aims which would develop from this starting point and from tnis
construct a model of the general outlines of the development of man's
"vico'o own term i3 "analisi".
Ion.
institutions.
It has been a weakness of the deductive account so far that thero has
been in the elements no explicit ention of a deductive model. All that
I have so far been able to show is that the elements make better sense if
we assume that this is the sort of account Vico is trying to give than if
we make what seems the only other plausible assumption, it would therefore
be very useful corroboration for the deductive account if we could establish
that by "analysis" Vico means deduction. Fortunately he now goes on to
talk in terms which make it most probable that this is what he has in mind:
"To determine the times and places for such a history,
that is, when and where these human thoughts were born and
thus to give it certainty by means of its own (so to speak)
metaphysical chronology and geography, our Science applies
a likewise metaphysical art of criticism with regard to the
founders of these sae nations end the criterion
our criticism employs, in accordance with an axiom stated
above, is that taught by divine providence and common to
all nations, namely the common sense of the human race,
determined by the necessary harmony of human beings, in
which all the beauty of the civil world consists".-1-
Vico is claiming that we can establish the order of development
of human ideas ("metaphysical chronolo. y") by means of an account of the
development of social purposes and aims, the determining factors of which are
hu. an needs and utilities. The suggestion appears to be that by means of the
detorndnir^principle3 which govern human aims we can deduce in the first
instance ..hat those aims will be and thence a general account of the develop¬
ment of human thought. If this were correct, part of what "The hew hcience"
would provide would be an irreversible sequence of human purposes, ideas and
institutions, while any actual history "written in conformity with such a
sequence would have to show not merely that one stage of history followed
another but that it had to follow Hie other, ;'hat this is Vice's view is
h. . 341.
confirmed by his next remark. He writes:
"The decisive sort of proof in our Science is
therefore this: that once these orders have been established
by providence, the course of the affairs of the nations had
to be, must now be and will have to be such as our science
demonstrates, even if infinite worlds .-ere produced from
time to time through eternity, which is certainly not the
case".1
v
The quotation £c®nf once speaks for itself. The notion of n
irreversible sequence to human institutions and the various kinds of human
activities ("the course of the affairs of the nations") is written into
the "ideal eternal history". That this is to be ensured by the deductive
nature of the model is confirmed by a further remark added by Vico:
"Thus our defence proceeds exactly as does georretry,
which, while it constructs out of its elements or contem¬
plates the world of quantity, itself creates it; but "with a
reality greater in proportion to that of the orders having
to do with human affairs, in which there are neither points,
lines, surfaces or figures".
The bearing of this remark upon Vico' s episteraological principle
2
will be discussed later. were it is import; at to note only the suggestion
of a parallel between the .method of geometry and that by which the "ideal
eternal history" is constructed. This lends added .eight to the deductive
account of the derivation of the latter.




The claims Vico has so far put Toward fall into Wo groups, the
connection between which is not brought out with sufficient clarity in the
general elements. I propose to conclude this preliminary survey of Vico' s
philosophical views with a summary and brief discussion of the two sets of
claims before commencing an enquiry into his own account of the 'ideal
eternal history' to discover what additional light it throws upon the theory
as so far conceived.
Vico began his theoretical remarks with a plea that history should be
put upon a proper critical foundation. He then argued that history could not
be fully explained merely as the outcome of the doings of individual men con¬
sidered purely as individuals. Some new category mu3t be introduced and
Vico's suggestion is that we think of the individual in his relationship to
the over-all social structure, i.e. in his various social roles and capaci¬
ties. By so doing we can introduce in the first place the notion of social,
economic and political aims and purposes and, arising from these, social
pressures and forces to explain the course of history. Hie aspect of the life
of a nation which will thus be explained will be the history of its social
structure, i.e. the ri3e, development and decline of the various kinds of
institution, social relationships and social roles.
■ >e must ask first why Vico thought th;t the consideration of the histoiy
of man under these various aspects could be relevant to the production of a
science whereas the history of an considered solely ■ s an individual could not.
The answer to thi3 is to be found in Vico's contention that we can know the
causes or determinants of the general outlines of the history of society whereas
we cannot with the same cert inty know the causes .of the history of individual
behaviour. Therefore the former and not the latuer can be relevant to the
production of a new science.
This contention is plausible only if we can establish that the sorts of
causes adduced, by Vico are sufficient to determine the history of society
and that the sort of explanation he wishes to rule out, i.e. explanation by
recourse to individual ctions the causes of which are ultimately unknowable
to us, is irrelevant. j.t is important to point out here that it would only
be fair to Vico to discuss this matter in relation to the kind of explanatory
factors he adduces, rather than the actual factors (the "human necessities or
utilities"), since at a later stage of "The dew science" he proceeds to expand
his account of the actual factors involved.~
The first point to be made is that Vice's claim only applies to the
general outline of history, iie is certainly not claiming that to the explanation
of no events whatsoever are personal, individual factors relevant. His was
made quite clear by paragraph 1108 wiiich allowed that men often acted for
selfish reasons, but the general outline of changes in social structure is,
on Vico's view, determined by factors other than individual wishes and desires.
It will be objected to Vico's position that these social factors with
which he deals are abstractions: to talk of social purposes is ultimately to
^Cf. N.S. 241. This is discussed in Chapter II below.
talk of purposes held by individual men, and to talk of social pressures is
ultimately to talk of pressures exerted by individual men.
There is no reason why vico need be upset by such an objection, at
is true that there is a sense in which social purposes and pressures are held
and exerted by individual men, but the latter are in turn merely abstractions
unless they are considered in their various role3 and capacities, '/ico could
thus defend his claim on the general philosophical ground that 11 concepts
are abstractions; they all describe spects of things, never a unique, individual
thing itself, insofar as our descriptions approach individuality they do so by
being . ode ;.ore precise or specific.
This would not entirely meet the objection. For though it might be
ad itted that one is getting nearer' to -an understanding of the individual when
one considers hi in his various social relationships it would still be con¬
tended that there is a difference between considering him as the individual
he is in these relationships and considering hi; as a sort of anonymous occupier
of roles which involve these relationships. Jureiy, it will be contended, it
makes ali the difference to the way the occupier of a cert-in institution will
act in face of the various social pressures, that he is, say, intelligent rather
than unintelligent, optimistic rather than pessimistic. and is this not what
V'ico is denying'
Put thus, the difference is no longer between a unique individual and some
social abstraction, it is between two aspects under which the individual can be
viewed. In one he is considered in relation to his various qualities of char¬
acter, in the other in his social relationships. It would now be the formsr
aspect which v'ico is guilty of neglecting in his endeavours to do justice to
the latter.
There is some force in this objection. we cannot tell how a /nan will
act in any given social situation unless we know ..hat kind of character he has.
if Vico has no answer to this difficulty, 1 see no way in which his position
could be preserved for it flies in the face of common knowledge to suggest
that one's character /rakes no difference to what one does.
But Vico has an answer. It is one of the unfortunate features of the
general elements that he fails to emphasise sufficiently the distinction between
those kinds of factors in the social situation which will help determine one's
choice and those other features of human nature which also play a part in
deternining it. ..hen Vico talks of the social decision being determined by the
"human needs or utilities" he seems to suggest that the latter are the sole
determining factors. It will be shown later, however, that his doctrine of the
different kinds of human nature, with their different kinds of motivation and
different mental properties and tendencies, providesan answer to just this
question. In effect what he argues is that at any stage of the historical
evolution of a nation there i3 a dominant kind of human nature, a dominant set
of ways of thinking, of tendencies and character traits. The general outline
of social history is determined by what people with these rental characteristics
will take to be the needs and utilities of the time in faoe of the various social
prossuraa and forces which, through their social relationships, they can bring
to bear upon one another.
it may be objected, however, that this reply still overlooks an obvious
fact: that the abilities, dispositions and character of an ugustus or a
Napoleon affect the general course of history in a different way from those of
a mediaeval villein or a Roman client, is Vico not committed to denying this
obvious fact:
11 O
•It is not obvious the t Vico does deny this. He allows that there are
certain stages in a nation's history when the prese ice of an individual such as
. u ustus will affect the general outline of the nation's history, within certain
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specifiable limits. But tnese limits are the selves determined by the sorts of
factors Vico has already introduced, . oreover, such occasions arise only at
a few stages in the nation's history and,when they do, the fact that those
particular qualities of character possessed by the individual should be able
to have such n effect is something which itself requires explanation, f is
again is provided by Vico on the lines already mentioned. .e require to know
why tiie doings of an ugustus can have an important effect in history while
those of a Charlemagne should scarcely outlive him; and to answer this we
shall have to have recourse not to differences in the abilities of the two kinds
of en but to the general nature of ti.e nations concerned, i.e. to the pre¬
dominant nature of the people, to the structure of the society and to the
operative pressures and forces which preserve or destroy the achievements of
the great.
I see no answer to Vico's position hero. It is true that some contem¬
porary historians still write as though history is to be explained by recourse
to the actions of some important individuals. But this is merely question-
L-eggirtg and superficial unless they ore prepared to explain what it is about
the over-all historical context which allows the decisions of 3uch individuals
to have their effect. It is difficult to see how this can be done without
recourse to factors, such as those of the underlying social structure and the
pressures which are exerted and channelled through this, of the sort provided
by Vico.
hi.3. 1104 and 1105.
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It may still be objected that these forces are "blind" and "impersonal"
but it is difficult to see how this would have any effect upon Vico's position.
His forces are not blind because the persons involved in exerting the pressure
know what they are trying to do, even if they do not necessarily know that
they are doing it in common with others and cannot perhaps see what will be
the final outcome of it all, Hor are his forces impersonal because to con¬
sider a person in one of his roles rathsr tlian others, and to consider the
pressures which he helps exert in one direction rather than those he exerts
in others, is not to cease to think of him as a person. It is simply to
concentrate on one or other aspects of :ds life and activities rather than some
others.
(ii)
Hie second group of theories outlined in the general elements are
concerned with the possibility of knowledge in relation to the history of
human affairs. Vico takes knowledge to be concerned with that which i3
universal and necessary. If there is to be such knowledge in relation to
human activity we shall find it by establishing a pattern to which the his¬
tories of all nations must conformj and we can claim to have done this if we
can show that an identifiable sequence of institution and idea is instantiated
in the histories of all nations independently of one another, Ouch instantiation
would amount to the empirical confirr.ntion which is necessary to establish laws.
The establishment of such laws would nowadays be taken to be the work of
a sociologist. It is clear enough, whether we incline to the deductive account
or the abstraction account of how to establish these laws, what the function of
actual histories would be here. ~n the deductive view they would serve to
confirm a theoretical model and give it the status of a set of laws. On the
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abstraction view they would present the facts from which the social scientist
would attempt to establish laws inductively.
.that is perhaps still not clear is why Vico thought that the history
which i3 to perform either of these functions must be of the sort he is ad¬
vocating. The answer is, however, not difficult to see. A law gives an
account of those kinds of things whose occurrence determines that of some
other kind of thing. The sort of history Vico is advocating can claim to have
a similar character, i.e. if history is written in the way Vico suggests one
can claim to have shown the occurrence and development of an institution of a
certain kind to be necessary and inevitable. But if we take i3tory to be the
outcome of the activities of individuals considered purely as the individuals
they are, we can come to no knowledge of laws through it. For laws establish
connections between kinds of things and it is just as a kind of person that
this view of history refuses to consider the individuals with whom it deals.
This explains why Vico, although in the end he wants to establish
sociological laws, felt it necessary to try to show that a certain kind of
history independently satisfied the highest requirements one could demand of
history. For it is useless to argue that the laws of history can be established
by appeal to a certain kind of history if an opponent can reply that this kind
of history is, for various reasons, intellectually unacceptable.
How is one to show that a certain kind of history is intellectually
acceptable'! V'ico's reply is to offer a philosophical justification of the
sort of history he is recommending, that is, in effect, to offer an account
of the nature of the sorts of things which require to be explained and of those
factors which are both sufficient and nece33aiy to provide an explanation. It
is difficult to see in what other way one would 3et about such a task. And,
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as i have suggested above, it is difficult to see that the kind of history-
advocated by Vico is not soundly grounded.
(iii)
By far the most unsatisfactory part of the general elements is the
highly ambiguous account Vico gives of the way in which we are to establish
the sociological laws. I have considered two possible interpretations of
Vico's remarks and have tried to show that on the Whole more sense can be
riiade of these if we take him to be advocating the deductive account than if
we favour the abstraction account. It is 'worth while to say something further
about this in the light of what has Just been said concerning the relation of
history and sociology and the need for an independent Justification of the kind
of history which is to be relevant to the task in hand.
It is one of the merits of Vico's conception of how history should be
written that he puts great emphasis upon the requirement that the factors which
are brought into historical accounts should be shown to be historically con¬
ditioned, He has complained constantly that other historians have failed to
do this1 and he has claimed that it is necessary to the understanding of any
institution that we should be able to show a necessary relation between the
form of the institution and the historically conditioned context of needs and
aims in which alone it can occur.
If we take the view that the "ideal eternal history" consists of a set
of laws arrived at inductively from material presented in various histories it
is difficult to see how Vico can think he has provided any sort of guarantee
that the factor of historical conditioning has been accorded its proper place.
^Bee Chapter III above.
Indeed, it is difficult to see that he has provided any account at all of how
we should introduce it into history. There would be nothing about the "ideal
eternal history" if taken in this way which would secure this.
The difficulty arises because on the abstraction view the discovery
and elucidation of the laws of history is, so to speak, a second-order
process: one which presupposes trie work of the historian and which therefore
cannot in any way contribute to the correctness of the latter. If we suppose
the social scientist to be looking for correlations between historical facts
or ideas as he finds them in the works of various historians then, if something
has gone wrong in the historical accounts, the pattern or set of laws arrived at
by an analysis of these accounts will also be wrong. On this view we could
only accept the pattern as correct if it were legitimately derived from accounts
of history which were themselves, and on an independent basis, judged to be
correct. The sociological analysis would thus presuppose the independent
verification of the historical accounts and could not be used to correct the
latter.
,.e must note here that the two conceits which Vico claims to be able to
eradicate do not represent mistakes made at the level of sociological analysis
of the above sort. They are mistakes matte by historians at the first-order
level of historical interpretation. It would therefore not be possible to
test these or eradicate them by confrontation with an "ideal eternal history"
arrived at by abstraction. <ere there a contradiction here it would be the
"ideal eternal history" which would be falsified and not the allegedly incorrect
historical account.
If we accepted the abstraction view we should come to a very odd conclusion,
we should have to hold that Vico realised that the possibility of acceptable
nr
laws of history presupposed acceptable histories and that the latter had to
give a proper account of the historically conditioned nature of the factors
which are operative in history, but that he omitted telling us how this
requirement could be satisfied, it would be strange that he should see the
necessity for the requirement yet fail to suggest how to satisfy it.
The view that the "ideal eternal history" represents a deductive .* odel
would entirely avoid this difficulty. It would In the first instance be a
model underlying the interpretation of the historical evidence, one would
construct it in accordance with those requirements which philosophical con¬
siderations had shown to be necessary in any acceptable history, ne would
thus have a guarantee that vhere actual historical investigation and inter¬
pretation of the evidence confirmed the model (but not, of course, where it
failed to do 30) the history produced would also satisfy the requirements in
the light of which the model had been constructed.
It is useful to note here that where this is achieved we shall have
1
discovered what Vico calls "the nature" of nations. To haw such a nature
is nothing but to be an instance of the "ideal eternal history". Strictly
speaking Vico should say that to have such a nature is to be an instance of
an "ideal eternal history". But his whole way of expressing the situation is
based upon the presupposition that the project has been successfully carried
through to the extent that he can claim that there is one "ideal eternal his¬
tory" which provides the model for all histories. Vico always talks therefore
of "the common nature of nations" rather than of their "nature" to indicate
hlco distinguishes sharply between the nature of human things, which is
knowable to us,and that of physical things which is not. Ilia ground of this
distinction is discussed in Chapter IVII below.
his belief that not only does each have a nature (i«e. i3 related to an
"ideal eternal history") but they all have the same nature (i.e. are all
instances of the same "ideal eternal history").'3'
In considering Vico's position in relation to the points raised in
this chapter it has been necessary to state some aspects of it of which there
has been little or no mention in the general elements. Not only are the latter
not precise enough to be free from ambiguity but also they are not full enough
to give a general idea of all the main aspects of the position necessary to
anderstand and assess it. It would still be impossible satisfactorily to
investigate the relation between Vico's main epistemological principle and
the various theories so far considered. To do this we require a more detailed
account of certain aspects of the theory of an "ideal eternal history". Yet
we have exhausted the more important of Vico's explicit remarks about the
latter. <e shall therefore have to try to extricate the further details
required about the theory by a study of the actual "ideal eternal history"
Vico offers. The next part of this thesis will try to do this.





The Two ..snocts of the "-ideal .torn .1 history"
xt is necessary first to .Take so..a brief remarks ab at the .rain aspects
of the "ideal eternal history" in order to simplify fry later discussion of
these. (6 fight begin by asking the question: in what would one expect the
"ideal eternal history" to consist in the light of what the general elements
have so far revealed?
..e have seen that the "ideal eternal history" is to provide a set of laws
which will constitute the "nature" of nations and that the "nature" of human
institutions, or of a system of institutions, will be understood once we know
the context of social needs and purposes for which they arose. To know the
latter we must also know at what stage in the development of the human mind
sucn needs and purposes could arise.we ight thus expect to find at least
two dimensions to the categories in terms of which the "ideal eternal history"
will be outlined; There will be first a. set of categories deriving from
Vico's views about the nature of institutions and their relation to human
nature, adopting a suggestion by hessrs. Bergin and Fisch I shall call this
?
the pattern in cross-section. There will be, in the second place, a genetic
account of these institutions deriving from a genetic account of the develop¬
ment of human nature.
"'"For these last two points, see the discussion of Elements KiV and iV
in Chapter VI above.
2
dee "The New Science of Giambattista Vico" revised translation by
T. G. Bergin and i.. H. Fisch, Anchor Books, 1961, "Introduction" p. xxiii.
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To substantiate this briefly we might turn to the set of "more specific
propositions" in which Vico puts forward the basis of the "ideal eternal
history". s we have seen Vico hi; self attributes this character to He/sent3
1
. LVi to XVI, The first few of these will suffice for ur purpose.
m Clement -XVI Vico writes: 'ten first feel necessity, then look for
utility, next attend to comfort, still later amuse themselves with pleasure,
2
thence grow dissolute in uxury • nd finally go • nd waste their sup stance".
In element LXV1I he continues: "The nature of peoples is first crude, then
3
severe, then benign, than delicate, finally dissolute".
Vico next gives examples of each type:
"In the human race first appear the huge and grotesque,
like the Cyclopes; then the proud and magnanimous, like
Achilles; then the valorous and just, like Aristides and
Ccipio . frlcanus; nearer to us, imposing figures with great
semblances of virtue accompanied by great vices, who among the
vilgar win a name for true glory, like Alexander and Caesar;
still later the melancholy and reflective, like Tiberius;
finally the dissolute and shameless madman, like Caligula, hero
and Dorratian".^
Finally he gives an explanation:
"This axiom shows that the first sort were necessary
in order to make one man obey another in the fairily-state
and prepare him bo be law-abiding in the city-state that
was to come; the second sort, who naturally did not yield to
their peers, were necessary to establish the aristocratic
commonwealths on the basis of the families; the third sort
to open the way for popular liberty; the fourth to bring in
the monarchies; the fifth to establish them; the sixth to
overthrow them".5
..hat we are given in these elements is a veiy general account of the
natures of people ("crude", "severe", etc.) related to another very general
\iee Chapter II above.
5h.C. 214.
2.;. . 243-. 3 . . 242. 4 . ... 243.
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account of what we might call their springs of action (they "first feel neces¬
sity, then look for utility" and so on), The point we must note is that there
is an alleged order of succession to these natures and springs of action.
for each type of human nature tfico adduces an example of a paradigm
political figure, in this connection he makes two claims: each political
figure is necessary for the proper functioning of a certain type of political
organisation; and each political figure is also necessary as part of man's
preparation for the next stage in the succession of political organisations.
From this it can be seen that each great figure, and that human nature of
which he is a paradigm, is both a necessary condition of what is to follow and
yet is also necessarily connected to other factors relevant to its own stage,
the main one here being the dominant motivation appropriate to it.
It becomes clear that there are therefore two dimensions to the pattern
envisaged. There is first a set of correlations between the motivation,
nature, type of behaviour and politicail organisation appropriate to man at
any one stage of his history. The nature of the correlation itself is far
from clear but at least in the case of the relation between political figure,
type of man and type of political organisation, it is suggested that the poli¬
tical figure is "necessary" to the occurrence of the relation between the other
Wo.
.are light is thrown on the nature of the principle involved here by
the next element. This states that "Governments must conform to the nature of
the men governed".1 Vico add3 that "this axiom shows that in the nature
of human civil things the public school of princes is the morality of the
peoples".
hi.6, 246. 2n.G. 247.
Both the axiom and its corollary suggest a definite relation of dependence
between the nature of government, "the public school of princes" and the nature
of the governed as expressed in their moral beliefs, the suggestion is that
the nature of the government is determined ("must conform to") by the nature
of the governed, the public doings of the rulers by the morality of the governed.
Some points of considerable interest arise out of these passages, r'irst
the sequence of springs of ction commences with what have hitherto been offered
as the sole determinants of "cor:a.on-sense" judgment, i.e. necessities and
utilities. Vico is now extending his account of these factors but the fact
that the sequence he offers correlates with a sequence of historically con¬
ditioned human natures shows that there are different sets of determinants
at different stages in the life-cycle of a nation. Vico should not be taken
to suggest that at one stage the determining factor is, say, what people take
to be necessary and that at the next this is replaced by what they take to
be useful and this again by what they take to be comfortable, then pleasant
and 30 on. What he means is that once people have created the institutions
which provide what they take to be necessary, they superimpose upon these other
institutions to secure what they hold to be useful and then yet others for
comfort and for pleasure and so on. Nor should Vico be taken to suggest that
in the course of this develop;ent institutions will not be modified in the
light of man's increasing requirements. In the case of those institutions
which are created for the necessities of life it is clear that, by the end
of the sequence, they re so modified that they fail to fulfil their function
and the nation dies. Vico is thus extending his sequence of the determinants
of human institutions in such a way as to give us the principles necessary for
understanding their historical development. He is also suggesting that as this
development occurs the principle necessary for a correct understanding of a
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whole system of institutions, as it might exist at any one time, becomes
increasingly complex. The factors mentioned in iilements XI and XIII are,
if taken to be the sole determinants of human activity, now seen to be relevant
only to the primitive stages of the life of a nation. The understanding of
later stages requires that other principles supplement these.
It is important to note also that VIco has brought in the suggestion
that a people's morality is a determining factor in the nature of their
government. ..e know, however, that the ultimate determining factors are to
be found in the sequence of "common-sense" judgments. He must therefore be
suggesting that morality is an intermediate system of principles by which
(some parts of) the nature of government can be explained but which itself
is to bo explained by more ultimate principles. In effect while some part
of the nature of government is to be explained by the morality of the time,
the latter is in turn to be explained within the context of a wider system of
end-directed kinds of behaviour.
In this Vico is telling us hew to construe the relationships subsisting
within a nation. It is thus a more detailed working out of the theory suggested
in Elements XI, XII, XIV and XV -which gave an account of the factors which
determine the whole structure of a nation's way of life.
,-,'e may now turn to the second aspect of the pattern embodied in the
"ideal eternal history". «e start, by noting that in the passages under dis¬
cussion Vlco claims that each kind of political figure is necessary for man's
preparation for the next stage in the sequence of political systems. But if,
as we have seen, a certain "morality of the peoples" is itself necessary for
the functioning of a particular mode of government or governor, that same
"uorality of the peoples" is necessary also for the subsequent acceptance of
the next kind of government by the people, of which it is a necessary condition
that they be prepared by their present node of government and type of governor
To clarify this we take one of Vice's examples from the above passages:
the Achilles kind of leader. His behaviour is "proud and magnanimous" but
it must "conform" to the nature of the governed, which in this case is "severe
People of a "severe" nature approve of those kinds of activities which are
directed towards what is thought to be "useful". Achilles will therefore only
be able to do those kinds of things, in his public capacity as a ruler, which
the people will accept on the basis of their presumed usefulness. It is a
necessary condition of the acceptability of any historical description of the
Achilles-type leader that it conform to this requirement.
But also Achillea' behaviour prepares the people to accept the next
type of political organisation; Vico says it is necessary for this. The
aristocratic commonwealths, the third type of political organisation, can
therefore not arise unless Achilles has acted in a certain way in the time
of the city-3tate, the second type. And since, in turn, Achilles could not
have acted as he did in the time of the city-state without his actions con¬
forming to the "morality of the people" i.e. fco the accepted norms of conduct,
it follows that the accepted norms of conduct of the second stage are them¬
selves at least necessary conditions of the acceptance by the people of the
type of aristocratic commonwealths of the third stage. From this it follows
that a correct description and explanation of the activities of any one stage
must show that the moral standards of the previous stage constitute at least
its necessary condition.
Thus into the pattern of the "ideal eternal history" is written a series
of necessary stages in the development of nations, this necessity being groun¬
ded in the claim that the moral condition of a people is not only a necessary
condition of their own conduct but also of the next development of their
conduct. The "ideal eternal history" will therefore contain a "genetic"
aspect which will trace the necessary sequence of the phases of development
of the institutions of any nation.
This goes to show that a full understanding of the nature of a nation
or of a system of institutions cannot be gained solely by a consideration
of social needs, aims, pressures, forces and a system of social inter-relation-
ships present at any one time in the life of the nation. Although such under¬
standing involves a knowledge of all these factors it involves also a know*-
ledge of their genesis for the latter shows not only how a certain system of
institutions arose but explains also why it should have one particular form
or structure rather than another.
la. f
CHAPTER III
•Ihe Three First Principles
U)
In investigating Vice's extension of the sequence of determining
factors in history it was suggested that there are some factors ("the
necessities") which would be involved in the explanation of social
structure at its imost primitive stage and at all subsequent stages of
development while there are others (comfort, pleasure or luxury) which
would only be pertinent to the explanation of later stages. Vlco has also
maintained that social needs and aims necessarily secure the birth of
1
certain institutions. It follows that certain institutions will also be
necessary to society both at its most primitive stages and at all other
stages, while other institutions again will only arise in the course of
its later development.
It will be useful to investigate in more detail what Vico has to say
about those Institutions which are necessary at all stages of social development.
Vico takes them to be specially important and devotes a chapter of Book I
specifically to them, in the course of investigating them it will be possible
to throw much light on the nature of the deductive model and on the part that
providence has to play in it.
Ihe factors in question are referred to ty Vico as "the three principles
of this science" and in Element V he commended the iiatonists for observing
1
See Chapter VI above.
fcheir importance. The principles are: "that there is divine providence,
that human passions should be moderated and made into human virtues and
1
that the human soul is immortal". In the general elements they were intro¬
duced in the context of Vico's contention that man is society-dependent
yet, as an individual, controls his behaviour by tendencies ("avarice" and
"ferocity") which, if left to operate freely, would "certainly destroy all
2
mankind on the face of the earth". Vico then argued that providence used
these anti-social tendances as means towards its own ends, which include
the creation and development of the social structure necessary for man's
preservation and happiness.
.«e must now ask: how this is to be established. There are two parts
to Vico's answer the connection between which is never clearly stated by
Vico himself. In the first place we require to know what are the social
institutions by virtue of which men are saved from: the destruction which
their individual activities would bring upon them. In the second place we
need to know what ore those aspects of man's general nature which secure
the birth and continued existence of these necessary social Institutions.
-<e might begin by looking at the institutions themselves and at the
way in which Vico tries to establish their necessity. Hie institutions
are religion, marriage and burial of the dead. 1 shall temporarily ignore
the first of these, which will be discussed in much greater detail, later
and concentrate primarily on the second and, to a lesser extent, the third,
in Jection III of Book i Vico treats these institutions in two ways. He
presents arguments to show that they are in some sense necessary, he also
hus, 130. 2N.S. 132.
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brings forward soma empirical consideration:.;. I shall commence with the
former.
In support of the claim that marriage is a necessary institution Vico
adduces the following argument, Let us suppose that marriage did not
arise, then:
"such parents" (i.a. unmarried parents) "since they
are hold by no necessary bond of lew, are bound to
abandon their natural children. Since their parents may
separate at any tine, if they are abandoned by both,
the children must lie to be devoured by dogs. If humanity
does not bring them up, they will itave to grow up with no
one to teach then religion, language or any other custom,
so that, as for them, they are bound to cause tills world
of nations, enriched and adorned by so many beautiful arts
. of humanity, to revert to the great ancient forest through
which in their nefarious feral wanderings once roared the
foul beasts among who® bestial veneiy was practised
by sons with mothers and by fathers with daughters".1
It has been suggested that we have here to do with conceptual truths,
on the ground that a society which did not observe these customs "would
2
not be 'human' but 'feral'". But this cannot be correct for there is no
conceptual contradiction in the notion of an advanced society which did
not practice marriage, .-oreovsr the argument could not establish the truth
of its conclusion by purely conceptual means. In effect Vico is arguing that
without marriage and fairily life there would be no conditions available for
the protection and teaching that is necessary for the continued cultivation
of certain desirable human customs. The children of unmarried parents would
therefore either die or return to a nomadic life. But to establish such a
conclusion we should have to rule out the possibility that unmarried parents
rrdght have love for their children, in other words, the argument assures
h.6. 336.
2
"Philosophy of History" by Alan and Barbara boriagan, p. 8.
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Vico's own view of individual human nature as basically "avaricious and
ferocious".But this is surely a factual claim to be decided by empirical
observation. A statement of it can hence not be used in a proof purporting
to establish a conceptual truth.
The character of Vico's argument can be seen if we view it in this
way. Let us hypothesise that man is avaricious and ferocious. »e can
deduce from this what will happen in the case of a wqy of life which does
not include the institution of marriage by bringing in other previses, drawn
from our knowledge of man's behaviour in cases where even though marriage is,
let us suppose, a norm of beh viour it is nevertheless not practised by all
citizens. In other words Vico's argument would run something like this,
tie know from a study of society that children of a family upbringing are
educated in such a way as to be able to keep up, and improve upon, certain
standards. We know also that children lacking this family training cannot
do this, we can see that in a society such as does not exist but which is
conceivable, in which there were no marriage and in which men were "ferocious
and avaricious", standards and achievements of the kind mentioned would be
impossible. «ve can therefore 3ee that the institution of marriage is a
necessary condition of human advancement for a man of basically vicious
nature. On this view Vico is trying by argument to build into his model of
the structure of society the suggestion that marriage i3 a necessiry feature
using some known truths to help do this.
We might consider here another argument vhich Vico advances, this time
concerning his third principle, that of burial based upon belief in the
immortality of the soul:
V3. 132.
"Finally (to realise) what a great principle of
humanity burial is, imagine a feral state in which human
bodies remain unburied on the surface of the earth as food
for crows and dogs. Certainly this bestial custom will 1
be accompanied by uncultivated fields and uninhabited cities".
Again we might be misled by the suggestion, that if we imagine a life
without burial we are bound to think of "uncultivated fields and uninhabited
cities", into thinking that the opposite supposition is impossible. But
this is not so. Our reason for refusing to countenance the opposite
supposition is that it contradicts our belief that, say, failure to bury
the dead brings disease and so would hinder social advance. But this is
a factual belief and so there is here also an implied factual premise.
Our conclusion must be that in these arguments Vico is not trying to
establish conceptual truths. He is presenting arguments to support a
theory about the sort of social conditions which would in fact, but net in
idea, be necessary if a certain kind of man (i.e. avaricious and ferocious
man) is to achieve any social progress, The arguments assert what would
have to happen if there was to be progress for a man with the suggested
nature. They 'would not leave tire realm of hypothesis until it had been
established that man had the nature suggested. Such a task would be the
work of the historian.
What Vico has done here is to construct a small part of the initial
stages of his model, what the arguments try to show is that sons.- institution
is a necessary condition of social progress. But they do not establish
any general factual truths. Before that could be done the model would have
to be confirmed empirically.
It is not, however, to be thought that all that Vico says here about
^♦S. 337.
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religion, marriage and burial is based merely upon argument. In fact
Vico does not begin his discussion with the arguments but with the following
passage:
"how since the world of nations has been made by men,
let us see in what all men agree and always have agreed.
For these tilings will be able to give us the universal and
eternal principles (such as every science must have) on
which all things ware founded and still preserve themselves,
he observe that all nations, barbarous as well as
civilised, though separately founded because remote from
each other in time and space, keep these three human customs}
all have some religion, all contract solemn marriages, all
bury their dead. And in no nation, however savage and crude,
are any human activities celebrated with more elaborate cere¬
monies and more sacred solemnity than religion, marriage and
burial. For by the axiom that 'uniform ideas, born among
peoples unknown to each other, must have a comrion ground of
truth', it must have been dictated to all nations that from
these three institutions humanity began among them all, so
that the world should not again become a bestial wilderness.
For tills reason we have taken these three eternal and uni-
versal customs as the three first principles of this Science".
This is a particularly difficult passage to interpret. The difficulty
lies in the fact that it can be read in two ways. It can be read first
as an account of the method by which one established the principles as
universal and necessary, i.e. by empirical confirmation drawn from (historical)
evidence on a very wide scale. On this view Vico would be asserting that
the three principles were universal and necessary because they had this wide¬
spread empirical support. But if we take this view it is difficult to explain
what the arguments considered above could add to this. Do they merely confirm
that principles known to be necessary are necessary? ftiis view runs into
exactly the difficulty which we earlier suggested arises for the abstraction
view: how to find a proper function for the reasoning of the philosopher which
hho. 334.
Vico holds to be so central to the new science,"1'
The passage can be read in a different way which avoids this difficulty.
It can be taken to be Vico's reference to the empirical investigations which
first prompted him to think of trying to establish these particular principles
as necessary to his science. On this view it is au autobiographical account
how Vico came to think these principles might be necessary to society. The
philosophical arguments which follow would then still be left with what
looks like their proper jobs that of constructing a model of the sort of
nan and the sort of progress to which such institutions would be necessary.
This interpretation, would have the merit of explaining how Vice's interest
in constructing a new science arose from his feeling the need to explain
certain empirical correlations. He is pointing to the empirical facts which
seemed to him to call for the construction of an explanatory theory. It is
left to the philosopher to construct the theory viiich is necessary if we are
ever to rise above the level of noting them as mere correlations and to the
philologian or historian to see whether the model docs succeed in enabling
one to write a new kind of history which both explains better and does more
justice to the evidence than the old sort.
It is not possible to decide between these two readings from an internal
examination of the above passage. Vico has again failed to express himself
unambiguously. But the considerations just mentioned throw considerable
weight on the side of the second account.
We must turn now to the second part of this enquiry: how Vico is to
explain, without recourse to some supernatural agency, the continued arising
and existence of these three necessary features. This is to be done by
"4.3. 133-140.
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reference to the action of divine providence in its immanent aspect, but this
notion needs considerable explanation itself if it is not to be irre ediably
supernatural and hence ultimately not amenable to empirical confirmation.
Vico has shorn that he is aware of the need to give this category criteria
which relate to empirical facts. .<e have also seen that it is of the essence
of Vico's conception of human institutions that they are necessarily related
to certain social needs and aims. The explanatory aspect of divine providence
must therefore come out in explanation by means of this aspect of human
activity. In other words the existence of these social institutions has to
be shown to be fully explained by certain features of human nature and by
certain beliefs to which alljhumens tend naturally to subscribe.
This suggests that from some points of view these "three first principles"
are not to be distinguished from the principles of the other institutions which
will figure in the "ideal eternal history". The main significant difference
will lie in the fact that these principles are necessary to society at all times
and the others only at certain times. The first three principles will therefore
figure not only in the genetic pattern, for which they will be the starting
point, but also in the pattern in cross-section at any time at which one should
choose to study the latter. 'This will not be true of the other institutions.
Before going on to investigate the significance of this feature, we
must look briefly at what Vico has to say about the institutions which figure
in these three principles.
The first of the principles Vico claims to find in a belief, held by all
societies, that there is a "provident divinity""'" or, as ho sometimes puts it
more simply, a belief in "some religion". .<e must not be misled into dismissing
334.
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this contention on the ground that Yico, as a Jhristian, has simply read into
history what he would like to find there. There are other reasons for Vico's
attempt to show this principle to be necessary.
begin by recalling Vico's contention that social activity is essentially
end-directed. In a full explanation of human conduct we should require to know
why men sub. it to the norms of conduct thus prescribed. ,.q might attempt to
explain this by the suggestion that they can see that it is what they ought to
do, perhaps because they can see that it is in their own best interest. But
such an explanation, if applied to all history, ,ould presuppose in primitive
peoples the ability to reason and 'would thus lead to the sort of historical
mistake embodied in the conceit of the scholars, ..a might ,;ain attempt to
explain it by the suggestion that men individually will behave in those ways
which are for their own good. But we have seen that Vico, in holding man's
individual activity to be guided by "ferocity, avarice and ambition", thinks
that this is false, ian'3 individual actions are to be explained by the fact
that each man is "bent on his own private advantage",
.-hat we must seek therefore is 3ome principle which will explain why men
accept the norms of conduct they do despite the fact that they neither wish
individually to accept them nor can see the real reason for doing so. The answer
lies in the notion of authority. They will accept these norms if they believe
that they are enjoined on them by an authority and if they believe that the
authority has some sanction at its command to enforce their acceptance.
This is the character which Vico first attributes to the notion of
religion or of a provident divinity in hi3 "ideal eternal history". It has
been suggested above that he did not come to this conception solely by argument
nor could the fact tiiat religion actually had this ciiaracter be established
solely by argument, at the same time it is important to realise that the main
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function of this principle in Vico's model lies in its ability to explain
why primitive men will accept codes of conduct which are both uncongenial to
them and for which they cannot see the true reason.
minor difficulty of interpretation arises here, if it is Vico's con¬
tention that belief in a provident being is a necessary condition of society
one would expect a pattern for the development of that belief to be traced in
the "ideal eternal history". But Vico does not do this. He traces instead
an outline of the development of the role of authority in human affairs.1
this suggests that he had misconceived the relation of religion and authority
and that he should have claimed that acceptance of authority was one of the
three necessary principles rather than acceptance of belief in a deity, since
the latter had the role of an authority in only one phase of its career.
however that may be, it is clear that the idea of a provident being or
of an authority finds a place in the "ideal eternal history" taken as a model
because it offers an explanation of what would otherwise be very difficult
to explain - the acceptance of unpalatable codes of conduct by egoistic and
unreasonable men. whether it ought to be there is a question which cannot be
decided without actual historical investigation.
The second of Vico's three principles is the institution of marriage. ..e
discussed earlier his argument to show that this was a necessary condition of
society. The argument is interesting not jib rely as an argument but for the
light it throws upon Vico'3 conception of the social function of marriage.
Vico does not attempt to deny that some sort of continuation of the human
"Hj.o. 386-390 and 942-946.
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species could be obtained without recourse to this institution. He is concerned
rather to argue, in view of the evident place of notions like training,
teaching and education in explaining the continuous and progressive character
of society, that without an institution which can secure these there would be
no social advance."'" In the course of this argument Vico clearly im; lias that
the sort of marriage he is talking about i3 that in which the union is a "neces¬
sary bond of lav/". Again this reveals that he conceives of marriage as a
legally established institution, through which is secured that which could not
be secured by man's egoistic natural impulses.
One might wonder whether Vico has not erred, this time in confusing a
specific institution, marriage, with its social function. For while one
might admit that educational institutions are necessary to social progress
one might hold that these could be provided by other means than marriage.
It might therefore be as well, when further discussing Vico's theories on this
point, to remember that when we talk of the institution of marriage in this
connection we ought to be talking of those institutions which perform the
social functions which Vico attributed to marriage.
Vico's third principle need detain us less. This is the principle of
2
burial of the dead, Vico sees this practice as intrinsically connected with
belief in immortality of the soul. It would seem to be particularly difficult
to show the latter to be a necessary condition of society but this need not
concern us much for Vico uses this principle rather less frequently than the
others in "The New icience".
This brief review of the three principles has shown that Vico's account
of them needs sorws correction. He fails to distinguish between the necessity
h.3, 336. S.S. 337.
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for the institution and the necessity for its social function. If we sake
this distinction for him we can see that what is necessary is not the
institution but the securing of its function.
Taken thus the arguments advanced in this chapter of "The hew Science"
shew that society cannot endure unless certain functions are performed, hut
this correction need not involve any change in the account given of the
arguments Vico adduces. It is still the case that these functions are not
shown to be conceptually necessary. They are necessary only for a society
based upon a certain kind of human nature and whether any society has ever
been based upon such a nature is something which can only be decided by
historical investigation.
(ii)
The passages considered in this chapter lend considerable weight to the
deductive account of Vice's procedure and throw light on its nature. At the
same time they show that the model must not be thought of as a deduction from
conceptual truths. They show also how Vico conceived the role of philosophy
in "The New Science".
It Is clear that Vico does not take the proper role of the philosopher to
be a concern with conceptual or rational truths although some of his remarks in
the general elements might seem open to this construction. It will be recalled
that when Vico first introduced his three principles in Element s/\ he sug¬
gested that their origin lay with "the political philosophers and first of all
the llatonists, who agree with all the lawgivers on these three points ..."
1
;.i. 129 and 130,
Since he also went on to softest that "philosophy contemplates reason whence
comes knowledge of the "trueit might seem that he was taking philosophy to
be concerned with a priori or necessary truths and the three first principles
to be examples a£ these.
On the other hand, ¥ico also holds that empirical confirmation is relevant
to their establishment. If we took the view that philosophy was concerned with
conceptual truths it would be diffico.lt to square these assertions for Vico
would seem at once to claim that the principles were conceptually true and
yet were supported by empirical evidence. If this were so we should have to
conclude that he was guilty of great confusion.
The suggestion that the work of the philosopher ii: to construct a model
of social development runs into no such difficulty provided the hypothetical
nature of the model is realised. The model doe3 not tell us what rust happen,
rarely what must happen if its hypothetical premises be tree. It tells us
./hat must happen if these premises be true because it deduces its results from
its premises. But the premises, as we saw, are themselves factual5hence their
truth or falsity can only be established empirically. Hiere is therefore no
question of the philosopher usurping from the philolo- inn or historian the work
of empirical research which would be required to establish the truth of the
theory.
An objection to this account might be that if reasoning can show a
certain structure in society to be necessary ther^is no need to "confirm" this
empirically. This rgument rests upon a misunderstanding of what is being
suggested. If the reasoning of the philosopher were purely conceptual the
hi.o, 13a.
objection would be correct. But Vico's arguments have been shown not to be
purely conceptual. They rest upon factual hypotheses. 'Die conclusions they
try to establish about the nature of society can therefore only be accepted if
these premises ere accepted and empirical confirmation is required for this.
If we ask the question what Vico is really doing on the above interpre¬
tation, we must say that he is offering a model for the interpretation of all
history. This is more like sociolo, 3 we knew it today than anything else.
We can safely reject what we might think of as the most extreme empiricist and
rationalist accounts of hi3 procedure. He is not doing what the first of these
might claim, i, •. he is not merely establishing laws of history by abstraction
from various actual histories. This view would leave no room for the reasoning
of philosophy. Equally he is not doing what the second might, claim, i.e.
deducing a model from conceptual or a priori truths. This view would leave
no room for the work of confirmation by the philologian. The truth lies in
an account of the sort suggested which lies somewhere between these extremes.
It is important to note that on this account Vico is entirely free from the
difficulty which might arise for anybody attempting to abstract X ;s of history
from actual histories. If any laws corns out of Vico's suggestions they will
not illicitly presuppose the acceptability of the histories which support them,
for the theoretical model which underlies all the histories relevant to the
establishment of laws will ensure that they conform to the requisite standards.
CHAPTER Kill
The Construction of The Ideal Eternal History:
The Structure of social Activity(i)
(i)
The discussion of Elements La.VI to Mil, in Chapter XI, showed that
there are two types of pattern in the "ideal eternal history". One of these
represents the working out of a theory about the relation of human nature to
the structure of society, and the other of a theory about the necessarily
historical or genetic character of the development of 3uch a nature and society
It was also s .own that these two patterns or, rather, these two facets of the
one pattern, are more detailed workings out of theories we had met with in the
general elements. ,e trust now loo': sore closely at the actual account of the
"ideal eternal history" offered by Vico, to see whether the character of these
patterns can be made clearer. This will be most easily done if we first turn
to Book IV of "The New .Science", entitled "The C arse of Nations" in which Vico
presents a summary of is findings.
Vico there maintains that there -re three ages through which each nation
passes, which he refers to as the age of the gods, the age of the heroes and
the age of men. The division is adopted, apparently, from an old Egyptian
tradition."'" In the Introduction to Book IV, having stated this, Vico continues
"For the nations will be seen to develop i:i conformity with
this division by a constant and uninterrupted order of causes and
effects present in every nation, through throe kinds of natures.
"'"Axiom XXVII, N.3. 173 and H.3. 915.
From these n- bures arise three kinds of customs; and in
virtue of those three kinds of customs three kinds of
natural law of nations are observed; and in consequence
of these laws three kinds of civil states or commonwealths
are established. And in order that men, having reached
the stage of human society, may on the one hand communicate
to each other the aforesaid three most important matters
(customs, laws, commonwealths), three kinds of languages
ana as ma ay of characters are formed; and in order that
they may on the other hand justify them, tiiree kinds of
jurisprudence assisted by three kinds of authority and
three kinds of reason in as many of judgments. The
three kinds of jurisprudence prevail in throe sects of
tiiao, which the notions rofess in the course of their
history,
In this passage we again find the two dimensions of pattern hitherto
distinguished. There is first the genetic pattern governing the development
of nations. This is referred to in the opening sentence in which Vico claims
that "the nations ..ill bo seen to develop in conformity with this division by
a constant and uninterrupted order of causes nd effects present in every
nation,,," The principal relationship involved here is characterised as causal.
There is next a structural relation, initially between nation and nature, this
is extended to include connections between nature and custom, custom and
natural law, natural law and civil state; then between these and language .and
character; finally between these and jurisprudence, authority, reason and
judgment,. The rel- tionships involved here are even obscurer than those in
the first pattern, "The nations" says vico, "develop through three kind3
of natures", ..hat is the relation between nation and nature by which the
development of the former can occur "through" the latter; Again: "From these
n.-turos arise three kinds of customs," This looks as though it implies some
sort of causal dependence, but what sort is most obscure.
We shall concern ourselves in this and the next chapter . ith trying to
h.3. 915.
clarify the nature a £ t;.o relationships involved in the .second pattern. Co
do trds it .1 LI be necessary /.a view of the amount of /eat .rial involved, to
be idLghly selective. it eight therefore be useful to explain the principles
on which this has been dbne.
Although tiie structural rel tionships in society change end develop
thrcugn the three -ages -i.t .111 ri.t be necess'ry to trace lie. : s they change.
It .■dll be enough if we can get a general idea of the sort of view Vico takes
and this can be done by examining the relationships as they subsist in any
one e. The first age has been chosen for this because here, for reasons
which .ill be explained shortly, Vico works out the principles of the "ideal
eternal history" core fully than for any other period.
In investigating the first age we must re.sober that Vic has already
tried to establish the first three rincirles as necessary tc society. It
will therefore be useful to investigate the relative influence of each of
these separately. At tie seme time it will also be helpful to make use of
the divisions suggested above by Vico. There will therefore be first an
investigation of the relationships between nature, custom, natural law and the
State as they ore affected by the first principle, religious belief. This
occupies Part (ii) of the present chapter and is followed in Part (iii) by
a discussion of the way in which the material thus -resented relates to a
numbor of different parts of Vico's theories as so far revealed.
Chapter ilV (i) continues with an account of the effect of the second
and tidrd principles upon the above relationships, ft is followed by an
account in Part (ii) of the character of language as affected and explained
by the three principles. Pa t (iii) concludes ith a brief survey of the
bird of Vico1 a divisions, the relationships between jurisprudence, authority,
and reason, a3 affected by the sa.e principles.
(ii)
In Book IV, section I, Vico describes the first nature thus:
"The first nature was a poetic or creative nature which
we may be allowed to call divine as it ascribed to physical
things the being of substances animated by gods, assigning
th ! gods to them nccor ing to its ide? of .ch
Furthermore it was a nature all fierce and cruel; but,
through that same error of imagination, men had a terrible
fear of the god3 whom they themselves had created. From
this period there remained two eternal properties: one, <CtX
re igion is the only means powerful enough to restrain the
fierceness of peoples; and the other, that religions
prosper when those who preside over them are themselves
in.,-ardly reve ent. "1
Vico calls this primitive being " oetic" man. his creative ability
is due to his extreme imaginative powers and compa rative Lick of a critical
rational faculty. His nature i3 to be imaginative, irrational, cruel and
fearful of gods who, in fact, are the products of is own imagination.
For a fuller account of this nature we must turn to Book li of "The
;L-. Science". In this book Vico .lives instances of actus.t history written
in conformity with the "ideal eternal history". When one comes to those
Greek and ;toman times for which there is some historical evidence his account
is, as should be the case, very much fuller and more detailed than the "ideal
eternal ,1 tory". The latter is used s a <_,uide offering insight inf.. the
broad, general lines of history. But when dealing with the first stages of
the development of nations Vico is dealing with a period for which there is
little or no historical evidence. hat he does consequently is to try to
work out that part of the "ideal eternal history" which applies to this period
in reater detail than he does for other periods and offer it as an actual
historical account. ..hether it can s tisf otorily be accepted as such is
very doubtful. But the attempt to work out the "ileal eternal history" in
more detail for this period has the useful result that it reveals very fully
the manner in which the latter is to be constructed. It will therefore be
h.S. 916.
most instructive for our purpose to follow his procedure here.
in Book 11, .lection I, entitled "ioetic letaphy'sics", Vico -writes:
"From these first inn, stupid, insensate and
horrible beasts, the philosophers and philoiogians should
have begun their investigations of the wisdom" (i.e. of
the "common sense" judgments) "of the ancient gentiles ...
And they should have begun with metaphysics which seeks
its proofs not in the external world but within the
modifications of the mind of him who meditates it. For,
as we have said above, since this world of nations has
certainly been made by men, it is within those modifications
that its principles should have been sought, -rid human
nature, so far as it is like that of the animals, carries
with it this property, that the senses are its sole way of
knowing things".l
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ifitaphysics for Vico is the study of the human mind; hence hi3 claim
here is that the study of history and the principles of history ("the
philosophers and philologians") should have been, and by him will be, begun
by a study of the- nature of the human mind, inreover, he suggests this is
justified since the historian, as the possessor of a mind himself, is in
soms sort of privileged position for getting at these principles. This last
claim refers to Vice's basic epistemological principle, which will be
3
discussed later. Ignoring tills for the present, vie can say that Vico is
maintaining that the history of any one period must start with a study
the human mind. It is also clear from tills passage that Vico equates "the
human mind" with "human nature", for in the course of it he uses the expres¬
sions more or less interchangeably.
<»e must note that even the "co-unon sense" of poetic man, or poetic
wisdom, which, a3 we saw earlier, underlies custom, cannot be understood or
properly treated unless we can discover the nature of his mind. Vico's
Vs. 374.
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of. M.J. 2 in 'which Vico equates "the metaphysical world" with "tie
world of human minds".
3
Bee Chapter AVII below.
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suggestlon is that the character-is tics of men's "common sense" are dependent
upon the overall nature of their minds or mental states and tendencies.
This is confirmed by Vico's next remarks
"Kence poetic wisdom, the first wisdom of the gentile world,
must have begun with a metaphysic not rational and abstract
like that of learned men new, but felt and imagined as that
of the first men must have been who, without power of
ratiocination, were all robust sense and vigorous imagin¬
ation as established in the axioms".
Vico implies here that the conceit of the scholars, the tendency to
attribute to former ages the conceptions of one's own, could be avoided if one
insisted, as a first condition of history, upon coming to a correct account
of the kind of mind possessed by the people of a particular age and of the
characteristic way in which this would express itself. Vico is taking the
notion of a mind or a nature widely here, to include imagination, emotions and
sense-experience as well as intellect. The suggestion is that historians have
hitherto erred in thinking that primitive man was guided by intellectual
considerations. They should instead have thought of him as being predominantly
a creature with a highly developed sensory, imaginative and emotional apparatus,
and his life 3uch that its events can be explained by those non-rational factors.
At a later stage he will develop an intellect and it will guide his conduct
in a -way at present to be explained by his emotions and imagination. The
interpretation of his subsequent history must recognise this fact.
An account of the nature of society must therefore begin with an account
of the nature of man. e mu3t next try to ascertain what sorts of beliefs
would be possessed by a man with such a nature. To decide this we must be
able to 3ay what sorts of things poetic man mu3t have beliefs about, Vico
has just argued that it is a necessary condition of society that it conforms
to his three first principles and that these three principles be explained by
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certain natural beliefs, «e know therefore that poetic man must have had
such beliefs, Vico has thus introduced a guiding clue in terms of which we
can begin to interpret whatever evidence is available.
That this is the line of reasoning behind Vieo's position can be shown
if we return to the "Elements". In Element XXI Vieo reiterates that "the
world of peoples began everywhere with religion", the first of the three
principles."^
In the next axiom he asserts that: "wherever a people has grown savage
in arms so that human laws have no longer any place among it, the only powerful
2
means of reducing it is religion," Just how this occurs is explained by
Vico in the corollary to tie element, "This axiom", he writes, "establishes
the fact that divine providence initiated the process by which the fierce and
the violent were brought from their outlaw state to humanity, and entered
upon national life. It did so by awakening in them a confused idea of
divinity, which they in their ignorance attributed to that to which it did
not belong. Then, through terror of this imagined divinity, they began to put
3
themselves in some order,"
In this passage Vico uses the principle as though it explains man13
emergence from a bestial way of life into a social way of life. To appreciate
that this is not all that he means ws must recall the assertion of Element XIV,
that "the nature of things is nothing, but their coming into being at certain
times and with certain modifications", we took this to mean that the nature
of an institution was to be found in that stage of development of society at
which it occuired and in the social needs and aims of that stage. Applying this
principle to the above axiom we see that what it explains is not only why man
emerged from a bestial way of life into a social life but also why he continued
in that latter way of life. In other words the same principle is used not
^•3. 176. 2N.o. 177. 3n.S. 178.
only to explain the chance from one way of life to another, but also to
present the rationale behind the continued acceptance of the new way of life.
Vico is tiius giving more than a principle of historical changej he is also
explaining why a certain kind of institution must obtain in a certain kind of
society. To put it another way, historical change is to be explained by the
needs, utilities and the rest which are secured by the introduction of the
change, without wishing to do more than mention it hare, it is worth pointing
out that we see in this the beginnings of a theory of the teleological nature
of historical explanation.
It is now apparent why all Vico's accounts of the structure of early
society start with belief in a provident being: given the mental apparatus of
poetic man, such a belief is the only way in which we can explain his continued
acceptance of this way of life. ,.e must note, however, that we have not yet
come across any account of how it is that we can claim knowledge of the mind
of such a man.
In the above quotations"^" Vico's claims go beyond asserting that early
man accepted the social way of life because he thought it was enjoined upon
him by the gods whom he feared. They include also an account of how the belief
in these gods arose or, rather, how it is to be explained, i.e. by recourse
to a particular use of poetic man's creative or imaginative abilities.
To understand this we must return to the elements, and in particular to
the first two elements, ..hen I originally dealt with these two elements, I
treated them with reference to their bearing on the historian's problem. At
the same time I pointed out that this represented only a part of the use they
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are given in "The New Science", we must now turn to their second function.
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N,3, 178 and 916, See Chapter III above.
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The first two elements claim that man, when ignorarfc of the true causes
of soixis phenomenon, tends to explain it in terms of principles appropriate
either to his own nature or to things 'with which he is familiar.1 These are
general elements, relevant to the whole of "The hew Science", if we turn to
Element X.CXil we find a statenant of the way the content of these two elements
tears directly upon the nature of poetic man. It is stated that: "..hen men
are ignorant of the natural causes producing things, and cannot even explain
them by analogy with similar tilings, they attribute their own nature to them.
2
The vulgar, for example, say the magnet loves iron."
what this claim amounts to is that when men are ignorant of the nature
of things, they will tend to interpret them on animistic lines by attributing
human, mental abilities to trie non-human, iariy humans vail attribute to
things abilities of the type they themselves possessed rather than those
possessed by later men,
Together with this will go another tendency, noted in Element IXU.il:
"The physics of the ignorant is a vulgar metaphysics by which they will refer
the causes of the tilings they do not know to the will of God, without consider¬
ing the means by which the divine will operates."3 in other words, such man
will tend to look upon God as the direct cause of anything they cannot under¬
stand, And this is so because, as vlco points out in the next axiom, it "is
a true property of the human mind that 'minds once cowed are prone to supersti¬
tion*. once men are seised by a frightful superstition they refer to it all
they imagine, see or even do",1
The upshot of these, and the subsequent axioms of this section, is to
explain the two tendencies, to animism and to the notion of a physically
active god, which themselves produce the set of beliefs described in Book 11,
Vs. 120 and 122. 2Um3. 180. 3N.S. 182. V.3. 183.
bection I, on "Poetic lietaphysics".. Hence:
"poetic wisdom the first wisdom of the gentile ..Grid,
must have begun with a metaphysic not rational and
abstract like that of learned men now, but felt and
imagined as that of the first wen must have been who,
without power of ratiocination, were all robust sense
and vigorous imagination as .stablished in the axiom.
This metaphysic was their poetry, a faculty born with
them (for they were xumi:-iied by nature 1th these
senses and imaginations); b rn of their ignorance of
causes, for ignorance, the mother of wonder, made
everything wonderful to men who were ignorant of
everything, as noted the axioms. Their poetry was
at first divine because they imagined the causes of
the things they felt and wondero d ctb to be god?.,,,,"
and "at the sane time they gave the things -hey ^
wondered at substantial being after their oven ideas...."
Vico's contentions hare are clear enough. In the first place there is
the claim that in the conceptual scheme of poetic man there would be no place
for the distinction between the animate nd the inanimate, 'There would
instead be a widespread tendency to what is no,. called "the pathetic fallacy"
in which such statements as "the magnet loves iron" would be taken as literal
truth-, secondly, insofar as such people had notions about th . causes of
thing3 these 'would be attributed do various gods, thought of as substantial
beings. The notion of a divinity directly and physically active would be
central in such a conceptual scheme.
Thus arises the conception of nature as "a vast and animate body which
feels passions and effects", the cause of whose activities, as indeed of the
2
activities of poetic man himself, ..ouLd be the gods.
Vico's next move in this chapter is to sketch the sort of relationship
which must have arisen between poetic men and his gods thus created and
conceived, particularly insofar as it affected man's activities. This takes
the form of an account of the arts of divination and of the taking of the
auspices, i.e. of the attempts to learn the purposes and desires of the gods,
through the interpretation of various natural phenomena conceived to be signs
h.3. 375. ^.3. 377.
from these Oods. For, having assured God to be the direct cause of all move-
.©nt, these "first men, who spoke by signs, naturally believed that lightning
bolts and thunder claps were signs load© to the;;; by Jove...... They believed
that Jove commanded by signs, that such signs were real words, and that
nature was the language of Jove. The science of this language the gentiles
universally believed to be divination, which by the Greeks was called theology,
weaning the science of the language of the gods.
But if nature is God's language and law what he commands we require
2
experts to read these for us. Therefore "they were called theological poets
or sages who understood the language of the gods expressed in the auspices of
Jove; and were properly called divine in the sense of diviners, from "divinare",
to aiivine" or "predict" Because they ware versed in this mystic theology,
the Greek poets, who explained the divine mysteries of the i uspices and oracles,
were called "nr/stae", which Horace learnedly translates "interpreters of the
pods", dvery gentile nation had its own sybii versed in this science
3
ybils and oracles are the most ancient thing3 of the gentile world"."
,.e :.iust note that in this sequence of argument, Vico has been following
the same sequence mentioned in the Introduction to Book IV, on "The Course
of Nations", There, it will be recalled, he . rote of "three kinds of
n tures", of which we have just considered the first. He talked also of
"three kinds of customs" which "arose" from these natures. <e have just
observed a relationship between custom find nature. There were again "three
kinds of natural laws" which were observed "in virtue of these customs".
1h . 379.
Cf. M.S. 398 for an explanation of the notion of law as that which
tue art of divination reveals as God's commands.
3N.3. 381.
We have seen how law will be that which is commanded by the god3, related to
the custom of taking the auspices, finally, he rote of three kinds of "civil
states or commonwealths", which are established in consequence of these laws.
We havo at least arrived at the expectation that there will be a strong
sacerdotal element in the form of state likely to arise in these circumstances
(ill)
It is appropriate here to interrupt this account of Vico*s conception
of the nature of early society, to discuss a number of points which arise from
the passages just considered. We / ight begin by asking ourselves what new
light this more detailed account throws on the character of the relationships
between human nature, custom, natural law and civil state.
It is clear that what the account of the nature of poetic man as a
creature of rent imaginative gifts but lacking, in critical abilities explains
is the reason why his religious beliefs had their own peculiar character.
Likewise, vhat these religious beliefs explain is why his activities, both
his customs and his legal duties, had their peculiar character, /ind what they
in turn ex lain, is why the sort of atate which existed had its particular
characteristics. In other words, we are offered a series of levels of explana
tory statements, so interrelated that a request for the explanation for the
particular character possessed by a form of state could only be fully answered
by a series of reasons which would find their resting place in a description
of the nature of man. Looked at from this point of view Vico is offering an
interrelated series of explanations.
At the same time this is not all that Vico offers. There is also an
actual historical account, i.e. an account of successive stages of activity.
First, we are told, men created the ilea of God as the direct cause of every-
thing. Then "they pictured trie sky to themselves as a great animated body"."''
They next began to practise the arts of divination and prediction, after which
developed the priestly caste. «e have here soire thing much more like an account
Z
of the successive events of early history. As such Vico is offering a set
of descriptions of what occurred,
Vico is therefore giving one account both to describe and explain the
same phenomena. His procedure thus confirms the earlier conclusion we reached
when considering the general elements, that history is never either purely
descriptive or purely explanatory! there is always an element of both in any
3
proper liistorical account. The question what happened cannot be answered
unless we can also give the reason why it happened: it is of the essence of
human activity that it cannot be fully described without some account of its
rationale, written history, whi- deals with human activity, must therefore
conform to this requirement.
In giving the one account both to describe and to explain Vico is
revealing that he interprets the above requirement very strictly. It is not
merely that explanation is necessary in history but also that the categories
which are relevant to the description of significant historical change are
related to the categories which are relevant to the explanation of human
conduct. This amounts to the claim that we explain by describing, Nor should
there be any mystery how this can be so. Vico's account above c=.n be read in
the two ways because his selection of what is significant in history and so
should be described is overned by his conception of what sorts of things or
events explain what other sorts of things. It follows from this that the
"^N.S, 377.
^Vico does in fact try to put a date on these events, cf. N.S, 377.
3
iee Chapter VI above.
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genetic pattern and the structural pattern, which we are now considering,
cannot, except for purposes of convenience, really be separated. The factors
which appear in any account of the pattern of what must happen in history and,
deriving from this, any account of vhat actually happened, must be selected
and arranged in accordance with categories which are relevant to the explan¬
ation of iiuman activity. Thus it i3 that a historical account can explain an
event by describing antecedent events vd-thout necessarily bringing in any
overtly explanatory statements.
An objection can be made against this view by raising the question:
is what is offered in the passages under discussion intended to be history at
all? The question can arise because of /ico's language, in which we find a
peculiar mixture of what might be taken to be phrases appropriate to a priori
speculation together 'with others more obviously appropriate to an historical
account.
For example, Vico opens the chapter on "Poetic iistaphysics" with a denun¬
ciation of philosophers and historians for not having begun their accounts of
primitive epochs with a consideration of the human nature of those concerned.
He gives his own account of this and then continues: "Hence poetic wisdom, the
first wisdom of the gentile world, must have begun with a raetaphy3ic, not
rational and abstract.......but felt and imagined.1,1 Here the phrase "must
have begun" has an a priori ring to it. Yet in the next sentence he changes
to the descriptive mode in his state/rent that: "This metaphysic was their poetry,
a faculty born with them.Is this a statenant of how they ware or of
how they must have been? The anfoiguity continues: "In such fashion th3 first
2
men of the gentile nations created things according to their ideas,"
h.S. 375. 2N.-. 376.
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This looks like description. let: "of such natures must have been the first
founders of gentile humanity..,..."^} this can hardly be description. Is
Vico talking, in all this, of what happened or of what had to happen? And,
if of what had to happen, how are we to take the sense in which it had to happen
and where does this leave the work of actual historical research?
Perhaps it is these uncertainties which led Croce to accuse Vico of
"doing violence to the facts". For, on Croce's account, .here Vico "found
himself faced by uncertain facts, instead of patiently 'waiting till the disco¬
very of further evidence should dispel the doubt, he cut the knot by accepting
the fact, as he put it, in conformity with laws,,,,.,so that the comparison
with facts, which none the less he recontends for the sake of confirmation,
became strictly speaking superfluous".
But this is by no means the only view possible. To find a more plausible
alternative, we must begin by trying to be more precise than we have so far
about the nature of the relationship between human nature and human activity
as conceived by Vico and then apply our result to the problem of historical
method.
From the nature of Vico's procedure in the above arguments, it seems
probable that he conceives the nature of the relation between man's nature and
all that follows from it to be such that in the former lie normally the suf¬
ficient and necessary conditions for the occurrence of the latter. Here the
proviso implied by the word "normally" must be noted, for it is of great
importance. As we shall see later, Vico by no means thinks that a certain
nature must always, so to speak, fulfil itself by the creation of the appro¬
priate beliefs, activities and institutions. There are certain conditions
under which it may be prevented from so doing. But when these are lacking,
"4l.o. 377. **"Tha Philosophy of Giambattista Vico" p.41.
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Vico takes the relationship to be as described above and, when describing those
occurrences to which this relation is relevant, indicates it by the notion of
the one set of phenomena being a "natural" outcome of the other,
;.e can see some examples of tills in the course of the account we have
been considering. Having pictured the sky "as a great animated body" the
poetic man "began to exercise their natural curiosity which is the daughter
of ignorance and the mother of knowledgeAgain, "the first men, who
spoke by signs, naturally believed that Lightning bolts and thunder claps
2
.ere signs made to them by Jove..,.,." Or yet again: "Thus, in accordance
with what has been said in the Axioms about the principles of the poetic
3
characters, Jove was born naturally in poetry as a divine character, "
And when we turn to the appropriate axiom we find it is one of three about the
origins of the concepts in terns of which poetic man thought, Vico writes:
"These three axioms give us the origin of the poetic characters that constitute
the essence of the fables. The first of the three shows the natural inclination
of the vulgar to Invent them, and to invent them appropriately,..... The
second shows that man had a natural need to create poetic characters.
From these and, indeed, from countless other examples, we can see the
importance of the notion of a natural connection in Vico, Its meaning, as I
have suggested above, is that under certain conditions, which must be specif¬
iable, and which tend to occur as the physical context of human activity,
man's nature constitutes the sufficient and recess.ry conditions of his
activity. Or, as has been suggested by iusssrs, Bergin and Fisch, the latter
5
follows spontaneously from the former.
Vs. 377. Vs. 379. Vs. 381. Vs. 209.
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See "The New Science of Giambattista Vico", revised translation by T, G. Bergin
and K. H, Fisch, Introduction pp. .GiX.III - XXX.IV.
From this it follows that one can deduce the general outlines of man's
customs and institutions provided one has knowledge of the ways in which his
nature will express itself where this is allowed to occur spontaneously i.e.
if one has knowledge of general rules stating a connection between a certain
nature and certain kinds of activity. Has Vico given any such rules? The
answer here is clearly in the affirmative. We have just 3een that poetic
man's beliefs about God's nature arose as a result of certain tendencies of
the mind which Vico stated first most generally in Elements I and II and later
in a form modified to conform to the nature of poetic man in Element XXXII,
we should note that these rules were synthetic. There has been no suggestion
of a conceptual connection between, say, being ignorant and tending to think
anthropomorphically. Nor is it possible to sea how there could be.
But even if the rules were synthetic ought we not still to conclude that
Vico thought that we could by means of them write history -without recourse to
11 '<*
factual confirmation? UPla still not the case that, as Croce claims, factual
confirmation is "strictly speaking superfluous"?
The answer to this lies, surely, in the nature of the rules themselves.
'Hie sorts of rules we have dealt with state only connections between kinds of
things and kinds of activities. It follows that at most we can use them to
deduce what kind of activity^. or custom or institution will occur in society.
But what will happen in particular cases cannot be deduced from thi3 and so
recourse to empirical evidence will not be superfluous to the writing of
history.
There is another point to be made here. If the rules state synthetic
connections whose truth is not known a priori, as s :ems obvious from the
examples being considered, they will themselves ultimately stand in need of
confirmation and this can only be empirical even if in a rather indirect way.
How are they, and the "ideal eternal history" deduced from them, to be
confirmed? The answer, as has been suggested earlier, is that they are con¬
firmed when the "ideal eternal history" deduced from them offera the general
principles necessary for a plausible interpretation of (all) the historical
evidence. In other words in its logical structure Vico's procedure is
similar to the hypothetico-deductivs method of the physicist.
This view cannot be established definitively without a consideration
of Vico's "proofs",1 But the discussion so far ha3 lent it considerable
plausibility, we know that Vico claims ultimately to establish knowledge
2
of historical laws, We saw, when discussing the first three principles,
that Vico's arguments to establish certain features of his pattern involved
deducing the consequences of factual hyotheses about human nature and so were
more akin to the theoretical reasoning of the scientist than the a priori
3
reasoning of the philosopher. In the general elements, moreover, Vico
insisted that the philosopher should put aside his over-abstract reasonings
by taking account of "man as he is"1 and that he should "confirm" his
5
"reasonings by appeal to the authority of the phllologians", The above
suggestion is certainly consistent with all these admonitions and presents a
very plausible sense in which philosophic reasoning could be said to be
confirmed by appeal to the findings of the historian.
If the suggestion is correct factual confirmation, far from being
superfluous, i3 of the first importance, Hore, however, we must distinguish
between various kinds of factual verification which are used by Vico with
little attempt to observe their different characters,
"^See Chapter XVI below. ^M.S, 137 to 140, See Chapter V above,
"*3ee Chapter XII above, 4n.S. 132. 5N.S. 140.
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There is first the sort of factual verification which would be appropriate
to the attempt to establish historical laws by the hypothetieo-deductive method.
As applied in the physical sciences that method has trie following character.
First we offer a hypothesis (or theoretical system ) and deduce from this what
must be the case if the hypothesis is true, Empirical tests are then carried
out to check that the consequences are in fact as predicted. If they are not
the hypothesis is falsified! if they are it is corroborated or confirmed.
Confirmation is thus provided when it is recognised that what must be the case
if the hypothesis is true is in fact the case. There is here no philosophical
difficulty about what constitutes such recognition.
The situation is different when this method is applied to history. For
in this sphere there are no acceptable facts with which to confirm the results
of the prediction., what there is, instead, is evidence and trie nature of
the facts "behind" this evidence is very nuch in question. There can therefore be
no confirmation by appeal to the facts, what we can ask instead, however, is
whether the hypothesis or theory can produce a plausible interpretation of the
evidence, which would thus confirm it.
whether Vico says anything about what is to count as "plausible" or
2
"implausible" here will be discussed later. what we can do instead is give
some examples of the above procedure connected with the passages we have been
considering, Vico has offered an account of the manner in which poetic man
cans to conceive of natural phenomena as signs from Jove i.e. as signs of
God's will. He also maintains, as we have seen, that the his boxy of the
meanings of words is governed by the history of such conceptions. One might
therefore expect the word Whose original meaning was "to make a sign" to cone
~Cf, "The Logic of Scientific Discovery" by K. R, Popper, P. 32.
bee Chapters XVI and XVIXI belcw.
to be attached to the notion of God's will with which such signs were associated.
From this, according to Vico, we derive a plausible account of how "nuo" which
first meant "to make a sign" came, in its later form "numen", to mean "the
divine will"."*" This is an example of how a theory or hypothesis about the
history of men's activities is corroborated by the linguistic evidence.
In a similar example from the same paragraph we find Vico explaining
how Jove wa3 first called "Soter" or "saviour" because poetic man, attaching
his own cruel nature to him (an exemplification of Element I), took Jove
also to be cruel and hence was grateful for what he took to be an act of
exceptional kindness by Jove in sparing him from death; and how this later
became "Gtator" (stayer or establisher) once poetic man had conceived that
Jove wished him to give up his nomadic ways for a domiciled existence. Here
again a hypothesis about the history of man's activities is confirmed by
linguistic evidence.
In this connection the following point must be emphasised, .-.hat we are
dealing with here is a logical thesis, i.e. an account of the nature of the
corroboration afforded a historical theory, and the theory of human nature
to which it is logically connected, by the ability of the historical theory
to provide a plausible principle of interpretation of the linguistic evidence.
It is not to be construed, even though Vico's language rather invites
this, as a methodological recommendation. In other words, we are not to assume
that the method involved is that °f first working out, in complete independence
of the historical evidence, how one would expect men with tire hypothesised
nature to behave and then see if this is confirmed by the linguistic evidence.
Iethodologically, 01x3 must start from what one knows; and this may involve a
^"N.5, 379.
little at both ends, i.e. something about the principles of human nature and
something about the meanings of the words used as linguistic evidence. What
is required is that the two should be brought into a consistent rel tionship
and thus corroborate each other.
The second type of confirmtion provided in these passages is rather
different, Vico, as we have seen, argues that the first men must have
attributed a divine nature to whatever they could not understand. In one
passa. e he then writes:
"This is now confirmed by the American Indians, who
call gods all the things that surpass their small
understanding, >»e may add the ancient Germans
dwelling about the Arctic Ocean, of whom Tacitus
tells that they spoke of he aring the dan pass at
night from west to east through the sea, and
affirmed that they saw the gods. These very rude
and simple notions help us to a much better under¬
standing of the founders of the gentile world with
whom we are now concerned,"1
The confirmation here provided is not that of being able to adduce a
consistent interpretation of all the historical evidence. In these cases
there is an appeal to allegedly reliable sources, Tacitus or from whomsoever
Vico gathered his information about the American Indians, and it is claimed
that the way in which they understood ii© notion of a god, being consistent
as it is with Vice's account of the way in which poetic man understood this
notion, confirms his account of the latter, ,e must note that the thesis
that all men and all nations 3hare the same nature is assumed by this con¬
firmation. For if the laws of the nature of man and society were discovered
and authenticated inductively then, ss we said before, such analysis would
presuppose acceptable historical accounts and could not be used to corroborate
them. But if we assume the contention that all men and societies have the
3. 375.
same nature it becomes legitimate to use what is well known in one case to
corroborate what is less well supported in others.
The third type of corroboration used here is different again. Vico
has argued that poetic men did not distinguish between animate and inanimate.
Therefore, he continues, "they gave the things they wondered at substantial
being after their own ideas, Just as children do, whom we see take inanimate
L ings in their hands and play with the., and talk to them as though they
were iiving r rsons -in such tla iu:i u c first ;:e ■. ox a itiJ.o
a tions, children of nascent mankind as we styled them in the cioais, created
things according to their own ideas,"1
It is here suggested th. t the phases of developmsnt of -he abilities,
•ad the conceptions implied in these, of children throws light on, and
perhaps corroborates (though Vice does not explicitly say this), the history
of such development in early nan. It certainly helps us to understand him,
however, rather then pursue this theory through "The New Science" in an
endeavour to characterise it more accurately, it might be bettor to leave
it noted here as being of some relevance to these questions o. corroboration.
From those considerations as to the nature of vIcq's procedure we may
now return .to the question from widen all this sprang: is Vico writing factual
history or is he giving us some a priori account of how society must have
grown': / gain, what is the explanation of his continued alternation between
phrases which suggest ttere is soma a priori or necessary character involved
p
("poetic wisdom,,.,..must have begun with a metaphysic not rational" and
3
"Of such natures must have been the first founders of gentile humanity* " )
ana hrases which suggest that he thinks he is narrating historical facts
1
. . 375 and 376. 2d.b. 375. h.o. 377.
("In such fashion tho first men. created things according to their own
ideas.""*') i
In part the answer to this has already been suggested, i-uch of the
account of the life of poetic ram as we h:ve been discussing it is taken
from Book 11 of "The New Science" in which Vico is trying to present history
as it should be written in trie light of the "ideal eternal history". But
t particular p: rt of history .ith which ho first deals, the career of poetic
man, happens to cone m a ,<:riod for which there was no available evidence,
.hat Vico has done therefore is to work out fairly fully that part of the
"ideal eternal, history" which would be relevant to this period, confirm it
with whatever evidence was available (which is really quite insufficient for
the purpose in hand) and present it as actual hisoory, although admittedly of
a vary general kind.
This is clearly unacceptable. To write a history for this period 'Vico
would have required much ore linguistic evidence to confirm that people acted
in general in the way the model suggests and,if possible, some other sources
giving accounts of actual happenings hicn could be interpreted within this
general framework. Only then could we say that we knew something of the
history of tnis period.
But this is not the .hole story. That Vico was able to try tc pass off
part of the "ideal eternal history" as actual history shows the very intimate
connection he conceived to hold between them. The alternation of the apodeictic
with the assertorial mode of expression in these passages therefore also
reflects Vico's awareness of the nature of historical reasoning as it has
just been described. If the nature of nan is as we think it is, he say3,
his activities must have the character we ascribe to them for in the one lie
^•N.S. 376.
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the necessary and sufficient conditions of the occurrence of the other. It
follows that if human activity can only be understood in its connection with
hu. :i i turo, in describing what happened we show als ; that it must have
happened in that way, given our account of human nature.
One might wonder here whether Vico does try to show that human activity
could not take a different course, even given the particular characteristics
he ascribes to human nature. In the passages under discussion he does not
do sc. But "The dew Science" abounds with his assertions that the course of
human activity could not have been as described by other philosophers and
historians because their accounts conflict with what is 'mown of human nature
as confirmed by the v. rious tyres of proof offered by Vico,
In the concluding paragraph of the chapter ,e are considering, there is
the summary of such an argument:
"This discovery of the origins of poetry does away 'with
the opinion of the matchless wisdom of the ancients, so
ardently sought after from Plato to Bacon's 'Be Sapientia
Veterum'. For the wisdom of the ancients was the vulgar
wisdom of the lawgivers who founded the human raco, not
the esoteric wisdom of the great philosophers. .hence
it 'will be found, as it has been in the case of Jove,
that all the cystic meanings of lofty philosophy attributed
by the learned to the Greek fables and the Egyptian
hieroglyphics are as impertinent es the historical meanings
the, both must have had re natural." 1
Vico is here returning to one of his favourite examples. vhat likelihood
is there, he demands, that in the society of poetic man we shall find evidence
of an awareness of the immutable natural law so beloved of theorists or of
the c receptions of philosophers, when, as we have shown, the - inds of men
'wore so primitive tliat they had not yet arrived at the distinction beWeen
the animate and the inanimate /id, indeed, whose every expression, improbable
"Hl.o, 381,,
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as this may seam to us, must be taken as meaning literally what it says? In
other words, it would be quite beyond people of the mentality described to have
given allegorical expression to philosophical or legal insights, .-hat looks
like allegory is, in fact, nothing but their literal way of expressing the
•world as they saw it,
.<e sec, in this sort of argument, evidence of a sort of philosophical
reasoning applied to history, Vico implies here that it is not enough to
show in history that certain activities occurred and that these occurred in
a context ox certain beliefs, -e also have to show that these beliefs were
the only possible ones i.e. that they embodied distinctions, the grounds for
which alone were available to the people concerned ana did not embody con¬
ceptions and distinctions of which this is not true. In the passages we
have been discussing, for example, there is the contention that poetic man
did not have the distinction between animate and inanimate, we need also,
however, to show that he could not have had it, and Vico does this by showing
that, according to that historical hypothesis which is confirmed by his
various methods, poetic l&ti was still at the stage of total anthropomorphism
in which everything which appeared to require explanation was explained by
belief in an imagined entity /hose sole function was to be a subject for
the possession of a nature similar to man's own. In such a world there
could be no ground for the distinction between animate and inanimate end so,
as Vico writes, in element OC11II, "the physics of tie ignorant is a vulgar
metaphysics by which they refer the causes of the things they do not know to the
will of God 1,1
Thus, because of the indispensable place of human ideas in human
■^.3. 182.
activities, the history of the latter must not only be accompanied by a
history of the former but also by a philosophical criticism to show that the
grounds necessary for the various distinctions embodied in the beliefs in
question were the only ones genuinely available to the peoples concerned,
.e here see a second way in which history cannot merely be narration of the
facts, for the conceptions which form a necessary aspect of these facts must
be shown to be the only ones historically and philosophically possible. Of
course, we must recognise that it is never possible to provide a logical
guarantee that a certain belief would be the only one possible in certain
circumstances, but then neither can the hypothetico-deductive method show a
certain scientific hypothesis to be the only one possible. It can, however,
be used to vindicate one out of a limited number of viable possibilities and
it is in this way that ¥ico's method also should be taken.
In view of this it is even les3 surprising that Vico*3 language should
fluctuate between that which would be appropriate to the statement of fact.
For the "facts" of history are always supported by arguments whose general
form is deductive. Sometimes Vico's language i3 chosen to reflect this, at
others it is not. Thus, to repeat an earlier example, he writes: "Hence
poetic wisdom must have begun with a metaphysic not rational and abstract.
Here ¥ico uses the apodeictic mode. For the justification of this usage,
however, we need only look to the preceding preposition in which he writes:
"And human nature, 30 far as it is like that of animals, carries with it this
2
property, that the senses are its sole way of knowing things." Here we have
the outline of an argument vhose force would be to show that the character
attributed by Vico to poetic wisdom is the only viable one consistent 1th
h.S. 375. 2M.S. 374,
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what is hypothesised about the nature of poetic man. The use of the apodeictic
mode is thus justified.
Finally, in respect of these passages, it is necessary to point out
one other feature of Vice's procedure. This is the fact that he draws upon a
number of principles vhieh must be thought of as having a universal character.
I refer here not merely to the notion that religion performs a function
necessary to the maintenance of society, but also to those principles of human
nature which Vico has introduced and vhich, when we first met with them in
the first and second elements, we treated as being relevant primarily to the
explanation of the neeu for a critical basis to history,^"
we must note now that these principles are used also by Vico as the
hypothetical basis of historical explanation in the sense that they are taken
to be premises from which a certain account of social activity is to be
derived. Their own justification is, of course, another matter,
Je must note further that to be used in this way these axioxas are re¬
stated as more specific elements. In order that in this restatement nothing
should be introduced which would invalidate Vico's procedure we require an
account of the principles on which it diould rest. Such a requirement has
not so far been explicitly acknowledged by 'Vico, but we shall show later that
2
he was aware of it.
"*"5ee Chapter III above. *"See Chapters XV and XVII below.
CHAPTdfi, 1IV
The Construction of The Ideal wtor ml History
The Structirre of social ,-ctivity (XI)
(i)
,.e have so far investigated the structure of poetic society as it is
affected by the first of Vico's three principles, Vico has used the latter
to explain the nature and the genesis of those beliefs and institutions by
adherence to which man'3 acceptance of a final authority in society i3
achieved. Such acceptance is itself necess ry to society,1 it will be con¬
venient now to proceed to the function of the second and third principles.
The second institution necess-ry to all societies is that of marriage.
Our discussion of the three principles showed that Vico holds marriage to be
necessary because it fostered between people a system of human relationships
and enotional an moral bonds. These in turn secured the education and training
without loich no social progress would be possible. . b the 3ame time marriage
is to be explained by reference to man1 ; nature,
..e must re-emphasise here what ..-a saw earlier: that there is no con¬
ceptual or logical necessity attached to the notion of marriage. Vico does not
mention such a possibility but there is no reason to think that he would not
have admitted the concoivability of a society in which there was no such
institution, he would, however, have treated such a conception as irrelevant
13ee Chapter III above.
to the issues in hand. what would be relevant would be only the question
whether we had .rounds for believing that a society based on man1s nature as
described by Vico could exist without marriage, Vico claims that it could
not.
t first sight Vico's osition appears to involve an inconsistency. If
marriage is an institution to b explained by reference to man's nature, an
institution which is necessary because through it can be achieved those things
necessary to progress which would not be achieved if individual men msrely
consulted their own wishes and pursued their own purposes, haw can we explain
it by reference to men who do just that? Surely it cannot be explained by
reference to the/:;.
Vico is not, in fact, . uilty of confusion here, for marriage is not to
be explained by nan's nature per so but by man's nature under the influence of
his belief in a provident being. Vlco goes so far as to claim that marriage
could only endure in the sort of early society with which we are now dealing
if sanctioned and enforced by religion, fhe institution of religion is there¬
fore a necessary condition for marriage. Vico explains this in the following
•way:
"ijoral. virtue began, as it must, with effort, for
the plants11 (the first primitives of each nation) "confined
under the mountains by the frightful religion of the
thunderbolts, learned to restrain their bestial habit of
wandering wild through the great forest of the earth, and
acquired the contrary custom of remaining hidden and
settled in their fields. Kence they later became the
founders of the nations and the lords of the first
commonwealths...... And with this effort likewise the
virtue of moderation began to show itself among them,
restraining their bestial lust from finding its satisfaction
in the sight of heaven, of which they had a mortal terror.
So it came about that each of them would drag one woman
into his cave and would keep her there in perpetual company
for the duration of their lives. Illus the act of human
love was performed under cover, in hiding, that is to say,
us
in shame$ end they began to feel that sense of shame
which joc rates described as the colour of virtue. And
this, after religion is the second bond that keeps nations
united, even as shamelesaness and impiety destroy them.
Such .ms the origin of marriage, which is a chaste, ,
carnal union, consummated under the fear of some divinity."
This passage, clear in itself, deserves some comment. • rriage cannot
be fully explained by man's nature in its most primitive state, for in that
latter stale men wish to act promiscuously. Therefore it can only exist in a
climate of opinion in which men feol shame at promiscuity. But shame can
only obtain in a context in which men are conscious of a distinction between
.hat they are doing and what they ought to do, in other words, in a context
of moral norms. But again, the egoistic primitive has no natural impulse to
moral norms, i.e. no innate moral sense. His acceptance of the notion that
he ought to try to do certain things and not others is therefore, in view of
his nature as we know it, to be explained by his fear of the consequences of
not so doing, which itself can only be explained once he has begun to believe
in a cruel provident being.
..hat is interesting is that this passage can be read both as an account
of the conceptual context in which marriage can be explained and understood,
and as an historical account of the arising of the institution of marriage.
in this second reading, of course, both accounts' are embodied, for the
description of the historical sequence of change at once also explains it.
c have thus another example of Vico's contention that historical description
::ust necessarily be explanatory as well,
one other comment is worth making here. e note th: t there is fin implied
distinction between what we might call social emotions and natural emotions.
.e might think of shame, "the colour of virtue", a3 a social emotion in that,
h.3. 504, 505.
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on /ico's view, it seems to presuppose a moral and hence a social context.
It is clear that he thinks of it in this way, for had he thought of it otherwise,
he could have built it in as part of Mian's nature par so. and explained marriage
as arising i'rosi an innate sense of shams, But he does not do so. He -argues
rather that shams presupposes a sense of moral virtus and that the sense of
oral virtue presup oses fear of a retributive god, oo if there i tural
, Ion here, something more like a non-derivative feeling, it is fear, ..hile
siia, e is disi inctly a more sophisticated f aling which presupposes a ore
developed context of beliefs. But since this is also a historical account,
we have here a glizapae of Vico's conception of the necessarily historical nature
of much of man's own psychological e juipoent.
fr.0 ti.ird of the "three first principles" is the practice of burial of the
dead or rather that principle which in poetic times takes the form of burial
of the dead. For the principle quickly turns out to be belief in the immortality
of the human soul, fids is taken by Vice to be necess ry in the creation and
sustaining of the notion of heredity, which is Itself necessary to those customs
whose rationale turns upon a recognition of rights and responsibilities between
generations of the same family, such as those which obtain between grandchildren
and grandparents.
,»e find, therefore, that these three "principles'1 explain at once the
origin and rationale of a large part of those systems of custom, rights and
responsibilities which constitute, for Vico, tho essence of society, The,y are
necesS' ry not in any unconditioned sense, but in the sense that, given nan's
particular nature, they alone can bring about, and explain, his acceptance of
..hat is ultimately necessary for ids own good, .a must therefore observe that




and nature of society. Their nature is to be explained, and can only be
explained, by reference to man's own nature and the account Vico offers of
that,
we have seen that Vico claims that there is a very close connection
between custom and law, particularly in the case of early societies. In
his summary of the "ideal eternal history" in Book IV he writes: "In virtue
of custom three kinds of natural law of nations are observed","1" The nature of
the connection involved has already been explained in the discussion of ilements
CIV and CV, It is only necessary to emphasise that natural law as here
conceived, i.e. as a system of rights, duties, responsibilities and obligations,
is to be thought of as enforceable. The full explanation of man's activities
can therefore not be achieved without an account of the nature of the mechanism
by which this is brought about. Hi is is how Vico thinks of the government,
i,e. as an institution for the conservation and legal enforcement of that system
of civil and human relationships which constitute the essence of society. In
the poetic age, with which we are dealing, the content of the natural lav/ will
not be a system of relationships seen by rational men to be just and equitable
and accepted because of this, but that behaviour which poetic man would see to
be appropriate towards the being to whom he attributes control of the universe
and accepted because of his fear of the consequences of nort-acceptanee, In
such a context, government would also be theocratic; fear of disobeying the
gods would soon bring about fear of disobeying those vtfio claimed to understand
the gods' wishes and to be able to make pleas and intercessions, in either
direction, with them.
Finally, in thi3 connection, it is useful merely to record the extent
Vd. 915.
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to which Vico himself insists that all the beliefs of the age be interpreted
in conformity with the principles of man's nature unaer the transfiguring
infulence of his acceptance of the three necessary principles, he have already
seen haw a poetic physics aro3© and is explained, with its tvhole apparatus of
divine activity in the world,"'" In such a scheme there is no room for the
distinction between the physical and the metaphysical. In the poetic cosmo¬
graphy which is associated with this the same concepts are likewise conflated
with the result that the limits of the physically existent (for poetic man,
the sky) is at once also the limit of the metaphysically existent, and as such
the sky becomes the home of the gods. In conformity with this conflation, the
home of the ungodly, the underworld, is identified with all areas under the
skies,2
A knowledge of astronomy will be necessary to poetic men, for whom the
taking of the auspices and the art of divination are important matters. But
the movements of heavenly bodies will not be read as physical phenomena,
3
Instead they will throw light on the aims and intentions of the gods,
what all this amounts to is an insistence that it is useless to treat
ancient conceptions of physics, cosmography or astronomy, some of which were
the forerunners of respectable sciences today, as though in their origin they
derived from, and are to be explained by, some scientific impulse in man, some
innate desire to reach the truth for its own 3ake, Of course, most historians
would recognise the non-scientific character of much of what passed for science
in former days but they raight still try to explain this as the result of a lack
of technical resource and thus still explain man's behaviour in terms of a
\T.b. Book II, sections I and VII, .0, Book II, Section VIII,
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N.3, Book II, Section Li,
desire to find oat the truth and a wish directly to control physical nature.
Here, however, Vico has a warning to offer.
For, in the far-off era in -which science first arose, if there wa3 any
sense in which man sought to control his environment it was not by an attempt
to acquire direct physical control over it, for the very notion of direct
physical control was ruled out under the conceptual conditions of the time.1"
His efforts must be interpreted in terras of a desire to 'read' what was
going to happen and to influence tire future by the offer of gifts and sacri¬
fices to the gods.
(ii)
It is appropriate now to turn to the next division of subject matter
mentioned by Vico in the introduction to Book XV. "And in order" he writes,
"that men, having reached the stage of human society, may on the one hand com¬
municate to each otrier the aforesaid three most important matters (customs,
laws and commonwealths), three kinds of languages and as many of characters
2
are formed "
we have already mentioned Vico's recognition of the historical importance
3of linguistic evidence. what concerns us here is his insistence, in the sphere
of language, upon the same requirement which underlies the interpretation of
man's social achievements, i.e. the requirement'that language bo interpreted
in such a way as to be seen to be grounded in, or explained by, human nature at
the time.
it is this requirement which explains vico's insistence that the element
of conventional definition would require abilities beyond the nature of primitive
nan.''1' what, then would be the characteristics of the language of poetic manV
182. ^N. . 915. ^hee Chapter VIII above. ^N,3 , 444.
The key to Vico's celebrated answer is to be found in Elements LVII to LIX., .
In Element LVII Vico writes: "Mates make themselves understood by
gestures or objects that have natural relations with the ideas they wish to
signify,"1 To this he adds Wo claims: "This axiom is the principle of the
2
hieroglyphs by which all nations spoke in the time of their first barbarism".
And: "It is also the principle of the natural speech which Plato (in the
Cratvlus) gueaaed to have been spoken in the world at one time,,,,,.
This natural speech must have been succeeded by the poetic discourse of images,
3
similes, comparisons and natural properties".
It is easy enough to see the nature of the language Vico is describing
heroj what is mors obscure is the nature of the argument implied in the axiom
itself. Does Vico 's reference to what mutes do mean that he wishes to argue
from what mutes do to -what primitive man must have dona? And if so why should
tie think that the one follows from the other? Or is he merely saying that a
study of how mutes converse will give us a key to how poetic man proceeded? In
the light of -what was shown in the last chapter about the logical structure of
Vice's arguments, we can legitimately discard the first suggestion, that the
behaviour of mutes somehow offers a proof or corroboration of a historical
hypthesis. ..e may instead accept the second suggestion, which offers it as an
interpretative key to our understanding of past language, ilead thus Vico's
point is t at, as a result of our knowledge of how the mute proceeds today, we
may hazard the suggestion that primitive man expressed himself, in that era
of language which preceded the language of conventional meaning, by "gestures
or objects tnafc have natural relations with the ideas they wish to signify."
1V,3. 225. ^.3. 226 , 3N.S« 227.
Vico reinforces this insight by two others. In element LVIII he ..rites:
"ijufces utter formless sounds by singing, and stammerers by singing teach their
tongues to pronounce","*" This is followed by the claim that "men vent great
passions by breaking into song, as we observe in the most grief-stricken and
2
the most joyful".
Our suggestion about the function of these elements is confirmed by the
corollary to llament LLC, Here Vico writes, of the two axioms just quoted,
that they " - supposing that the founders of the gontile nations had wandered
about in the wild state of dumb beasts and that, being therefore sluggish, they
were inexpressive save under the impose of violent pass ionsV" (load to the
jt. 3
conjecture that) their first languages must have teen fonred in singing".
The effect of these two elements is to introduce the conjecture, or
hypothesis, that tte main fmiction of the vocal element in the pre-verbal
language of poetic man is, as it would now be described, to express emotion
in song, Vico'3 suggestion is that poetic man "vents" his emotions in song.
In tiiis way Vico puts forward what must be taken as the hypthesis that
there are throe main elements in the pre-verbal language of poetic man -
the use of gestures find of objects which are "naturally" related with certain
ideas he wished to signify, and vocal utterance as the natural expression of
emotion. But how, one mi ht wonder, wer® intellectual ideas expressed! The
question does not arise, for poetic man had no intellect worthy of the name.
There is another dimension to Vico's conception of the language of
poetic nan. To understand this we must again recollect Vico's claim that a
true account of any institution and hence of language, at any stage in its
development must show that institution to be grounded in, and appropriate to,
hi.3. 220. hi.St 229. %.3. 230.
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man's nature at the tims,"L In the case of poetic man this means that it must
be the sort of language which would arise naturally for the man of sense and
passion, whose beliefs and ways of acting centred on an imaginative and theo¬
logical view of the universe and his place in it.
what functions would language have in such a world? Vico describes it,
in his summary in Book IV, as "a divine mental language by mute religious
acts or divine ceremonies, from which there survived in woman civil law the
actus legitixnl which accompanied all their civil transactions. This language
belongs to religions by the eternal property that it concerns them more to be
reverenced than reasoned, and it was necessary in the earliest times when men
2
did not yet possess articulate speech",
Vico gives this language essentially the character of an activity, in
referring to its "mute religious acts" and its "divine ceremonies". His refer¬
ence to the survival of these actions into woman civil law is interesting but
should not mislead us. He does not mean, as in the case of the Roman civil
law, that these acts accompanied certain linguistic activities; he means that
in the age of poetic man they were themselves linguistic activities. But
tire character of these activities is dictated by the human and social context
in which they have this usage,
Another aspect of language is written as against gestured and spoken
language. Trie interpretation of prewritten language must also conform to trie
same requirement as that of spoken and gestured language. The divine language
of poetic man will therefore have its appropriate character - the hieroglyph;
the essential feature here will be that it is also naturally related to what it
represents, expresses or performs, Vico's own examples are fanciful but the
13ee Axioms VIII, XIV and XV. ^.3 . 929.
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following quotations will reveal something of their nature. In the "Chronological
Table" in Book I, we find the following entry regarding Idanthyrsus, king of
Scythia:
"This king answered Darius the Great, who had threatened
to make war on him, with five real words (which as we
shall show later, the first peoples must have used before
they car® to vocal words and finally to written ones).
These words were a frog, a mouse, a bird, a ploughshare
and a bow for shooting arrows. Further on we 3hall show
the natural and proper meaning of these objects".1
when we turn to Chapter IV of Book 11 on Poetic wisdom, in which Vico
explains the origins of hieroglyphs, we find the following account:
"These five vers a frog, a mouse, a bird, a ploughshare
and a bow. The frog signified that he, Idanthyrsus,
was born of the earth of Scythia as frogs are bom of
the earth in summer rain3, and so that he was a son
of that land. The mouse signified that he, like a
mouse, had made his horns '.here he was bom; that is,
that he had established his nation there. The bird
signified that in that place he had his auspices:
that is, that, as we shall see, he was subject to none
but God, The ploughshare signified that he had
reduced those lands to cultivation, and thus tamed
them and made them his own by force. And finally the
bow signified that as supreme commander of the arms of
Scythia he had the duty and might to defend her. This
explanation, so natural and necessary, is to be set against
the ridiculous ones worked out, according to St. Cyril,
by the counsellors of Darius, Add to the interpretation
of the Scythian hieroglyphics by Darius'3 counsellors the
far-fetched, artificial and contorted interpretations by
scholars of the Egyptian hieroglyphics, and it will be
evident that in general the true and proper use of
hieroglyphics by the first peoples has hitherto not been
understood. As fcr the Latins, Roman history has not left us
without such a tradition; witness the mute heroic answer
which Tarquinius Superbus sends to his son in Gabii
when, in the presence of the messenger, he cuts off the
heads of the poppies with the stick he has in his hands.
In Northern -/orope, as Tacitus observes in describing
their customs, the ancient Germans were not acquainted
with the secrets of letters; that is, they did not
knov; how to write their hieroglyphics "2
Apart from its value a3 an illustration of how Vico conceived the fore-
Vs. 99. Vs. 435.
runner of written language, there are a number of points of interest which may
be made concerning this passage, he might note, first, Vico's claim that his
explanation is "natural and necessary" as against "the ridiculous" alternatives.
Now Vico's explication of Idanthyrsus* language is far from simple nor has it
any appeal on the grounds of immediate plausibility. It seems unlikely that
he himself would expect it to recommend itself on this ground, when he claims
that it is "natural" he cannot mean that it is natural to us, but must mean
that it is natural in the circumstances i.e. that it can be seen to follow
from, and be fully explained by, the sort of reason we have earlier considered,
re can see, in fact, that at least two of the "real words" are interpreted in
conformity with features of the poetic way of life with which we have already
msti the "mouse" in conformity with the suggestion that poetic man is no longer
a nomad and has now some customs based on recognition of heredity, and the
"bird" in conformity with his reliance on the taking of the auspices as a means
of communication with the gods.
we must note next that trie re are two reasons why Vico expects his suggest¬
ions to be accepted. They are, first, "natural and necessary" as against the
"far-fetched, artificial and contorted" interpretations which other scholars
have produced of Egyptian hieroglyphics. Vico can make this claim because in
interpreting this language in accordance with principles supplied by the "ideal
eternal history" he has ensured that the interpretation should take Into account
the intimate connection between all the various activities of a certain kind of
man.
But this, though necessary, is not sufficient, we must note also the
widespread nature of Vico's corroborative evidence. That an unwritten language
n $
of natural hieroglyphs must have preceded the language of written hieroglyphs
is supported not erely by the fact that on that supposition we can make sense
of the doings of Idanthyrusus but also because by means of it we can make sense
of the doings of Tarquinius, of the Germans and, for the passage continues
beyond quotation, of French, lexicon and Scottish history.
This suggests that Vico is trying to establish his principles of inter¬
pretation as laws. In effect he is arguing that a hypothesised principle of
historical intsrprotation can be accepted satisfactorily as such only if it
can be applied successfully to a large enough number of actual histories as to
give it the status of a law. This is a very strong requirement indeed. We
shall discuss later whether Vico needs anything as strong,"'"
(iii)
-e may now turn to the third gemral category into which, in his summary
in Book IV, Vico divides the various elements of the social life. This category
arises in order that men may "justify" their customs and laws and consists in
"three kinds of jurisprudence assisted by three kinds of authority and three
2
kinds of reason in as many of judgments".
There is no need to go into this at all fully for the general character
of Vico1s view is now clear. As one might expect, the jurisprudence of poetic
man cannot be a rational jurisprudence. For one who believes that everything
is a direct creation of God and is largely under his direct control, juris¬
prudence will take the form of a justification of certain types of activity by
showing them to be directly ordered by God and the prohibition of others by
showing them to be impious. Thus in the life of poetic man the taking of the
auspices will occupy that place which, in later ages, will be occupied by a
3
aiore rational set of procedures.
Again in the world of poetic imn there will be no place for later
. 2 3
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conceptions of the role of authority e.g. of the conception of authority which
base3 itself "on the trust placed in parsons of experience, of singular prudence
in practical matters, and of subline wisdom in intellectual matters".1 In the
poetic age authority also rests with the gods and their interpreters and its
2
decisions re accepted without comprehension of its real nature by trie people.
Finally such man can have no conception of reason in practical affairs,
i.e. the ability to accept a certain practical rule or code of conduct because
they can see it to be necessary, useful or generally advantageous in the long
run. In their world the place which will later be taken by reason is taken
by authority i.e. by appeal to those who are held to have wisdom in practical
affairs, the gods. For early man the functions of reason and authority in
3
practical matters coalesced.
•hl.S. 942. ^.o. 944. 3N.3. 943.
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CHAPTER Vf
The Construction of the Ideal Eternal History
Tho Genetic Pattern
It has been shewn that there are two aspects of the "ideal eternal
history". These derive from Vico's two requirements, that to understand the
nature of society and of social change an account both of the rationale of its
institutional framework and of trie historically conditioned nature of the latter
be given. The factors involved here are necessarily related; we may discuss
them separately for reasons of convenience but we cannot reach an adequate
conception of the nature of society and of social change without understanding
their relationship.
This view has been reinforced by the discussion of the first type of
pattern in the "ideal eternal history". The important feature here has been
the emphasis on the close relation between description and explanation in
history: our descriptions explain because our selection of what should be
described is governed by our conception of what sorts of things explain other
sorts of things, conception which is written into the "ideal eternal history".
we can see, however, that while we can explain both the genesis and the
<
character of an instition by describing the context in which it arose and cm
A
do the same for the context itself we cannot reach a fully sufficient explan¬
ation until a self-evident explanatory feature is reached. Vico find3 this in
the psychology of the people, taking an account of tils to be an intelligible
yet ultimate explanation beyond which it would be senseless to enquire. Thus
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any attempt to understand the pattern in cross-section at any specific point
would have to rest u on an understanding of human nature at that phase of its
development.
But this will not give us a fully sufficient explanation unless we can
understand the historical conditioning factors which have made human nature
what it is. it is thus impossible in principle to chieve a full explanation
of social change unless we can also give a genetic account of the development
of human nature.
The discussion in the last two chapters of the pattern in cross-section
can therefoi-e not be taken as a complete account of the sort of explanation
Vico wishes to insist upon. It has been first an account of the nature of
hu an activity traced over a relatively short period of time i.e. within a
period of time whose events could be explained by reference to the one sort of
hu.. i nature. It has also been an account of that which could be explained
by the first sort of human nature, To take it as containing in principle all
the elements which Vico thinks are involved in the understanding of social
change would be defective In two ways. It would fail to bring out factors
whose importance is only revealed by a consideration of the long-term pattern
he claimed to descry in history. It ould also fail to ive a proper account
of those kinds of social activity whose explanation involved not only a reference
to their relation to the over-all structure of society but also to their own
previous states since, by definition, there would be none of these.
These infects ...ust now be remedied. We commence with the second, the
nature of the relation between different historical stages of the same institution
or type of activity. The principles of Vico's treatment of this can be dealt
with briefly for they are to some extent the same as those we have already
considered. In the account in the foregoing chapters it has come out that a
type of activity or institution is to be explained by showing that it would
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"naturally" have this character in view of man's other activities and beliefs.
Vico uses this same notion of what is "natural" when talking of the conditions
to which, for example, a history of the meanings of words must adhere. tynology
should "tell us the histories of the tilings signified by the words, beginning
with their original and proper meanings and pursuing the natural progress of
their metaphors according to the order of the ideas, on which the history of
languages must proceed, s we have premised in the axioms".1
In effect this se sms to do no more than insist that a history of the
change in meaning of words should conform to the principles already investigated.
At every stage of such a history the interpretation of the meanings of words
mu3t conform to the interpretation of man's total activities as governed by the
nature of i is ideas and, ultimately, of his mind.
But in fact something new is de.wanded here. As soon as ..a start to talk
of the order of change in the case of any one kind of activity, and explain the
order of change of all activity by reference to that of man's nature, we are
committed to giving an account of the order of change as it applies to man's
nature. -e therefore see that a history of rj one type of activity or institution
(.. ., et;sd3 of warfare, of the [.canings of words or of economic ■ nd political
practices) must conform to two requirements. Over a short stretch of time it
must be explained by reference to man's other activities at the tin©, resting
upon a certain sort of human nature. ..hen attention is shifted to longer stretches
of tire the explanation must take account of developments in human nature itself.
To s.e how Vico deals with thi3 we turn to consider the long-term pattern
he claimed to descry in history. Immediately, however, we con© upon a difficulty:
Vico gives at least two accounts of the sequence of change involved in the
354.
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history of any nation. Ona of these we h&ve already mst with, whoa we mentioned
Vico • 3 account of the five n tures of mn, together with tho dominant otivational
characteristics of each nature sad the various types of political organisation
•ropri .to t them, put forward in J.o..ent .. if and those .v.JLch follow it.'
From this account we night think that the history of each nation falls into five
distinct epochs, related by the fact that while the activities of man in any¬
one epoch could be ex lainsd by his nature at th t time, his nature at that time
Could only b explained by refo mc- to tho nreccdia epoc .
But Vico writes also as thougi the history of any one nation falls into
three distinguishable epochs. This is tost cle rly revealed in the summary of
the "ideal eternal history" in Book IV, with its sections entitled "Three ,inds
of Natures", "Three binds of Customs", "Three .Linda of Situral Law", "Throe
Kind3 of Governmentand so on. Hero Vico applies the division into three
hi- orical epochs to a variety of the elements of the social life as he conceives
it.
In his actual practice, however, Vic fails to adhere to either ciassil'i-
catozy schema. For exa. pie, in the fivefold scheme, with its five types of
human nature and dominant motivational characteristics, one right expect J ico to
present us with five paradigm figures. Instead, he presents us with six such
2
figures. . Again, the titles of. the sections of Book XV suggest that in the
"ideal eternal history" there re throe kinds of government associated with three
kinds of n ture . There is the theocratic government appropriate to theocratic
or poetic man; there is the aristocratic government appropriate to tho heroic
nature of poetic man's successor; and there is human government appropriate to tho
fully hvBuan, or intelligent, man who succeeds heroic man. But in practice, it
l 2
dee Chapter XI above. N.3. 243.
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turns out that two forms of government are appropriate to human man. Vico
vacillates between thinking of these as alternative and as successive types of
,.ov rnment. But on either reading the simple trichotomy, with ne type of
government appropriate to each type of nature, has failed to be applied.
Another example of this same inability to adhere to the threefold classi¬
fication of historical epochs is to be found in Vico's discussion of the languages
of noetic and heroic man. Vico sometimes uses the adjective "poetic" when
referring to matters appropriate to the first stage of development. In this
3ense "poetic" is to be distinguished from "heroic" which is applicable to the
second stage. Yet when he gives his ccount of the stages of development of
the Sgyptia language he writes: "The second kind of speech, corresponding to
the age of the heroes, was said by the Egyptians to have been spoken by symbols,,,.
In consequence they must have been metaphors, images, similitudes or comparisons
which, having passed into articulate speech, supplied all the resources of
poetic expression",1 And shortly afterwards he explicitly uses the terms as
synonyms when he claims that "the heroic or poetic language was founded by the
?
heroes".
Vico's failure to adhere to these large-scale divisions suggests that they
are perhaps intended to be primarily divisions of convenience rather than
divisions fundamental to his account of the "ideal eternal history". There i3
no doubt that historians do find it convenient to have terms for referring to
changes which occur in a pattern which only reveals itself over a long period
of history. On t..ia view the 'three natures' terminoLogy -would be used for
referring to a kind of change which only revealed itself over a large part of
433. 2N,.w, 443.
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the nation's histoxy and the 'five natures' terminology would be a more specific
language for discussing the pattern as it revealed itself over rather shorter
stre tc. ' of history. The position night bo like that of an historian who finds
it convenient to talk of say, the difference between the medieval mind and the
renaissance mind when wishing to draw attention to changes in natal outlook and
belief which can only be made clear by considering a large period of history
but ho also finds it convenient to talk of the difference between the thirteenth
and fourteenth century mind when wanting to discuss less narked changes rising
over a smaller period of history.
If one took such a view of "The New dcience" one would have to be careful
to distinguish beWeen the claim that a nation's history does not fall into three
or five significantly different epochs and the claim that it had no discernible
pattern at all, if we said that the large-scale classificatory divisions are
matters of convenience, that they are useful in that they enable us to refer to
parts of the pattern in different ways according to our needs, this would not
be to say that no significant ; attern exists at all at any level of history
and the question would arise: at what level does the pattern exist?
In fact this solution serves only to bring out a major ambiguity in
"The Net-/ cience" and one which to some extent must be resolved. For the above
view appears to be inconsistent with the theory of historical explanation we
h ve attributed to Vico, .a have argued that it is implicit in his procedure
that the kinds of activities which a e exemplified in history can only be fully
explained when shown to be related to certain kinds of human nature. And if,
as his explicit language suggests, these kinds of human nature are significantly
different _t follows that there is a philosophical ground for the distinction
into three or five epochs, that ground being provided by the division of human
nature into three or five different "finds. The latter divisions can ha rdly then
be looked on as distinctions of convenience,
,.e may put the difficulty in the following way, if we say that the
large-scale division into epochs find corresponding types of human nature is in the
end merely a matter of convenience we can reconcile the exists ice of two or more
such systems of classification. But if we take this view can we also claim that
such explanations as are to be afforded by these arbitrary divisions are true?
It seems not, ,.e need 30me reasoning or argument to show that the nature of
human activity is susceptible of ex l&naoion on these lines, ..nd if this were
available the divisions would become -.ore than a master of more convenience. On
the other hand, if e hold that we can justify the application of these large-
scale divisions to the history of social activity because we can show them to
relate to certain fundamental factual truths about man's nature we can claim
that the explanations they afford are true, But how, on this view, are we to
reconcile the existence of two sets of fundamental truths concerning man's
nature? what is raised here is the question of the status of these "kinds of
natures" to which Vico alludes and of their relationship both to one another and
to those other human activities which are explained by them,
we must note first that it is Vico's view that although, given the nature
of poetic man, it is necessary that his subsequent activities should have their
particular character which can therefore be explained by his nature, there is no
way of explaining that nature .itself. In the hierarchy of levels of explanation
it is ultimate. It is therefore inexplicable, though not unintelligible.
The question now aii3es: are we to attribute this same character to
those other human natures which Vico adduces in the course of Ids three-fold
I si
and five-fold divisions of che pattern of human development? Is "heroic"
nature, -like "poetic" nature, an ultimate explanatory feature which can be
used in explanation but which itself cannot be explained? and is this true
also of the "human" nature of the third stage of society?
Throe unfortunate consequences ensue should wo adopt t.wls view. First, as
already mentioned, .<o must choose between the fivefold and three-fold divisions
of man's nature. They cannot both bo true.
beco id, it follows that if the three kinds of natur s :re the ultimate,
ineducable basis of explanation then, though we explain the development of
social activity by reference to them, t»>ose U.roo features ti-.emse-.ves fall
outside the laws of historical, social development, .e are tr.us precluded
from iving an Historical account of the Jcvelopment of man's nature in the
J
way in which we can, for example, give an account of the development of his
winds of government or legal systems.
But can we even do the latter? The third consequence is that this is
also now precluded. If we explain one legal system by showing how it developed
from the activities of a certain type of nature ad we ex. lain how its precursor
eveioned from a different and unrelated type of nature, we are no longer in a
ocition to explain how che second type of legal system developed from the first.
To do the letter we should require to know the principles which explain the
development of the one kind of nature from the other; and if these kinds of
natures are to be ccapted as fundamental and inexplicable there can be no such
principles.
The conclusion from this must be that to look upon man's nature throughout
its career as ultimate nd inexplicable is inconsistent with the type of
explanation Vico wishes to offer for the growth of human oci 1 institutions.
If the latter is necessarily Historical in the sense that institutions can only,
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and then must, occur under certain .Astorical conditions, the same must be true
of human n ture itself.
Th&t Vico did try to hold views involving the above inconsistency is
suggested mainly by his artificial and over-precise attempts to summarise the
structure of the "ideal eternal history" in some simple manner, Thus he talks
of three kinds of natures from which spring three kinds of customs and natural
law, giving the impression that not only are the three kinds of natures identically
related to their kinds of custom and natural law but that they are identical in
every way, logical status included."1"
One right think that this represents Vice's view were it not for three
considerations. In the first place, as we have already mentioned, in the history-
he writes Vico does not adhere to this simple trichotomy. He appears to find it
difficult to decide where to draw the line between poetic and heroic or beWeen
heroic and human. Consequently a certain ambiguity seems to escend upon the
terms themselves.
In the second place, Vico does not think of these terms as exel isively
applicable to their own epochs. This is because he allows for considerable
intarpenetration of the institutions of one epoch with those of another, although,
of course, the character of the institution will necessarily change in the course
of this. ->e find for example, that the succession of forms of political states
"adiits of mixtures not of form with form (for such mixtures would be monsters)
but of a succeeding form with a preceding overnment. All such mixtures are
founded on the .axiom above, that when men change they retain for some time the
2
impression of their previous customs". Yet, interpenetration of this sort ought
to be impossible on the above view.
"'"N.S. 915. 2N.3. 1004.
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The fxrw. and most important consideration, however, lies in the fact
that there is to be found in "The New Science" the claim that human nature itself
undergoes an historical development, together 'with an account of the principles
of this process. This claim is incompatible with the view that the three or
five types of human nature are to be thought of as ultimate, inexplicable facts.
One is not surprised to find a point of such importance receive some
mention in the general elements. But before considering this it would be advisable
to give a brief account of the way in which Vico envisages this development.
The idea that man's nature undergoes a development in time has repercussions
upon the interpretation of all his activities, Vico finds that these also develop
in time. As an example of this we consider his account of the history of
natural lav;,"'" In the summary of Book IV we are told that there are three kinds
of lawj "The first law was divine for men believed themselves arxl all their
property to depend on the gods, since they thought everything was a god or made
"2
or done by a god. This is followed by heroic law which is "a law of force,
but controlled by religion which alone can keep force within bounds where there
are no human laws or none strong enough to curb it. Hence providence ordained
that the first peoples, ferocious by nature, should be persuaded by this their
religion to acquiesce naturally in force, and that, being as yet incapable of
reason, they should measure right by fortune, with a view to which they took
3
counsel by auspicial divination". The third "is human lew dictated by fully
developed human reason",^-
Here the character of the law depends upon the nature of men. The latter
e/olves through two stages in which men are "as yet incapable of reason" to
that in which there is "fully developed human reason". This third stage, that
"Vico invariably refers to law as 'natural* law to emphasise its relation
to society, Jince he is not a natural law theorist in the sense that
expression now ha3, it would be as well in what follows to omit the
adjective 'natural',
^N.S.922, 3N.S. 923. Vs. 924.
of the developed human reason, is one which is not fully described in "The
New science", Vico preferred to expend his energies upon more obscure periods
of history. Nevertheless, it is necessary to rasp its nature if we are to
understand the direction of /nan's development.
The history of law i3 expounded more fully in the concluding 3et of particular
elements.1" Here Vico offers a distinction between "strict law", which is the
law of trie first and second epochs of development, and "mild law", the law of
the third epoch. The distinction now is between law which i3 applied according
to its "certitude" and backed by authority, and that which is applied because
2
it is what "impartial utility dictates in each case". This distinction is
fairly easy to grasp if we distinguish between the letter of the law and the
spirit of the law. Vico's contention then would be that, in the poetic and
heroic ages, men, being unable to grasp the spirit of the law, applied the law
as they received it from the gods or from the appointed authorities, as closely
according to the letter as possible. This is the "certitude" of the law, ^ore-
over, since at this stage they could not understand the spirit of the law, they
accepted it only when the authority could enforce it.
Against tiiis ..e are offered the later stage in which men accept the law
because they can grasp its spirit, i.e. because thejr can understand its true
function in civil life: "The natural equity of fully developed human law is
a practice of wisdom in affairs of utility, since wisdom in its broad sense
3
is nothing but the science of making use of things as their nature dictates".
In other words, equity (the spirit of the law) can operate effectively only
when men are sufficiently rational to be able to understand the nature of law and
to frame and accept law with thi3 in mind. But to understand the nature of lew
h.6.319-329. 2N.o. 323.- 3N.O. 326.
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much is re uirod. Law has its m Lure because of the relationship between man
and society. The nature of law cannot therefore be grasped until one can under¬
stand the nature of the relationship between can and society. Here the importance
of the rinciple of historical relativity must not be over-looked. The laws which
equity will enjoin will not be some set of immutable truths finally accessible
to man's reason, but 3imply those laws which, now that the relationship of man
to society is understood, are seen to be dictated by that relationship, ignorance
of this principle has led the natural law theorists to think that the spirit
which informed the law of their own age is some sort of timeless essence which
informs the law of all ages."
The principle which Vico puts forward here is that there is a development
in the history of law which is explained by a development of man'3 understanding
of the rel Liunship between himself and society, i.e. ultimately, of his own
nature. The understandirv, which thus develops is, of course, noL primarily
the property 01 the individual per se. but of the individual in his social
capacity. Vico talks of it as "the practice of wisdom" and -dsdom, as we saw
earlier, is nothing but the "common sense" of man, the public background of
individual thought, as embodied in institutions and types of ctivity. Thus it
is not man as an individual, or aggregate of individuals, who develops, but
man as an essentially social being, whose nature is expressed in forms or types
of social activity.
In these passages Vico also characterises the distinction as that between
"the true" and "the certain", and refers to the use of these terms in this
context as an application "to the particular matter of the natural law of
nations (of) the two general definitions which treat of the true and the certain
1h... 327 and 329.
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in general with a view to conclusions in all the matters that are herein
treated".1
Vico here refers to hleinsnts II and X, which we earlier concluded expressed
an epistemological principle about the nature of the objects of belief and
knowledge. Mow we are referred to these axioms as embodying the principle of
the historical development of man's understanding. The principle itself is
stated in element IX; "ten who do not know the truth of things try to reach
certainty about them so that, if they cannot satisfy their intellects by
2
science, their wills at least may rest on consciousness", earlier we related
this axiom to Vico's account of the difference between the work of the philo-
logian and of the philosopher. The forcer was concerned with particular facts
"the certain", the latter 1th the universal and eternal, "the truth", in
its new use, as a principle of interpretation, the axiom implies that the
3ort of knowledge that is put forward in "The New Science" is itself to be
seen as a development from the concern with particular fact which is a dominant
characteristic of the mind of certain ages. Applied, for exa pie, to the
history of lav/, the suggestion is that we should try to read that history as
the development of the ability to use general rules embodying principles of
equity and "impartial utility" from the ability to concern oneself only with
the literal interpretation of authorised injunctions about how to proceed in
specific cases.
we find therefore that Vico does put forward a claim concerning the
principles of development of the human mind, i.e. of the types of things which
minds did rather than of that which any one mind did. Put in a most general
way, that claim is that the development of the mind proceeds from a stage in
^.S. 325. ^.3. 137.
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which all it could do was imaginatively to objectify its own characteristics, and
build of these the background for one sort of social world, to a stage in
which it can understand itself, its needs and requirements, and so c:n create
those institutions which will best satisfy these. The guiding principle of
history is therefore the development of reason, i.e. the gradual emergence of
the ability to tnink about, and un erstand the nature of, human activity, and
the gradual growth of freedom from superstitious and imaginative ..ays of doing
this.
It is most im; ortant to recall that this principle, which is concerned
.vxth the development of human understanding, is presented as a general principle
and is then given a particular application to the history of law and to all the
matters treated of in "The New science"."'" It is clear from this that Vico
thinks that human understanding, which is a part of human nature, is expressed
in the law and in all those other matters. We should therefore be careful not
to think of vico's"human nature" as soire thing over and above the law and customs
of men. It is expressed in them and their history is its history. It cannot
therefore bo lorn...to., as :±r>~A:\ separately from them. nsn we refer to it
separately thi3 must therefore be taken a3 a device for talking about certain
characteristics - a kind of unity or a kind of development - which they exhibit.
Once tiiis is seen the difficulties over the relationship of the three
kinds of natures to each other and to the other kinds of human activities soon
remove themselves, if man's nature is not 'something over and above his types
of activity the demand that the latter should "arise" from the former is not
a demand to show a connection between two kinds of things but a demand that
one kind of thing be thought of in a certain way. The requirement that, for
1u >. 325.
m
example, the customs of poetic man should arise from his poetic nature involves
nothing more than that his customs be interpreted as having their rationale in
an imaginative view of the world. The dei.and that the customs of fully human
man should "arise" from his intelligent nature is the de;xtnd that our inter¬
pretation of his customs be based upon the premise that he understands his own
nature and therefore understands why he should freely accept the social life and,
further: ore, accept it in ne form rather than another.
Vico's principle is really a request for the introduction of certain
principles of consistency and unity into the interpretation of the social life
of a people, he see man's nature itself develop as we see hi3 institutions,
types of activity and ways of thinking develop. But the latter develop
according to a necessary order, bo too .rust the former. The second and third
kinds of nature therefore develop necessarily from the first and are thus not
the inexplicable be. sis of colanation they .right otherwise seem to be. The
first kind of nature is the only inexplicable element which need be brought
into the ideal scheme or into historical explanation. Hence far from being
some extra-historical hypothesis in terms of which we eight try, but fail, to
explain the develop.nient of society, flco's later "kinds of natures" are them-
og■voc conditioned by the necessarily historical process.
If this is .ranted the way is further opened for accepting the earlier
explanation for reconciling the three-fold and five-fold divisions both of
society and of man's nature. If the process of change and development through
which society and man's nature develop is equally necessary, there is no room
left for the gaps in explanation which would be left if we accepted the three¬
fold and five-fold types of nature as historically inexplicable facts. Explanation
must conform to Pico's ideal and development be seen to occur "by a constant
m m uninterrupted order of causes and effects present in every nation.... "x
The three-fold and five-fold divisions of men's nature cannot be thought of as
interrupting this sequence. They are instead convenient .-ays of referring to
the different characteristics it reveals when considered over shorter or longer
sections of its full course.
it may seem an objection to this view that if we. accept it we shall find
it difficult to make much sense of the notion of a pattern in history. This
does not follow, it is certainly true that if the three and five natures are
not to be thou^ t of as the ultimate determinants of history e c mot find
the pattern by appealing to them, we ust therefore look else..here for it.
But . ? have not far to look. The p; stern is revealed in the sequence of stages
of development of human activity established deductively in the "ideal eternal
history". This has the character of continuous and gradual development ("through
a cc istivit and uninterrupted ore r of causes and effects") which would be impossible
were the different kinds of human natures taken to be the ultimate, inexplicable
determinants of that development. The process as traced by Vico is far too
continuous to fall neatly into three or five different sections;hence Vico.'s
difficulties in deciding how to relate the detailed process of development of
the pattern itself, and the actual events of history which are instances of this,
to wis larger but over-precise cl sslficatory schemes.
K suggestion therefore comes to this. The ultimate determinant of history
is human nature but it is human nature conceived of as expressing itself through
the different kinds of human activities, not es something over and above these.
It is moreover a hu.an nature which develops historic- lly i.e. which.is affected
1..3. 915.
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by its own previous states, and which, as it develops, brirv s about a develop¬
ment of those kinds of activities in which it expresses itself.
This development is a continuous and gradual process and in it there is
no one-to-one correspondence between the distinguishable stages of development
of the different kinds of naoan activity. These develop parallel to one
smother and as affected by one another, because they are equally expressions
of human nature their character . ill be found to be affected by the same under¬
lying jrental tendencies but since they are also different kinds of activities
it is not to be expected that a distinguishable change in one will be accompanied
by a corresponding change in all the others. The number of distinguishable
stages w,.ich will occur in the hi tory of any one kind of activity will depend
as much upon the nature of the activity as upon the changes which occur in
human nature.
It is nevertheless convenient to have terms for referring to certain
longer and shorter term characteristics which can be seen to occur in the course
of the development of diiferent rdlnds of activities as a result of the fact
that they are all explained by the same principles of human nature. The
language of three and five natures, if not applied too schematically, can
supply those and serve to call attention to the basic unity in any period of
history.
In concluding this account of the nature of the "ideal eternal history"
we have discovered that the informing principle of Vico's long-term pattern of
history is the development of man's ability to have knowledge rather than belief,
ns such it represents the application to the history of man's nature of what
Vico took to be a well-founded epistemological distinction. This prompts the
question: did ,ico think that because it is well-founded as an epistcmolo. ic 1
distinction it must for this reason be true as a principle of historical
interpretation: nd this in turn is pert of the larger question: .hy did





In the course of the foregoing examination of Vico's version of the
"ideal eternal history" it has been suggested that the procedure he adopts
is a form of the hypothetico-deductive method."" This gives a plausible
interpretation of the rather obscure remarks Vico made in the "Elements"
about the rapprochement of philosophy and philology, in doing so, however,
it lays considerable importance upon the question of empirical confirmation
and it may seem that I have emphasised the latter factor more than Vico.
To see whether this is so and to decide finally how vico conceives the
relation of model to fact we turn to the question of proof.
The notion of a proof is introduced, but not defined, in hook i,
Action lv, entitled "hethod". Three kinds are distinguished: "divine
O O I
roofs"'" or "sublime proofs of natural theology" ; "logical proofs" or
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"philosophic proofs" , and "philological proofs". .
The notion of a "sublime proof of natural theology" is brought in at
the end of a section in which Vico argues that his Science must provide, in
7
one of its aspects, "a rational civil theology of divine providence."
By this he means no more than that it must trace the intelligible workings
of providence in the sphere of human activity. He then writes: "in contem¬
plation of this eternal providence our Science finds certain proofs by which
it is continued and demonstrated. Since divine providence has omnipotence
"*"See Chapter kill above. ^N.S. 343. ^346. ^N.3 . 346.
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as minister, it develops its orders as easily as the natural customs of /.en.
Since it has infinite wisdom as counsellor, whatever it establishes is order.
Since it has for its end its own immeasurable goodness, whatever it ordains
must be directed to a good always superior to that which men have proposed
to themselves".^
The categories to which he appeals are "the aforesaid naturalness,
order and end (the preservation of the human race J." it is clear that what
these categories, if successfully applied, villi show is that we are entitled
to make use of the notion of divine providence.
This is most easily seen if we again distinguish between the trans¬
cendent and the im: n art aspects of divine providence. s regards its
transcendent aspect Vice appears to be producing his version of the argument
from design, ids claim here is that we are entitled to call the pattern
Identified in "The dew hcience" the work of a divine agency because it
exhibits the above characteristics. This argument is incidental to "The
Now dcience".
At toe other level, however, vico is arguing that we are justified
in speaking of the operations of providence in its immanent aspect when
we find that these three characteristics are present. If this is what
Vico means we should also expect a justification for the introduction of
these three, as against other, characteristics. This, in fact, is forth¬
coming, hut tfico gives first a fuller account of the three criteria in
operation. The "naturalness" is exhibited "when we reflect with what ease
things are brought into being, by occasions arising far apart and sometimes
3
quite contrary to the proposals of wan, yet fitting together of themselves".
Vo. 343. 2N.3 . 344. 3N.S. 344.
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Order is exhibited when we "compare the things with one another and observe
the order by which those ;.re now bora in their proper times and places
which ought now to be born, and others deferred for birth in theirs..."*"
Purpose is exhibited when it is not possible that "in these occasions,
places arid times we can conceive how other divine benefits could arise
by which, in view of the particular needs and ills of men, human society
could be better conducted or preserved","*"
It will be noticed that not ing here affords a proof of anything
immanent, it is at best only an account of the categories which Vico
relates to the immanent, before we reach a proof, we should require
also a justification for the introduction of these categories. Vico now
provides this. "Thus the proper and consecutive proof here adduced" he
writes, "will consist in comparing and reflecting whether our human mind,
in the series of possibilities it is pernitted to understand, and as far
as it is permitted to do so, can conceive more or fewer or different
2
causes than those from which issue the effects of this civil world".
. \
The justification lies in Vico's claim that by means of the application
of these categories, and only by means of it, can we understand the growth
of society, despite its theological ring there is nothing inherently
mysterious in Vico's notion of a sublime proof. Its essence is nothing
other than to argue that we are justified in bringing in certain descriptive
and explanatory categories, which Vico refers to as the operations of
providence, because by means of them we can arrive at the only possible
understanding of the whole subject matter of the human past and human nature.
In the above quotation Vico suggests that it is impossible to "conceive"
of any other explanation of the whole of human history. The sense of "conceive"
Vs. 344. Vs. 345.
here must not be misunderstood. Clearly, he does not mean to refer to what
is logically or conceptually possible. The sense in which other accounts
do not deal with what is possible is that sense which we explained earlier
in our account of the philosophical reasoning by which Vico tries to prove,
for example, that society cannot progress without the institution of
marriage. There the icfDsslbility was seen in the light of a theory about
human nature, in the sana way Vico is not saying here that it is absolutely
impossible to conceive that the causes of human history are different from
those he advocates but that we cannot apply those other causes, consistently
with our theory of human nature, and still explain the whole of human
history.
There is, therefore, nothing of the a priori in Vico's conception of a
sublime proof, ouch a proof will be afforded if we find in our actual
practice that the notions of naturalness, order and purpose are necessary
for the complete description and explanation of the growth of human nature.
1 2
The next proofs w'ico mentions are the "logical" or "philosophic".
Vico's remarks here are unfortunately obscured by his combining an account
of the mtura of such a proof with an account of the method to be followed
to secure it. moreover, he seoaa to have a variety of such proofs in mind,
he starts, for example, by suggesting that we have a "logical" proof when we
succeed in explaining "the particular ways in wfcdLch they (things) came into
being, that i3 to say, their nature, the explanation of which is the dis¬
tinguishing mark of science, mid finally (these proofs) are confirmed by
the etern 1 properties (the tilings) preserve, which could not be what they
are if the things ted not come into being just as they did, in those particu¬
lar times, places and fashions, which is to say with those particular natures,
h.S. 346. 2n^
as we have set forth in two axioms"."1"
The claim here is that we have a logical proof if we can reveal the
nature of an institution or set of institutions, but the nature of an
institution is that in it which is universal and eternal and this can
only be demonstrated if we can show it as an example of a universal and
necessary pattern. It is therefore not surprising that \lico's next proof
should refer to the "ideal eternal history", which is an account of such
a pattern:
"The decisive sort of proof in our bcience is this: that,
once these orders were established by divine providence, the
course of the affairs of the nations had to be, must now be
and will h 1.x: sucl s our Science demonstrates, even
if infinite v/ori s were produced from time to time through
eternity, .hich is certainly not the case.
"Our Science therefore comes to describe at the same time
an ideal, eternal history traversed in time by the history
of every nation in its rise, progress, maturity, decline
and ia.il. indeed, we go so far as to assert that whoever
meditates this science tells himself this ideal eternal
history only in 30 far as he makes it by the proof 'it
had, has and will have to be'."2
A logical or philosophical proof is afforded here by a demonstration
of the universal and necessary character of that sequence which is traced
in the "ideal eternal history", we have seen how V'ico attempts to demon¬
strate such necessity and universality, by means of philosophical reasoning
in which deductions ware drawn from factual hypotheses about man*3 nature.
There is no hint of the a uriori in the sense of the purely conceptual here,
but .. _dally the procedure is not straight forwardly empirical. Theory
is used and this is what makes the whole thing 'philosophical'.
Vico next refers to the third type of proof, the "philological", in
"Hi.5. 346. 2N.3. 34S.
Paragraphs 352 to 358 he puts forward a list of the different kinds of
such proofs. Philological proofs are given whan we succeed in showing
that"our mythologies agree with the results of our meditations, not by force
or distortion, but directly, easily and naturallyj""1' that the saaie can
2
be said of the explanation of "heroic phrases" and the "etymologies of
3native languages;" that a "mental vocabulary of human social tilings" can
be exhibited;^" that a principle is provided whereby we can recover the
original truth from false historical traditions; and that, when U3ed in
accordance with these principles, the great literary reniain3 can be a
5
source of knowledge.
In all this the key notion is that the interpretation of historical
knowledge fits in, "agrees", with the "results of our meditations", as
embodied in the "ideal eternal history", not "by force and distortion but
directly, easily and naturally", what this means is that in the "ideal
eternal history" is embodied a set of historical hypotheses through which
the historical evidence can be interpreted "directly, easily and naturally".
The essence of a philological proof therefore lies in a practical demonstration
that the hypotheses embodied in the Ideal eternal history" are confirmed
by their ability to .afford correct principles for the interpretation of
historical evidence.
Finally Vico makes explicit the relationship between philosophy and
philology 'which is implicit in these proofs. He writes:
Vs. 352. Vs. 353. Vs. 354. Vs. 355. Vs. 357.
"These philological proofs enable us to see in fact
the things we have meditated in idea concerning this world
of nations, in accordance with Bacon's method of philoso¬
phising, which is 'think (and) see' (cogitare videre).
Thus it is that with the help of the preceding philosophical
proof, the philological ones which follow both confirm
their own authority by reason and at the sqmm time confirm
reason by their authority."1
2
In tills passage /ico claims to do that which, in Element X , he
accused philosophers and philologians of failing to do. The fact he ±3
referring to is the interpreted fact, its truth is confirmed not merely
because the evidence is susceptible of such an interpretation but also
because philosophy, through theoretical argument, has shown the pattern
which underlies this interpretation of the evidence to be necessary. Thi3
necessity was demonstrated by appeal to factual hypotheses and is therefore
not conceptual. It follows that other hypotheses could be used to demon¬
strate other patterns, hence it is also necessary to show that this pattern
is the one according to which the evidence should be interpreted rather than
any others. This is shown by the capacity of the pattern to afford a
convincing interpretation of all the evidence, a capacity not soared with
other possible patterns. Philosophy and philology thus confirm each other.
Vico's remarks in relation to this matter of proof, i.e. to the question
why we should accept the findings of "The Hew sciencemake it clear that
he does not envisage the possibility of any a priori vindication of the
pattern to which history conforms; he does not think there is any sense in
which the acceptability of the pattern can be established independently of
its bearing upon the historical evidence. It is impossible to reconcile Croce'
remark that factual confirmation is "strictly speaking superfluous" with the
h.S. 359. 2N.3. 140.
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above account of the different kinds of philological proof.
..e can, ho..ever, raise the question: ..hat level of factual confirmation
is relevant here: Vico's pattern, as we have seen, traces only the general
outlines of the development of a nation and it is this which is offered as
the key to the understanding of actual history. ,.e can .llov. that the broad
outline may be correct even if Vieo, in his capacity a3 an historian, makes
some mistakes of detail -hen inter, reting historical evidence in accordance
with it. -hat must be the case, however, if the pattern is to be confirmed,
is that the evidence must support an interpretation of the broad outline of
the nation's history 'which is as suggested by the pattern. There is there¬
fore no noed for V'ico to be upset if in his actual history he cakes mistakes
of detail. It is only when it becomes difficult to interpret the broad
outline of a nation's history that it becomes necessary to reconsider the
model to see how it should be modified to meet this situation.
This does not, however, quite settle the question for there is a
relation between detailed history and general history. V'ico obviously
agrees that this is so; he often disputes questions of detail with other
historians on the ground that their detailed interpretation is not consistent
with any plausible ^.eneral account of tne period in question, it follows
from this that the "ideal eternal history" has a bearing upon the details
of istory through its store direct relation to the general outline of his¬
tory. dven if vico could allow for some difficulties of interpretation at
the " .ailed level without abandoning his account of the general outline of
history it would still be the case that if the only plausible inter¬
pretations of detailed history consistently conflicted with the general
account of histoiy suggested by the "ideal eternal history" we should have
to reconsider the latter. This is because Vico's occount of the broad out-
lot*
line of history rests upon a theory about the deep-lying, conditioning
factors beiiind social change. Iho historian may investigate detailed
matters of which there is no explicit mention in the "ideal eternal history"
but in giving his account of these he cannot avoid making assumptions about
the public background of thought, custom, institution and accepted kinds of
activities in which these take place, where the general history provided
by the "ideal eternal history" provides an acceptable background for much
detailed investigation this constitutes a form of confirmation for it.
where it becomes impossible consistently to carry through detailed inves¬
tigation based upon it this becomes a reason for reconsidering it.
It follows from this, although Vico does not hi. self make the point,
that the possibility of deciding between different "ideal eternal histories"
is available, for their differences will eventually issue out in historical
theories which are detailed enough for historians to be able to decide
between them. It follows further that not only should one thu3 be able to
decide between different "ideal eternal histories" (i.e. between different
ideal models which take human nature as the ultimate historical determinant)
but also beWeen these and other philosophical theories of history which,
starting from different accounts of the determining factors of history,
recommend different models for its interpretation. Vico is open to this
fori,, of assessment because, as has been shown, his theory has the character
of a scientific theory and, mutatis ...utandis. can be tested accordingly.
CHAPTER .£VH
-.,pi?t,ej09lor,f arid -,ew ..gienpe ■
(i)
It is now possible to reconsider the difficult question how Vieo
conceived the relationship between the enterprise carried out in "The
Mow Gcienee" and his fundamental opisteaologleal principle, xn the pre¬
liminary discussion ox paragraphs 330 and 331 it was pointed out that Vico takes
the consistency of his system to be a necessary but not sufficient condition
of its truth."" For a sufficient condition he required also a relation to a
"truth beyond ail question: that the world of civil society has certainly
been >.<vie by man and that its principles are certainly to be recovered within
the modifications of our own human mind, .hoever reflects on this cannot
but marvel that the philosophers should have bent all their energies to the
study of the world of nature, which, since God made it, e alone knows: and
that they should i«ave neglecteo toe study of the world of nations or civil
world, which since men had mads it, mm could hope to knew."
in the ligi i oi the foregoing account of Vice's method and the nature of
the confirmation involved in it we must now note a perplexing feature in the
above claim, if vico is advocating a version of tiie hypothetieo-deduetive
method tiie appeal to the epistomologieal principle should be superfluous, for
the hypo the tico-deduc tivo method correctly applied is normally taoen to be
X
oee Chapter I above.
sufficient to establish the truth of certain laws. This suggests that, unless
he is merely confused, Vico is using the terra 'knowledge' in a special sense
here. This requires investigation.
Unfortunately the "truth beyond all question" to which Vico refers us
in our search for a sufficient condition is obscure for we do not know what
are "the modifications" of our human mind to which Vico is referring nor do we
know what sort of a mind is "our own human mind" in which they exist. Je are
given some help here in the passage in which Vico begins his account of the
religious beliefs of the first men, Ke writes:
"From these first men, stupid, insensate and horrible
beasts, all the philosophers and philologiana should have
begun their investigation of the wisdom of the ancient gen¬
tiles ......... and they should have begun wit. iaphysics,
which 3eeks its proofs not in the external world bu^ within
the modifications of the mind of him who meditates it. For,
as we said above, since this world of nations has certainly
been made by man, it is within these ..edifications that its
principles should have been sougtit. And human n lure, so
far as it is like that of animals, carries with it this
property, that the senses are its sole way of knowing things.
"Hence poetic wisdom, the first wisdom of the gentile
world, must have begun with a raetaphysic not rational and
abstract, like that of learnad men now, but felt and 1 'nod
as that of these first,men must have been, who, without power
of ratiocination, wereall robust sense and vigorous imagination,
as established in the axioms ........ "-L
In tiiis passage Vico reaffirms the necessity to find the principles of
the world of nations "within the mind of him who meditates it". The principle
which he then adduces is that "human nature, so far as it is like that of
animals, carries with it this property, that trie senses are its sole way of
knowing tilings", in the remaining paragraphs of this section which we have
already discussed, he goes on to argue that poetic men, in their ignorance,
Vs. 374-375:
"imagined the causes of the things they felt and wondered at to be gods"
and "at the same time gave the things they wondered at substantial being ....1,1
It was pointed out earlier that to arrive at these conclusions Vico uses
principles expressed in the first two elements, these were, that "Because of
the indefinite nature of the human mind, wherever it is lost in ignorance,
man makes himself the measure of all things"; end, also a "property" of the
human mind, "that whenever men can for no idea of distant and unknown tilings
they judge them by what is familiar and at hand".
It is clear from the general nature of these prepositions that Vico
takes them to be applicable to man at all phases of his career. Thi3 is
confirmed not only by the fact that he refers to them as "properties" of the
hum&nd mind but also by the fact that both the conceit of scholars and of
2
the nations are alleged to derive from them. dlnce these conceits have a
history extending into Vico's own day it follows that these general principles
are as true of the workings of the human mind in its later stages as they are
of its workings in the poetic era.
Vico'3 "modifications" are tlierefore properties of the humw. ind. This
confirms the suggestion made earlier that Vico'3 'Lodification" has that sense
3
of "rode" in which the latter was part of traditional philosophical terminology.
The .lenientof "The lew hcience" contain many other examples of "modifi¬
cations" wliich have not been mentioned because they have not been relevant to
the short sections of the "ideal eternal history" I have traced. They form a
network of propositions which enable Vico to arrive at a model by which to
^N.S. 375. For the discussion of these passages, see Chapter XIII (ii)
and (iii) above.
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interpret the evidence. For example, Vlco offers a list of those which lie
behind his account of the activities of poetic man. The list is headed by
a more explicit statement of the principles embodied in the first two axioms.1
To this is added the claim that "it is a true property of the human mind
which Tacitus points out where he says 'minds once cowed are prone to super-
2 3
stition'". We read also that "wonder is the daughter of ignorance "
that "imagination is more robust in * roportion as reasoning power is weak"1
and that "curiosity he3 the habit, whenever it sees some extraordinary
phenomenon of nature, a c et for example, a sun-dog, or a mid-day star, of
5
asking what it means".
These are some of the propositions which underlie Vice's account of the
nature and origin of early man's grotesque religious beliefs. Other sets of
properties are offered to explain how historical traditions arise and in what
6
manner they proceed to become false, hew ideas and names from being associated
7
with "particular tilings come to refer to classes and types of thing, and how
language arises. There is no need to extend this list since to do so would
involve going through nearly all the Elements. The point is th t 'co tries
to offer an account of the properties of the human mind which, will be sufficiently
complete to explain all the human activities dealt with in "The Mew Science".
Hie last claim is not strong enough. Vico's problem is not erely to give
an explanation of what happened. It is also to deduce an account of what hap¬
pened. We have already seen him do this in our discussion of his account of
the religious beliefs of poetic man. What now becomes clear in the light of
that discussion is that the propositions embodying these "properties" of the
^.S. 180-182. Vo. 183. 3N,o. 184. *N.S, 183. 5N..;. 189.
N.S. 201-205. 7N.S. 206-210.
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human mind, must be sufficient to enable us to deduce an account of the sequence
and nature of man's activities. If thi3 is acceptable we shall then be able
to claim both to have discovered and explained the nature of man's activities.
That this is what Vico means is confirmed by the second important
passage in which he refers to his basic epistemological principle. He there
writes:
"uur Science therefore comes to describe at the same
tin® an ideal eternal history traversed in time by the
history of every nation in its rise, progress, maturity,
decline and fall. Indeed we go so far as to assert that
whoever meditates this Science tells riimself this ideal
eternal history only so far as he makes it by the proof
'it had, has and will have to be'. For the first
indubitable principle above posited is that this world
of nations has certainly been made by men, and its guise
must therefore be recovered within the modifications of
our own human mind. And history cannot be more certain
than when he who creates the things also describes them.
Thus our Science proceeds exactly as does geometry, which,
while it constructs out of its elements or contemplates the
world of quantity, it3elf creates it; but with a reality
greater in proportion to that of the orders having to do
with human affairs, in which there are neither points,
lines, surfaces nor figures ..."1
ue must note here the claim that "whoever meditates this Science tells
himself this ideal, eternal history only so far as he makes it ty the proof
"it had, has and will have to be". The suggestion is that the *ideal eternal
history" is only grasped or understood insofar as one can demonstrate the
necessity for its various stages. ..e have earlier seen that there is no sense
in which the stages ©f the "ideal eternal history" are conceptually necessary.
They are necessary only in the sense that they must occur given the occurrence
of certain prior conditions, what the reader of "The .lew Science" has therefore
to be offered is an account in which the character of certain occurrences is
-"■N.S. 349.
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deduced from these prior factors. But this can only be done if certain
general hypotheses about human nature are available and it is these which are
provided by Vico's various properties and modifications of the human mind.
It will be useful to give as an example of this procedure the one argu¬
ment/of "The New Science" we have been able to look at in detail - the argument
to discover and explain the metaphysical beliefs of poetic man.
The argument starts from the properties stated in the first two elements.
These assert that "Because of the indefinite nature of the human mind, wherever
it is lost in ignorance, man make3 himself the measure of all tilings"1 and
"... that whenever men can form no idea of distant or unknown things, they
2
judge them by what is familiar and at hand".
These are alternative accounts of the way the human mind proceeds
in area3 of doubt. They are also exhaustive. In the li^it of these two
features we may set up the following propositions ..hen men are ignorant of
the cause of something and cannot even explain it by analogy with similar things
they attribute their own nature to it. Vico himself does not bother to set out
I
this last proposition. He moves instead to a yet more specific proposition
which is entailed by its "when men are ignorant of the natural causes producing
things and cannot even explain thorn by analogy with similar tilings they attri-
3
bute their own nature to them". This is Axiom which, he says, "is
embraced by the first (axiom)".
It is this principle which, in conjunction with the premise that poetic
men cou^d not understand the natural causes of things, leads to the conclusion
Vico reaches: that poetic men "gave the things they wondered at substantial
"4^.3. 120. 2N.3. 122. 3N.S. 130.
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being after their own ideas
In this way Vico deduces what must have occurred. It is this deductive
relationship between the premises and the conclusions of "The --lew Science"
which leads him to the claim that in understanding the "ideal eternal history"
one must see that "it had, has and will have to be".
An important point concerning these "properties" or "modifications"
is brought to light if we consider the following objection. If the properties
are so general as to be applicable to all human natures everywhere, ought it
not to be the case that human nature is everywhere the same? And if this is
so what happens to the element of historical perspective so highly prized
by Vico?
To appreciate Vico's position here we must note two points which come
out in the above example. The first is that the conclusion is not directly
deduced from the propositions in their most general form but from a mora
specific statement into which is written conditions which make it relevant to
the matter in hand. In the above argument it is neither of the first too
"general" elements which provide the major prenAse but the "more specific"
Element AXXII.2
The second point is that although this premise has a temporal condition
written into it we require another pre.ise, that poetic man could not under¬
stand the natural cause of things, to know that the condition is satisfied.
The question arises: what is Vico's warrant for asserting this second pre ise?
In view of the fact that Vico holds that none of this gives us knowledge
until confirmed in relation to scire evidence, it might seem that he could be
^.3. 375. ^Compare N.3. 120 and 122 with N.S. 180-181.
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content to try the hypothesis that poetic nan did not understand the natural
cause of things on an ad hoc basis. But were he to do this the whole notion
of historical perspective would be lost. For it is of the essence of the latter
that we be able to s. ow that hun<an conception or type' of activity is possible
only at certain phase in the development of human nature and not at any other,
it is therefore absolutely necessary for Vico to try to produce a pattern of
the development of human nature whose prior phases alone sufficiently explain
the posterior and not merely a series of ad hoc hypotheses about changes which
occur in human nature involving no explanatory pattern.
The hypothesis that poetic man did not understand the natural cause of
tilings is therefore only permissible insofar as it is part of a larger theory
in which is stated an intelligible order of development in human nature. Such
is the theory which is stated in its ost general form in dleirent and
described with varying degrees of specification in the sequences of three or
2
five natures of men which Vico advances.
-ve must now note that these two types of hypothesis, in which are
presented suggestions about men's natural mental tendencies and the se ;ue ice
of their development, provide the basis for the two necessary aspects of the
'ideal eternal history" which we have already distinguished, in a sense there
is nothing more in the conclusions of Vico1s argu ents, represented as the
"ideal eternal histoiy", than can be derived from the pre ises, consisting of
his "principles", "properties" and odifications" of hums v ture. This
provides additional confirmation that the method by which the -"ideal eternal
^'ben who do not know the truth of things try to reach certainty about
them, so that if they cannot satisfy their intellects by science their wills may
rest on consciousness".
2
dee Chapter XV above.
history" is initially constructed is deductive,
(ii)
The question now arises: how are the principles from which the "ideal
eternal history" is constructed themselves derived': In the passages we are
considering tfico refers to them as being "recovered -within the modifications
of our own human mind". .e have now seen what sorts of modifications he is
talking about, in what sense, however, are they modifications of "our own
human mind"?
The expression "our own human mind" is higidy ambiguous. It could be
used by Vico on the one hand to refer to his own individual mind, his own
or any other .Jew ocientist's individual mind, his own or any reader's indi¬
vidual ind; on the other hand it could be used to refer to some social mind,
perhaps some body of knowledge, to which he, in his social or human capacity,
has access.
The expression must therefore be interpreted in the light of our
reading of the rest of Vico's work. This rules out any of the first set of
suggestions, i.e. those which suggest he is referring to soma individual mind
per se. 'Two lines of reasoning support this claim.
First, if Vico is suggesting that the principles of history can be
recovered from one's own individual mind, this is tantamount to suggesting
that they are to be recovered by introspection. But we have seen what sorts
of modifications vico is referring to: some are properties of the mind at
all stages of its development,'1' others reflect abilities and tendencies it
2
has at certain stages only of its development and others, again, present
3
the order of its development. Kot only are there at least these three type3
1
i.o. 120, 122, 137. 2d.d. 211, 212, 215-217.
3h.S. 137, 213, 236, 242.
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but also a large number of examples of each type. It seems inconceivable
that anybody should think that all this could be discovered by introspection,
i.e. by examination of one's own case.
aecond, the whole tendency of Vico's philosophy has been to diminish
the importance of the notion of the individual as a means of explaining the
course of human affairs, it has stressed, instead, that man must be thought
of in terms of various capacities and tendencies, themselves presupposing
the primacy of social organisation and social relationships over the individual
man. The character of the latter is largely determined by these factors rather
than their character being determined by his.
In these circumstances it might seem that, since the individual man's
human characteristics are examples of their social or human types or kinds,
<eL
we could discover the nature of the latter by a study of onself. But even
i.
if this is so, since no individual man has all Hie possible capacities and
tendencies and certainly not those of a former epoch, such a nethod could not
discover all the principles or modifications adduced by Vico,
If "our own human mind" is not the individual mind as such, it must
be the social or group mind, the only other 3ort which figures in Vico,
.,e can have no introspective access to this but we can have some access to it
nevertheless because we are part of it and therefore share in and can understand
its characteristic features.
If wa wish to deny that this access is introspective we must be careful
not to jump t the opposite conclusion and pronounce it public, if by this
wa mean to imply that it i3 identical in all respects with the knowledge
obtained in the natural sciences. ..ere we to do this we should fail to
observe the point of v'ico's complaint "that the philosophers should have bent
oin
all their energies to the study of the world of nature which, since God made it,
He alone knowsj and that they should have neglected the study of the world of
nations or civil world, which, since man had made it, man could hope to know".*"
Here Vico wishes to reserve the term "knowledge" for that which is
available to God in respect both of the world of nature and of nations and
to men in respect only of the latter. .en can have no "knowledge" of "the
world of nature".
To understand this we must recall that a cardinal feature of the know¬
ledge offered in "The New Science" is to be found in the necessarily explana¬
tory nature of the latter. In the case of the social, economic and political
institutions with which "The New Science" is primarily concerned, such
explanation is given by an account of those human need3 and purposes which
dictate the nature of nan's activities. In the case of "the world of nations"
men can reach such explanations; in the case of the world of nature God can
reach them but men cannot. If one compares the accounts available to men
.in respect of these two worlds, it is clear that in the case of our knowledge
of the natural world there is lacking a whole dimension, that of a certain
kind of explanation, which is available in the case of the "human"world.
This distinction provides Vico's reason for wishing to deny that we can
have knowledge of the world of nature and allow It only of the world of nations.
It is clear from the account we have given of Vico's position that he does
not think we need be any less rigorous in our conception of what is a law of
human activity than we are of purely physical laws, from the point of view
of their logical characteristics the two kinds of law are not to be distinguished:
as products of science they equally have to do with "what is universal and
h.6. 331.
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eternal"."1' The point of Vico's complaint that men cannot "know" the "world
of nature" in the same way they can the "world of nations" cannot lie in any
basic difference in the strength of the methods by which we confirm the kinds
of hypothesis involved, it lies rather in the notion that the hypotheses are
of different kinds and that there is a consequent difference in the -way we
understand them. Vico is suggesting that when we understand the nature of
something by reference only to people's needs and purposes we attain the
fullest kind of knowledge available to man.
Vico has undoubtedly chosen to put thi3 point in a most unfortunate
2
way. in discussing the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter,
1
it was pointed out that Vico•s appeal to his basic epistemological principle
cannot be looked upon as a search for a sufficient condition of the truth
of his theories. This is already supplied by his correctly conceived method.
The fact that this principle has a bearing upon "human" knowledge and not
upon physical knowledge cannot therefore show there is a difference between
the two qua knowledge. It can only serve to distinguish between them as
kinds of knowledge. Vico would have put this distinction much more satisfac¬
torily had he, instead of trying to distinguish thai; as knowledge and non-
knowledge, allowed that they were both knowledge but of differing kinds. Hie
distinction should be between understanding and knowledge.
But if the knowledge derived from "the modifications of our own mind"
is confirmed in largely the same way as that derived from the laws of the
physical sciences, is it possible that Vico thinks we have access to "modifi¬
cations" In just the same "way as we have to the physical laws, i.e. by obser¬
vation? This, also would be a false reading. For it is implicit in Vico's
Vs. 163. Vs. 330-331.
c2J <=1
general theory that in no case, not even that of the natural sciences, is
knowledge gained by observation alone.
To appreciate this we have but to recall the account of the metaphysics
of poetic man. There the character of all of man's beliefs, including his
beliefs about metaphysics, physics, cosomography, astronomy and geography,
was explained by his natural tendency to think in certain ways. Jince all
human activity is to be explained by recourse to features of human nature,
it follows that even in the case of the history of the natural sciences, which
Vico fails to trace, the character of the hypotheses of the natural sciences
will be explained by the character of man.
it is implicit in such a view that there can never be a contrast
between some "subjective" or introspective way in which, for example, we
grasp the principles by which we understand other people's actions and an
"objective" way in which wa merely observe and report on, or describe, the
material world. Our observation of the physical is governed by the natural
ways, historically modified, in which we think just as much as is our
explanation of the human. The mechanism of the two processes is the sa#e;
it is merely the actual categories involved which differ.
But if we do not gain knowledge of "the modifications of our own human
\
mind" by observation alone then how do we gain it and how does it arise?
Vico does not give the answer explicitly but it is clear enough that the
answer he would offer must be on the same lines as hl3 answer to these questions
in respect of any knowledge whatsoever. As individuals we gain it in the
course of the teaching and training by which we acquire that human nature
which has developed at the time in which we live. The knowledge itself has
grown in the course of the social development of human nature which Vico has
traced for us. It is thus the product of a social and historical process in
which, through teaching and education and by reason of our own place in the
social system, we can come to share.
It is not surprising, in view of this thesis, that Vico's "modifications"
vary much in character, dome are nothing more than what Vico conceives to be
widely held generalisations about human nature. Others, again, are explicitly
1 2 3
taken from writers such as Tacitus, Lactantius Firmianus and Dio Cassius.
Others again seem to be generalisations suggested by Vico himself.
It might seem that there is something question-begging about the kind
of answer I here attribute to Vico, Can we not, for example, still justi¬
fiably ask for an account of how Vico or Tacitus or the unknown individuals,
from whom the most widely held generalisations must originally have sprung,
derived their generalisations? And can we not expect something over and
above an account of those historical and social forces which have helped sriape
the nature which, through education and social intercourse, these individuals
have acquired?
That Vico's position should appear question-begging results not from
his inability to give an answer to these questions but from the fact that his
answer is necessarily uninformative. As we have seen, it is his contention that
everything which requires explanation in "the world of nations" can be explained
by reference to an historically and socially conditioned human nature. It is
possible to ask what it is that is conditioned here in two senses: as appli¬
cable to the primitive nan from whom Vico traces the course of a nation's
history, and as applicable to a child in whom also one can trace the course of
that social conditioning by which its nature is created. But in neither case
is it, in fact, possible to produce an account of a pure, unconditioned nature
Vs. 183. Vs. 188. 3N.3. 308.
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possessed before social conditioning has begun its work. Vico's "poetic"
man is not a pre-social creature in whom we can find the unconditioned features
upon which the social forces act. He is merely a very primitive or rude
social type.1 do we can know nothing of what characteristics he would have
in a non-social context. Likewise in the case of the child we can have no
knowledge of its characteristics before training, teaching and the educative
effect of social intercourse, have taken their affect. Therefore, although
it might seem that we should be able to ask for an account of that which is
conditioned by the social forces in, for example, the case of an individual
such as Tacitus or Vico himself, no more informative answer can be given than
that nature which, when conditioned, was possessed by Tacitus or Vicoj and this
is not informative at all. In other words we can trace the stages of social
and historical conditioning by which the nature of an individual or of a
society is produced by reference to prior conditioned stages. But we can
never reach anything not socially and historically conditioned.
Once we have appreciated this we shall stop asking such questions as
"from whence, or how, are true generalisations initially derived';". The
ability to form them is part of our human nature, at once natural in the sense
that we do it spontaneously, and yet historically and socially conditioned in
that we can only do it when our minds have been trained in certain necessarily
social ways.
Vico's position is therefore not question-begging at all. If he cannot
offer an answer to this kind of question it is because the latter falls beyond
the limits prescribed by his theory of what can intelligibly be asked about
those human abilities we possess and on which the framing of "The Lew Science"
XCf. N.S. 134, 135, 308, 309.
depends. God alone, as the maker of our unconditioned natures, would know
in what terms to answer such a question.
(iii)
Finally it remains to state exactly how vico conceives the nature of
the relationship between "The New Science" and it 3 basic epistamological prin¬
ciple, the "truth beyond all question", it is clear that the latter doe3 not
constitute a sufficient condition of the truth of the former. For we have
seen from Vico's proofs that ultimately the truth of the laws of "The New
Science", or of the history it provides, depends upon confirmation by the evi¬
dence. That the episteraological principle does not provide a sufficient con¬
dition of the truth of "The New Science" is confirmed furtrier by the fact that
although God, as creator of the world of nature, "knows1'"'* this world, it does
not follow that man, as creator of the civil world, knows the latter but only
that he "can hope to know" it. This agrees with the above suggestion that our
ability to construct a model in terras of which to interpret past history depends
upon our possession of knowledge of "the modifications of our human mind11. Nor
possession of such knowledge does not guarantee the truth of our model; it merely
enables us to construct a certain kind of model, i.e. one appropriate to
historical knowledge, let if we could not construct such a model there would
be no account to be confirmed and historical understanding would be denied us.
Our possession of knowledge of these modifications is therefore a necessary
condition of ascertaining historical truth . Conjointly with the other neces¬
sary condition, confirmation by appeal to the evidence, it provides a suffi¬
cient condition of historical truth.
The effect of this theory of Vico's is to establish the limits of
historical understanding. For a historical account to be true it must not
1N..,. 331.
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only be confirmed by the evidence, it must also be an account of a certain
type, i.e. an account in which explanation is ultimately provided by recourse
to the categories through which we understand our own and other people's
activities. - s used in historical understanding these categories are modified
in such a way as to take account of the historical development of human
consciousness but not in such a way that we are unable through them to under¬
stand tie historical activities of man in a similar manner to that in which
we understand our own. were we to come across historical evidence which could
not be used to confirm any of the possible models we could construct in
accordance with the above principle, we should have to conclude that here





Vico's aim in "The Hew Science" is to discover the laws which govern the
historical development of human activity. By a law Vico means that which is
"eternal and universal", i.e. that which is necessary and universal. Vico
does not try to show that there is a sense of necessity as rigorous as that of
conceptual necessity attaching to these law3. He is content if he can show
that, given certain factual hypotheses about man's nature and the circumstances
in which the latter can spontaneously express itself, the course of human
affairs must take a certain direction. Because it is the case that one
cannot perform experiments upon past events, Vico tries to demonstrate this
necessity by argument and by deduction. His aim here is to show that, given
a certain hypothetical account of man'3 nature, certain conditions are necessary
to human progress and that only by taking the course of social activity
suggested by Vico could man have secured these conditions.
In Vico's sense neither necessity nor universality is absolute. If a
certain truth is logically or conceptually necessary it is true in all possible
worldsj it is therefore also a universal truth. In the sense in which Vico
argue3 that human affairs necessarily take a certain course, this is not so.
If the course is only necessary given that man has tine alleged nature from
which tine course Springs, it follows that wherever man has not this nature
his history need not follow this course. The pattern of development is not
true in all possible -worlds; it is only true in all worlds in which man has
the hypothesised nature and in 'which Ms development is affected by nothing
other than the latter.
The deduction of a pattern of history from a number of hypotheses about
man's nature, although it suffices to show that the pattern is true given that
the hypotheses are true, does not suffice to show that the pattern, actually
has application in any one case, for this to be shown some sort of empirical
confirmation is required, Vico holds that this is provided when, using his
pattern as a model, wo are able to arrive at an account of human history, i.e.
actual historical accounts, free from contradiction and inconsistency. His
view of the nature of the criteria involved In this is implied in his account
of the relation of human nature to social structure. He does not, however,
tell us how we know when these criteria are satisfied. It is assumed that
such an ability is something which we bring with us to the problem.
It has been shown that Vico's practice does not support the suggestion
that the pattern of social development is abstracted from actual histories,
even though the vague wording of the first set of general elements left it open
1
that this may have been Vico's view. Nevertheless, from certain vacillations
to be discussed shortly it will appear that Vico had not a complete theoretical
grasp of his own method and found it particularly difficult to decide what
status to accord it.
The suggestion that the pattern of historical development be abstracted
from actual histories could not account for the kind of pattern and kind of
necessity Vico in practice adduces. Failing experimental conditions, not
hare available, this can only be done if we - can argue that, given that man is
at a certain stage of development, another stage represents either the only
possible way or one of the only possible ways in which this development could
"*"3ee Chapters V (iii) and X above.
20.1
continue. To argue thus we must be in possession of enough generalisations about
the relation of kinds of human nature to kinds of human activity a3 to be able to
deduce our account and rule out the alternatives.
Such a claim could not be put forward on behalf of a pattern abstracted
from a number of given historical accounts. The discovery of a number of
common factors and correlations in these accounts would not be enough to
establish the relationship between these factors to be necessary. For tlie
method of abstraction would not, of itself, be sufficient to distinguish
between coincidental correlations between different histories and correlations
arising from the conformability of the historical and social development
of different nations to the same laws. Therefore, notiling more could justi¬
fiably be written into the nature of the connections in a pattern abstracted
from actual histories than could be found in the actual histories themselves.
It follows that the connections in an abstracted pattern of human social
development could only be necessary if the connections in the histories from
which the pattern was abstracted were themselves necessary.
If the suggestion that Vico wants to derive the pattern of human
development from actual histories were correct, we should have to conclude
that sucii a procedure could not support the claims .made by Vico about the
necessary and universal status of the connections involved in the pattern.
But our consideration of Vico's actual practice has shown that it is not what
he does. .e have now 3een the relationship between history and the laws of
history implied in his practice. Formally this relationship is correctly
conceived.
The pattern is therefore derived from a number of beliefs about
necessary relations between kinds of human nature and kinds of human activity
under certain specifiable circumstances, i.e. from beliefs about a "natural"
relationship, which the philosopher, historian or scientist, himself brings to
the problem. There is, however, as yet no guarantee that these beliefs are the
correct ones from which to derive the pattern. Vico does not say that it
is by virtue of them that men know the pattern but only that it is by virtue
of them that men "can hope to know it"."*" Different men might come to the
problem of the historical laws of human activity armed with different beliefs
from which to derive their models. It is possible to envisage correctly
derived patterns which are mutually incompatible. Correctness of derivation
is therefore no guarantee of truth but merely a necessary condition.
It fallows from this that we must distinguish between patterns of human
development and the pattern of human development and provide a criterion to
support this distinction. Vico provides this by the alleged ability of his
2
pattern to afford a consistent interpretation of all the evidence. we must
not make the mistake of thinking that such confirmation as this affords
gives the pattern its universality. The latter is, as suggested above, a
corollary of the necessity of the connections in the pattern and must be taken
to have the same restrictions as is involved in the type of necessity Vico
claims. Confirmation has the function only of distinguishing the actual
pattern of human social development from other possible patterns.
It will be seen that on this view Vico is free from the difficulty which
arises when the attempt is made to abstract the pattern of human develorm®-,t-
3from actual histories. As I pointed out in iry earlier discussion of this,
should a conflict arise between a first-order history and the second-order
pattern, it is surely the pattern which must be abandoned and not the history,
"Si,3, 331. ^N,3. 353. ^3ee Chapter X above.
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ijoreover, in view of the ever-present possibility of such a conflict we can
never ascribe a necessary status to the connections embodied in the pattern.
In Vico's case, however, since the hypotheses from which the pattern is
derived are those which underlie the first-order history there can be no
possibility of conflict between a first-order history and the pattern. For
a first-order history is nothing but a confirmed instance of the pattern.
At tiiis point it i3 convenient to dispose of one misconception which
might be aroused by the -way in which 1 have tried to set out Vico's theory,
rutting the latter in terms of a set of initial hypotheses, a model they sup¬
port and justification of both of these by an appeal to the over-all adequacy
of the interpretation of human history they afford, might suggest that Vico
holds that we arrive at the problem armed first with a complete and specifiable
set of hypotheses, together with a model deduced from them, and then go on to
confirm these. Such a suggestion is not necessitated by any part of his theory
and may be rejected. There is no reason why Vico's hypotheses and model
cannot be applied in piecemeal fashion, some parts of both retained when they
give a prima facie. plausible interpretation of part of the evidence, others
abandoned when they fail to do so, it is only in the final result that one
denands ovar-all consistency of hypotheses, model and interpreted evidence and
only here that completeness is a requirement. But this is something which
can legitimately be reached by a process of trial and error in which neither
hypotheses nor model are taken to be either irrefutable or complete. The
notion that the whole model can be worked out in advance might also be suggested
by the way in which Vico tries to set it down, to a certain degree indepen¬
dently of the interpretations of history it supports, in the "Elements".
But here there is no reason why one should presume that, because Vico was
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finally able to arrive at a reasonably comprehensive conception of the model
which supports, and is supported by, his account of actual histories, he
necessarily started from such a complete conception.
Although Vico may be free from the difficulties engendered by the
occurrence, or even the possibility, of conflict between first-order history
and second-order pattern of history, since in his case there is no room
for the distinction between first and second order activities, he has to face
other difficulties peculiar to the nature of his theory, one of these arises
in the case where we find that a set of generalisations is not adequate to
provide a pattern for the interpretation of a number of actual histories.
Perhaps, as Vico claims, his model will provide for a consistent interpre¬
tation of all the evidence relating to Greek and daman history. But what
happens 3hould it be found wanting in the case of, say, the histories of
Japan and China'/ what effect has this possibility, if we are prepared to
admit it, upon his theory'/ Alternatively, if we are not prepared to admit
it, what effect would such a refusal have upon his theory'/
.<e may dispose of the latter difficulty first. Jn cy account of his
theories Vico could not refuse to admit the possibility that any alleged
"ideal eternal history" night fail to provide the model for a certain his¬
tory. for were he to do so there would be no legitimate sense in which he
could claim that in the cases inhere the model did provide for a consistent
interpretation of the evidence he had grounds for holding the model to be
confirmed, it is true that at times he does write as though he is not prepared
to allow for accounts which seem to conflict with his model.^ But 3uch
XCf. M. . 334» in which tfico dismisses as "travellers' tales, to promote
the sales of their books" the suggestion by some writers that there have been
atheistic societies - a claim which, if admitted, would refute the first of
Vico's "three first principles".
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dogi .tla- is an indication of his conviction of the truth of his own version
of the "ideal eternal history" rather than a position whic,. is forced upon
him by his conception of the nature ox such a pattern. Consequently there are
also places in which he admits that his pattern has not been exemplified
universally in actual histories.^
it is therefore clear that in the case of any given "ideal eternal
history" Vico would admit that it .light not provide a pattern for the develop¬
ment of all histories. But it is necessary to distinguish between two senses
in which such an admission /eight be made,
Vico might maintain that the reason why a certain account of the "ideal
eternal history" was not exemplified in all actual histories was to be found
in the influence in some cases of extraneous or external factors. Such
factors might be large-scale natural disasters or foreign influence through
conquest or war. Vico could admit this type of reason why a certain history
did not follow the suggested pattern and yet still maintain that the pattern
was necessary and universal in his sense, for the pattern only traces the
course of development of a nation where the course is internally conditioned.
Such an admission would, for example, be constituted by Vico's claim that
"in the new world the American Indians would now be following thi3 course
p
of human things if they ted not been discovered by the Europeans'?."* Vico
can allow this sort of divergence from an alleged pattern on the ground
that it would not be an exception to his main claim, that where a nation's
history is governed only by internal factors, i.e. by the nature of the
people concerned, it must take the sug. ested course of development.
But can Vico also admit the possibility of such exceptions where no
■Hi.S. 1092. 2N.S. 1095.
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external factors are relevant'* in other words can he admit the possibility
that trie internal course of different nations might differ* *»nd what follows
from hi3 answer here*
gain, one must hold that, on the view advocated above, Vico would have
to admit such a possibility. For if there is to be any legitimate sense in
which the pattern is to be "confirmed" by philological tests, it must also be
oossible to refute it by philological tests.
This being so, we must ask: what is to bo done in those cases, if there
;mre any, in which it is not confirmed* . number of moves seem possible.
The first and obvious one is to abandon this particular version of the "ideal
eternal history" and try sons other. ,e shall see shortly why tfico never
seriously entertained this possibility.
But what of the case, perhaps i/ico's own, in which a certain pattern
seems to do justice to the history of some nations, say Greece, Rome and the
various European countries mentioned in book V on the idcorso, but which
fails to embody principles which can do justice to the development of others,
say the Communist countries of the twentieth century* Are we to say that the
pattern which affords acceptable histories of Greece and Rome is not acceptable
because it does not afford acceptable histories of Russia and China* Or are
we to say that there is one pattern for some nations and another for others,
rather in the way we night apply different patterns of explanation in our
attempt to understand the activities of different individuals'* if we take
the former course it would seem that we are putting an extraordinarily high
definition upon our conception of knowledge and must admit that, insofar as
we might never reach a pattern adequate to all histories, such knowledge
might never be reached. But if we take the latter course it might seem that
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we could never show any pattern to contain necessary and universal laws and
therefore still fall short of knowledge.
It is not, in fact, obvious that the dire consequence alleged does
follow in the case of the second of these alternatives. But Vico thought
it did and found it difficult to know what to say in face of t, c two possibili¬
ties. it is this uncertainty which explains how he allowed that so. e histories
had not conformed to his pattern and yet obstinately felt he must adhere to
the apparently incompatible claim that the "ideal eternal history" describes
"what had, has and will have to be".1
let it would seem that, even on this mistaken assumption, Vico ought
not to have found any difficulty here, would the obvious move not have been
to argue that in "The how hcien.cs" were set out the conditions necessary for
knowledge, together with an attempt to show that the "ideal eternal history"
satisfied these, while at the same time, admitting that if Vico's "ideal
eternal history" fell short of universal instantiation, and if no other
account of the pattern could achieve it, knowledge was unobtainable in this
sphere'. That Vico did not argue thus is evidence of an instructive mistake
he was making.
The difficulty we face is that of understanding why Vico found hiniself
unable to abandon either of two mutually Incompatible positions, i.e. the
claim that the "ideal eternal history" be necessary and universal and the
ad-rission that it might fail to be universally exemplified. Let us ask firsti
why did he not abandon the latter demand, that it should be shown to be
i
universally exe.nplfiedt why, in other words, was he not content to claim
A




The answer to this lies in the fact that Vico was not completely
decided in his own mind about the function of empirical confirmation in his
scheme. From his account of the "proofs" 1 it is clear that he took empirical
confirmation to be indispensable. But he did not al„ays see lor a. t it was
indispensable. Cometimes he thought it was this which generated the univer-
2
sality of the pattern. But according to my account of his most characteristic
method of argument, the universality of the pattern, which is a limited and
conditional universality, follows from its necessity, also limited and con¬
ditional. moreover, both necessity and universality are demonstrated by
3
argument. The function of empirical confirmation here is not to confer
necessity ar universality upon any pattern but to distinguish the actual
pattern from other possible patterns.^ The failure of any particular pattern
to be confirmed in the case of some actual histories need therefore have no
unhappy repercussions on it3 claim to be necessary and universal and to be
the key to the understanding of any histories by which it might be confirmed.
Vico, however, has failed to see this point and we must now look for
the reason for thi3 failure. Clearly enough it lies in Vico's assumption
that, although there can be a number of possible "ideal eternal histories",
there can only be one actual such illstory. Now there is obviously something
wrong with this assumption as it 3tands. But we can best see what this is
by going on to ask the questioni why did Vico think there could only be one
actual "idea.l eternal history'1? T,e answer to this lies in two further
1 2
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assumptions he was making J that there will only be one pattern which is
adequate to, or sufficient for, tiie understanding of any actual history and
that it must be the same pattern for every actual history. It is clear that
Vico took toe capacity of the pattern to give us understanding to be a product
of its necessity and universality. >.e can see, therefore, that if i-je
thought that the failure to confirm it universally constituted a refutation
of its claim to be universal he would also tiiink we had destroyed its
necessity and thus rendered it useless as an instrument of understanding
and of knowledge, oven worse, if he thought that the only pattern adequate
to understanding and knowledge was that which was universally instantiated
it would follow that the failure to achieve confirmation in any one case
would entail the admission that knowledge and understanding were not possible
in respect of human activities.
This position, however, is inconsistent with the admission that there
might be a number of possible "ideal eternal histories". For in the former
position there is embodied the assumption that the necessity and universality
of the pattern is provided by empirical confirmation. It follows that even
the claim of the pattern to be an instrument of toe understanding would be
dependent upon universal confirmation. But if this were so, in what sense
could the other "ideal eternal histories" be said to be possible'^ At first
sight they might seem to be possible in the sense that they present a number
of different but intelligible, ways of construing the course of human history.
But if their intelligibility is dependent upon their necessity and univer¬
sality and the latter in turn upon confirmation it follows that all those
"*"Cf. Vxco's claim that "whoever meditates this Science tells himself
this ideal eternal history only so far as he makes it by the proof "it had,
has and will have to be"1. N.3. 349.
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patterns which fail to be confirmed are not really intelligible. And if they are
not really intelligible in what sense are they possible!
It Is, nevertheless, essential that there be ,m appropriate sense in
which these patterns be possible if the appeal to historical evidence is to
have the legitimate function of confirming one rather than another pattern.
It is senseless to talk of one pattern' s being confirmed empirically if the
alternatives are per se unintelligible. If there is therefore to be any
sense in the admission of possible patterns these patterns must be allowed
to be intelligible independently of the question of their confirmation.
■-hat thi3 shows is that if empirical, confirmation is to have its
legitimate function in Vico's scheme then the criteria as to what makes a
pattern possible and what makes it actual must be distinct. If historical
evidence is relevant to the latter then it is not to the former. Therefore,
even where a pattern night be shown to be actual we should still have to have
independent grounds for showing it to be possible and these grounds would
have to be of such a nature that they were compatible with the adrjdLssion of
the possibility of other patterns.
it follows that Vico was wrong "whenever he thought there was only one
possible pattern for understanding history and that this claim could be
supported by empirical confirmation of the pattern in question, -sere there
only one possible pattern confirmation would indeed be superfluous.
Had Vico seen this clearly he would have known what to say in the case
of those recalcitrant histories which might fail to conform to his pattern.
He would have felt no need to cling obstinately to the claim that hi3
pattern told us "what had, lias ana will, have to be". Instead he would
have been free to admit in this first place that where histories failed to
conform to his pattern this in no way threw doubt on its claim to give
knowledge in respect of those which did conform to it. He could also admit
that other patterns could, indeed, be adequate to tne recalcitrant histories
and that these other patterns, where confirmed, could give us knowledge of
the laws appropriate to these other histories.
It would seem that we should just conclude that Vico was inconsistent
in hi3 view of the relationship of the notions of intelligibility and con¬
firmation in his scheme; that he used these notions in a legitimate 3ense
in his actual practice but that in soaie of Ms theoretical pronouncements he
tended towards a different view from which sprang his difficulties over the
status to be accorded his results. But if we left the matter there we should
fail to investigate one of the most interesting facets of Vice's theory,
for we have seen that the main source of Vico1s vacillations over the function
of empirical confirmation was Ms assumption that there could only be one
pattern sufficient for the understanding of any actual Mstory and that it
must be the sane pattern for every actual history, w© must ncrw ask: why
did Vico believe these two propositions":
we might commence with the latter which is, in a sense, the less
interesting since the explanation involves that Vico had made a simple Ms-
take. Vico insists that what men have made men can hope to know.1 This has
been shown to be in part explained by the insistence that the sufficient and
necessary conditions of human Mstory, in its general outlines, be found in
human nature. Because we are human beings and can grasp the relationship
between our own human nature and its necessary social context we are in a
position to rediscover the past history of human nature in its social context.
Ihus it is that the Mstorian " nd the sociologist can provide a model with
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which to try to interpret the past. The insistence that men have made their
own history, i.e. that in man's nature lis the sufficient and necessary
conditions of the structure and development of society, means that, in
theory at least, the wnole of history in its general outlines is know-able,
even though, for the purely contingent reason that the evidence might be
.Lacking, it may never all be known.
If we admit that the bread outline of human history be susceptible,
at least theoretically, of a complete explanation without going beyond
human nature and if we were able to confirm one such pattern of explanation,
one "ideal eternal history", in all actual histories, 'would it not follow ■
that we had not only shown the pattern to be adequate but that we had
confirmed that in it lay the laws of all human progress'! This, at any rate,
is Vice's view.
But the conclusion does not follow#; and that for a reason Vico was
aware of but the relevance of which he had here overlooked. For all that can
be claimed for the pattern is that it shows that if certain conditions obtain
certain results necessarily follow. But it does not show that the conditions
themselves must obtain. Vico, of course, thinks that tire fact that the con¬
ditions and their necessary consequences, obtain is established empirically.
And so it is. But this is not enough. For such confirmation will never
show that they must obtain and, therefore, that they must in the case of un¬
known histories, be they past or future. At best, if we accepted Vico's other
claims, we could say that we know that if a certain type of nature should
appear history would take a certain course. But we could not 3how that such
a nature must appear and so we could noo show that history must, in all
J. 3 ^
circumstances, take that course.
That Vico was to soi;e extent aware of what is involved here is revealed
in his admission that there is a point in our seart for ultimate explanations
"beyond which it is vain curiosity to demand others earlier"."1" This point
is reached when we am. v at the nature of man from which the course of
nistory springs, in v'ico's own account this nature would be that of poetic
man. out if it is "vain curiosity" to demand an explanation of this nature
this must be because we cannot produce an account of its sufficient and
necessary conditions and so cannot show either that it be necessary that
such a nature should appear in the first place or that it should reappear
in the case of the ricorso.
x-nreover, we can see that this basic inexplicability of the first human
nature follows from the very nature of Vico's epistemology. For, according to
2
his basic principle, man can hope to know what they have themselves made, i.e.
their own creations. But their own crudest nature is not their own creation,
it is God's, it follows that lie can understand it and man cannot. It follows
again that we cannot give an account of its necessary and sufficient conditions
in the way we can for those things which are explained by human nature itself,
from this it is clear that wa cannot show the occurrence of such a nature to
be necessary and so we cannot show that all histories must take the course
postulated by the ideal pattern.
it seems, therefore, that V'ico's claim that the course of all history
must conform to liis pattern is inconsistent with the basic epistemological
principle on which the possibility of establishing such a pattern itself
hi.s. 346. ^i.s, 331,
depends. It follows from the epistemological principle that if a man o£
a certain type appears on earth a pattern can be constructed to show the
course his history must take. But it does not follow that a ;:an of that
type must appear, Vico has again lost sight of the hypothetical nature of
the necessity and universality of his pattern and has advanced to a more
extravagant and unjustifiable claim.
><e may now consider the more interesting question; why did Vico
believe there was one, and only one, pattern adequate for understanding
history'; To answer this we must begin by looking at Vice's conception of
an explanatory pattern.
Vico had noted, quite rightly, that when we explain an event we often
do so by reference to a pattern or system of activities in which we can
locate the event in question and trace its relationship with other constituents
of the system. Furthermore, what gives a set of events its right to be
thought of as part of a pattern is the fact that one can discover, or at least
adduce, some relevant rules which state various relationships and connections
between kinds of events. Thus we contend that event A explains event B when
we have grasped a general rule, suitably specified, about the nature of the
relationships beWeen events of kind A and those of kind B,
Historians do something of this sort all the time, we are told,
perhaps, that dissatisfaction over a certain economic or social state of
affairs was the cause of a certain economic or social change. The historian
shows that this explanation is the correct one by showing how, in a mmsber
of specific cases, the dissatisfaction felt by certain persons was followed
by their acting in certain way . it beyond this he does not go. He assumes
that we take such an account to be an explanation. And, of course, we do.
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Bat not because of the particular sequence of actual events the historian
has traced for us. we accept that it is an explanation because we have
learnt, in other contexts, to understand and use the ^neral rules presupposed
by this account. And were it not the case that the historian had done this it
would never occur to him to offer the particular account he does as an explana¬
tion.
But in his conception of a pattern Vico goes one stage beyond this.
He assumes that patterns of explanation involving rules of a specific level
of generality, themselves are explanatory only in so far as they can be
linked up into a pattern in which they presuppose yet more general rules.
And this process can be carried on indefinitely until we reach an overf¬
all pattern in which all the rules are linked together in such a way that
they can all be traced back to dependence upon one, or a few, very basic
and very general rules which themselves form an intelligible pattern of
explanation.
Given such a conception it is easy to see why one might, as did Vico,
come to think that there could only be one such over-all pattern and hence
only one truly intelligible pattern for understanding history. To put it
another way, it might seem that for any human event there could be one,
and only one, fully sufficient explanation and that it would be a condition
of the acceptability o£ this explanation that it be consistent with a sufficient
explanation for all other events. These assumptions made by Vico are, however,
questionable,
Hven if we accept that when we understand an explanation of certain
events by seeing their connect- i.th others we do so by virtue of seeing
this as an instance of a relationship between types of events, it i3 not
obvious that we ought to accept the further view that we understand these
JLU3-
relafcioiiships between types of events only by reference to relationships
between yet ..ore general types of events. For .ore we to accept this additional
claim there would still remain the problem of the most general rules which
cannot be explained in this way, since there would be no yet more general
rules to help us. In this case our ability to understand the most general
rules must depend on some other characteristic - perhaps an alleged self-
evidence of which we could have some 3ort of rational intuition. But if such
an account were offered we could ask why it was thought impermissible to
apply the same sort of account to the less general rules, at least it would
have to be admitted that ono could in principle apply such an account to the
less general rules even if it were also contended that this is not, in fact,
what we ever do. But this ad.ission alone would be enough to show that it
is not the case that there can only be one over-all pattern sufficient for
the understanding of human history, it would thus show that it is not
necessary that all explanations be of such a nature that they be inter¬
related in a pattern in vice's sense.
h defence against this would have to argue that the most general rules
were somehow more luminous, i.e. that we could understand them, perhaps
because of their simplicity, in a way we could not their less general and
more specific consequents. But this would be a very odd line for Vice to
take since he explicitly says that it takes a tremendous effort of the under¬
standing to grasp for example the ways of thinking of poetic In any
case it would still have to be shown why these most general rules were claimed
1° k<3 r:>er se intelligible as against the less general which derived their
intelligibility from them;, wince this would be a question of principle,
involving the very question what it is for a ruie to be intelligible, sim¬
plicity would not, after all, suffice as an answer. For there is no obvious
h.o. 33a.
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contradiction in the notion of simple rules about the way human nature
manifests itself being no more intelligible than other less sample rules.
It see/us clear that in thinking that we can only use patterns of
explanation if we can 3ee these pat terns as part of an inter-related system
Vico i3 vrrong. The noting of this mistake goes a long way towards explaining
why he was driven to make his most extr-sscagant claim on behalf of the "ideal
eternal history" - that it tells us what "had, has and will have to be" -
and why he could not rest content with the more moderate claims which, as
"® have sown, it could more plausibly have supported. For if Vico thought
that ultimately thare was only one pattern by virtue of which we could
understand the history of human activity and that it must be the same
pattern for tire whole of numan activity it becomes easy to see wiry he was
unwr 11 ,i ng to adrilt that the pattern might fail to be "confirmed" by the
evidence relevant to some histories, if this occurred we should not only
have to admit that we could have no knowledge in the case of two recalcitrant
histories - they would be "metaphysical" in the contemporary pejorative
sense of that term - but we should also have to conclude that the pattern
was inadequate to those histories which did conform to it.
This mistake of Vico's does noo, however, cast doubt upon the value of
the notion of an "ideal eternal history". The latter can remain unaffected
if we drew a simple distinction between Vico's claim and another which is
much more plausible. 'Vico could admit that we can understand an event simply
by virtue of our grasp of an appropriate pattern of explanation but maintain
now that we understand better or more deeply when we can see relationships
between patterns of explanation and can bring these inter-related patterns to
bear upon a set of actual events. On such a view it is not necessary thau
iff ^
in order to understand an event by locating it in a pattern of explanation
we must be able to locate the pattern as part of a still wider pattern but if
we can do the latter we understand the event in question in a different way
find at a deeper level.
This distinction would suffice to retain all that is valuable in Vico's
conception of an "ideal eternal history" and put it in a truer light, it
utilises the notion that there are levels or depths of understanding while
admitting that we can also use patterns of explanation without seeing their
bearing upon one another. Vico's mistake seems to have been to have assumed
that because we explain by reference to patterns of explanation, and because
we can in principle see no reason why all human activities should not
ultimately be explicable by reference to the same over-all pattern, we can
only understand them; if they are explained in this way. he has overlooked
the fact that we often do explain events by reference to a particular pattern
of relationships between kinds of events without being able to see how this
pattern is related to others, moreover, we decide what level of explanation
is appropriate in a particular context not on the grounds of a relationship
it may or may not have with a more ultimate principle but simply because
understanding a pattern of explanation carries with it a grasp of the sort of
event to, and context in, which to apply it. Thus if one historian wishes to
explain the outbreak of the First ,.orld ..ar by reference to national self-
pride, another as a necessary consequence of certain political alignments
formed many years previously and another by reference to the fears and
ambitions of a few influential individuals, we can understand each of these
explarv: tions in its own context and each can claim to be true. Often an
historian when talking about the causes of the war vdll offer a large number
of such causes. Yet there is no need to assume that if these accounts are
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to be accepted as intelli. ible or true they must all be part of one over¬
all account, the Truth, so called because ultimately all its different
elements can be shown to constitute a consistent and comprehensive system in
which they are all mutually derivable from the same few intelligible principles
of human nature.
But having said this we need not go to an extreme and say that because
we can understand explanations of a partial nature it is therefore neither
desirable nor possible that we should have a sufficient explanation of the
sort Vico is offering. An historian can certainly offer an explanation of,
say, the First world ..ar, if he wishes, in terms of the leading characters
involved and there is no reason why we should deny that we can understand
his account. This alone would be enough to show that Vico was wrong in
thinking that there was one, and only one, pattern of explanation adequate
for any understanding of history. But there is no reason why, just because
we can understand this explanation, we should accept it as the best explanation
or daily that we can understand others more deeply.
To see what we should say here and to come to some assessment of
Vico's position it is necessary to make a few points about explanation and
description, he have seen that it is one of the principal contentions of
"The Hew Science" that history can never be purely descriptive. Just because
human activity is essentially end-directed its description would be incomplete
without reference to its ends and an account which includes these would at
once explain the activity in question.
In "The New Science" Vico is very much concerned with this aspect of
things. In his own historical accounts Tiis explanations are often accom¬
plished through hi3 descriptions, it is also clear that he understood the
Xlt fc
theoretical consideration involved here."1" Nevertheless it must be faced
that his preoccupation with the theoretical aspect of explanation led him to
neglect the theoretical aspect of description. This must be to some extent
rectified.
we note first that explanations operate in a context. Whether a remark
is an explanation or not depends largely on its context for no remark is
per se explanatory. Thus in one context the remark "John was angry" would
be an explanation: it would tell us why John acted as he did. in another
context it might be a description, simply telling us about John's mental
state at a certain time.
In history the context is something which has to be described. The
description can be offered in various ways and at different levels of detail
or generality and the level and kind of explanation which will be relevant
here is largely determined by the level and kind of description in which its
context is given. Thus in one caae it would be appropriate to explain the
outbreak of the First World War by reference to the personalities of the
leading statesmen of the day. Such an explanation would presuppose that,
from the way the context had been described and in view of the state of know¬
ledge and expectation built up in the reader, the question to be answered
was why those statesmen took the decisions they did. In another case,
however, such an explanation would be inappropriate because, again from
the description of the context, it would be clear that what needed to be
explained was how and why the system of political alignments arose in which
such decisions could have the effect they did.
It is true that historians are not always clear about the relation
"*"Cf, Elements XIV and XV, discussed in Chapter Vi above.
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between kinds of explanation and Icinds of description, Thus much dispute,
even where all the relevant information and evidence is available, about the
cause of the First .Vorld War is not genuine dispute at all lor there is no
way in which it can be settled. This is because the historians concerned have
described tlie situation in such a way that trie explanations offered are really
explan. cions of different things.
This can be seen if we consider two such explanations. In one we
might explain the outbreak of the war as the inevitable outcome of cert?in
economic tendencies in the world* in the other we might explain it by reference
to the activities of the Kaiser and his naval command. There is a presumption
here that the two explanations cannot both be true if we assume that they are
both offered as accounts of the cause of the war. But what is the 'war' here
referred toV The explanations offered by the historians both refer to the war
as described by them and there may be few relevant factors in which these
coincide. The dispute between them is therefore spurious for they are
explaining different things.
The important point here is that any set of facts allows of a very wide
set of alternative descriptions, in history the position is made more com¬
plicated because what passes there as a fact is often a very complex 3tate
of affairs indeed. To these different descriptions different explanations
are relevant and often, given their respective descriptive contexts, there
is no way of choosing between these different explanations, dach is in order
as it stands.
But it does not folio,; that we cannot exercise a rational choice here.
The explanations offered are only in order, and our assent commanded, given
the descriptive context. .<e can still question whether we want a description
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of the sort offered and we can do so on the ground that the dnd of explanation
which it makes appropriate is insufficient or unacceptable, in other words,
although it is true that explanations often operate in descriptive contexts
we can ask whether we are satisfied with the whole type of account being
given.
it becomes therefore the question how we justify a preference for one
kind of account rather than another. »e must note first that a capacity to
deal with the historical evidence would not be a sufficient reason hore, for
what is to count as evidence, how it should be selected, arranged and used,
and the sort of description one will put forward on the basis of it, are all
dependent upon the sort of account one is trying to give. Clearly something
about the adequacy of the account is determined by its relation to the evidence.
.<a should not be happy with an account which was such that much of what had
hitherto passed as good evidence for throwing light on history would now have
to be rejected as useless. On the other hand neither can we simply reject a
kind of account like Vico's which considerably expands our conception of what
is to count as historical evidence and how it is to be used to do this.1" Other¬
wise there would be no possibility of progress in our conception of what his¬
tory should be and the kinds of explanation appropriate to it.
we must admit therefore that the evidence is not a given, incorrigible
datum by reference to which alone we can justify preferences for particular
kinds of accounts. The decision between different kinds of account must rest
on other grounds than this.
It seems to me that we cannot decide here other than by giving our
preference to that which most nearly approaches our ideal of the strongest
account possible. ->ince in history we deal with factual natters this ideal
is best represented by the sort of account at which the natural sciences aim
"^Cf. Chapter VIII above.
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i.e. by an account which establishes tha laws by reference to which we can
validate claims to knowledge in particular cases. The laws in question 3tate
the sufficient and necessary conditions of the occurrence of events of the
kind in question.
This might seem to take us into the current controversy about the nature
of historical explanations: whether they really have the same character as
the explanations offered in the applied sciences or whether they are acceptable
as long as they offer accounts of necessary conditions. But it is not necessary
to enter this dispute since it is admitted by those who favour the weaker case
here that if explanations of the stronger kind were available they would be
preferable, we can therefore accept that where Vico can substantiate his
claim to explain through an account of the sufficient and necessary conditions
those matters of which rivals offer an account only of necessary conditions
his type of account is to be preferred."1" Consequently the conception of the
use of evidence which is involved in his view is also to be accepted.
Two points must be made in connection with this claim. 1 have tried
to show that V'ico's claim that we can have knowledge in the case of human
affairs but not in that of the natural world should not be taken as a dis¬
tinction between knowledge and something weaker but between two different
2
kinds of understanding. The law3 involved in our understanding of human
affairs will not be,as with those of the natural sciences, statements of
invariable correlations between natural phenomena but statements of the way
the human mind develops and manifests itself under certain conditions, it
^i?or a discussion of how far his account goes in this direction see
Chapter A above.
2
lee Chapter XVII above.
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shall be able to establish claims to knowledge in particular cases.
,.e must note further, however, that as used by Vico these are not
sufficient to validate our claims to knowledge. <e must recall the hypo¬
thetical element in i/ico's method, he is not 3aying that from certain laws
we can deduce certain occurrences but that from certain hypotheses we can
deduce them, i'here is no question, however, of these hypotheses being known
to be true antecedently of their bearing upon the evidence, it is important
to emphasise this or we shall fail to do justice to Vico's concern over the
problem of historical conditioning. >o have seen that he is particularly
worried by the question of "what the historian can legitimately assure i3
known about the agents of history and how he i3 to avoid imputing to them
kinds of motivation and ways of thinking and acting which are historically
unacceptable, -.e need some 3ort of generalisations about the causes of human
activity to underlie our various hypotheses about the possible causes of his¬
tory and to give us the key to the interpretation of the evidence; but we
cannot know these to be true independently of the evidence. Conversely, we
can establish the general hypotheses as true by factual confirmation but we
cannot know that the confirming facts are true unless the hypotheses which
underlie their interpretation are correct. The consequence is that in his¬
tory knowied. e of fact and of law i3 mutually dependent, he cannot have it
in one case without having it in the other.
Once this is seen one final difficulty in the interpretation of Vico
is removed. »»e know that in "The New science" there is to be a rapprochement
of philosophy and philology: each will confirm the other. But Vico also
f. N.S. 177>180, 183 and 189 for a selection of such statements.
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wanted to limit knowledge to that which is universal and eternal, i.e. to
laws, and loft us in the pre-Vichian world with mere belief about facts.
He does not tell us, moreover, what the status of our consciousness of fact3
will be as a result of the w'ew science. If it remained as belief, Vico would
be in the odd position of suggesting that we can establish knowledge of laws
by appeal to facts which are merely believed, we can now see, ho .ever, that
this is not his position, if our conception of the explanation of human
activity is adequate we shall be able to com® to mutually supporting knowledge




It is appropriate now to come to some conclusions drawn from the thesis
as a whole as well as from the discussion in the foregoing chapter. These
are confined to Vice's contribution to the philosophy and methodology of
history and sociology end do not touch upon his word as a historian as such.
First, l think tfico's account of the nature of human activity as being
essentially motivated and end-directed is subst ntiaJLly correct, it follows
that ho is also correct in his insistence that the way we understand human
actions differs from that in which we understand the facts of natural science,
one would not wish to deny that it would be possible to describe actual human
events, and hence some historical facts, in the sane way as the facts of
natural science. This is because human activities conform to the conditions
which whce such description possible, hut twey also conform to conditions
which ;.ake other cinds of description and explanation applicable as well.
Thus we have what amounts to entirely different ways of talking about them
based upon criteria and evidence of very different kinds. If Vice weans,
as x have suggested," that there is a radical difference between the ways in
which we understand human and non-human activities he is correct.
Jecond, 1 think that Vico's contention that the historian and the
sociologist should use this different kind of understanding is also correct.
If we take first the case of the historian the main argument against his using
it ig that it is not susceptible of the same degree of verification as a
\iee Chapter XVII above.
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scientific description. But Vico has shown that there are no grounds for
holding that there is more difficulty in describing the ends to which an
activity is directed than in describing trie activity itself, in neither case
are we merely describing what is in front of us. In both cases we are construc¬
ting a hypothetical account of what happened and then confirming this by an
appeal to the evidence.
The position is little different in the case of the sociologist. To
think that the natural scientist can verify his laws in a more rigorous way
than the sociologist is a mistake. And the reason for this is that, on the
account which i have attributed to Vico, the method of the sociologist would
be substantially the same as one of those employed in natural science - the
tiypothefcico-deduetive method, if the purposes, motives and intentions of kinds
of men are verifiable, we have no grounds for believing that there is any ob¬
jection in principle to laws .which establish psychological propensities as
the explanation of social structure and social change. I am inclined to think
that 'Vico was wrong in thinking that psychological factors alone were sufficient,
but even if one thinks that other factors are relevant here there is no dif¬
ficulty in principle in the notion of scientific laws which state the con¬
ditions under which psychological propensities will be the causes of certain
social phenomena.
Third, however, I think that "vico's suggestion that, because the cate¬
gories used by the historian and the sociologist differ from those used by the
natural scientist, we must reject the claim of the latter to give us knowledge
is incorrect. This was suggested by Jxco on the grounds that the natural scien¬
ces were concerned with what God had made but the hew Scientist with what man
had made, ut seezas clear that Vico had here overlooked the corollary to his
theory .. .ich r. us, in Jhapter XVII, that the laws of both the natural and the
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social scientist are man's own cre.ouc us. if we accept that the hypotheses used
by both are the creation of man and that the standards of confirmation are the
same in the two cases, then if both are verified we cannot great to one the
status of knowledge and yet refuse it to the other, if, as is the case, there
is a difference between the sorts of tilings correlated in the laws of the
two sciences it is less iiisleading to indicate this by talking of two kinds
of understanding than by reserving the title of knowledge for only one of them.
Fourth, it will be seen from the foregoing that in my view Vico's
account of the nature of the method used by historians and sociologists is
also substantially correct, at is perhaps misleading to refer to this as
Vico's "account" since it is not well discussed at a theoretical level by
Vico, hut, as 1 have, tried to show, it is certainly the account which is
most strongly suggested by those passages, of which there are wary, in which
Vico argues in such a way as to reveal his method.
Fifth, it follows from the first two of the above points that Vico i3
in a position to put forward a criterion for the limits of history. Vico's
own suggestion is that history i3 .Limited to those periods in which men "began
to think humanly". in effect this J.eqns that it is limited to that period
-in which the model provided by the "ideal eternal history", which is in bum
based upon the modifications of "our own human mind", can be confined, .,>ince
Vico iras shown that the possibility of using certain categories and certain
kinds of explanation for purposes of historical interpretation and understan¬
ding depends upon our ordinary grasp of those same categories in their
everyday u3e it follows that history ia limited to those periods which offer
conditions vdiich will suffice for the application of these categories.
h.% 333.
as it stands this is rather a vague criterion. e do not know, for
example, how many of our ordinary categories of description and explanation
inust be applicable to any* period of history before we can talk of under¬
standing it. Does such understanding re aire all of our categories'! This is
too improbable to merit discussion. The criterion fails to distinguish,
however, between two more plausible suggestions, it might be taken bo mean
that all the categories applicable to any period of history must come from
those of which the historian has an everyday grasp; or it might be taken to
mean that certain basic categories, from which ..e may deduce others less basic,
must come from those whic. the historian brings to the problem, vico's
formula, that the "principles" of "the world of civil society ... are ... to
be recovered from the modifications of our own human mind" is not explicit
enough to aecide here. In wis practice, however, it has been, shown th t,
starting from some principles which -c understand quite well (those of religion
and marriage, for example) and others which we perhaps understand less well
(the assumption of the correctness of anthropomorphic thinking, perhaps) we
can deduce modes of thought and activity very far removed from our own. This
suggests that Vico favours the second possibility.
But in any case the question vhich of these ought to be accepted
cannot be decided iaeroly by an appeal to what vico does. ..hat is re ..aired
to decide between these possibilities would be an enquiry into the conditions
on which rests the possibility of understanding conceptual schemes other titan
our own. ouch an enquiry would have to be philosophical, indeed transcendental
in fCant's 3ense of the term, Vico fails entirely to produce 3uch an enquiry
so there is no point in discussing; it in relation to him. ,.hat he
^w-ee Chapter XVIII above.
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can be said to have done, however, is provide a formula, albeit a vague one,
which does indicate the assumption upon 'which such an enquiry would be based.
wixth, x think that :/ico is absolutely correct in his implied suggestion
that whoever would offer a "science" must be prepared and able to set out the
genera oresuppositiono 1 his arguments, The notion of a 'science" here is
very vague, it is clear that for Vico and for us a science claims to give
us knowledge, for Vico, however, knowledge of facts and knowledge of laws
are inseparable and the question whether such knowledge is obtainable in the
sphere of human activity could not be decided until somebody tried to apply
Vico's scheme or one like it.
on this view Vico's require ent would be demanded of the sociologist.
But here such a requirement would be superfluous for in the sociologist's
case ary initial assumptions he maxes are revealed in the laws he confirms.
For a law is, after all, nothing but the establishment of the sufficient and
necessary conditions of a certain, in this case social, kind of occurrence.
Bine© it contains a statement of the conditions under which the truth holds
good, nothing is presupposed which is not stated.
But the notion of knowledge is today applied in two cases where, if liis
stringent requirements were not satisfied, Vico would say we would have to
rest content with consciousness, or belief."'' These are the cases where the
historian claims knowledge of individual facts (such as that Columbus dis¬
covered .ussrica in 1492) and where he claims knowledge of soma sequence of
fact which, it is alleged, will explain some other fact, xt would be pro¬
fitable to 3ee how these claims would be affected by Vico's suggestion.
1"
oee Chapter V above.
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I turn to the first: is there anything to be gained by setting out
the presuppositions on which depends the historian's claim to know certain
facts: On the whole it does not soexa so for historians rarely disagree over
these facts. On certain issues such agreement is less widespread (..as there
a gunpowder plotV Did demy il "command" the death of Beckett;) out this
sort of disagreement would probably not be cleared up by adducing the pre¬
suppositions of one's arguments. For historians are basically in agreement
about the standards to be applied in settling such matters. Their dis¬
agreement here stems from trie contingent fact that the evidence does not
allow these standards to be fully applied.
Hie position seems a little different when we turn to the more obscure
and distant periods of history, here the presuppositions made by historians
vary ere widely. There is disagreement, lor example, over the problem which
occupied Vico - the interpretation of the Iliad and advssev. Hie disagreement
here is over how to take such accounts, how much of them to take as literal
and how much as symbolic. But this sort of disagreement would probably not
be cleared u] cgfci-by the adducing of the . resuppositions of one's arguments
for these are often evident from the arguments themselves. On the whole,
therefore, do not think that the historian's claim to know individual facts
would be much altered by setting out the standards presupposed by his argument.
1 turn now to the case in which the historian claims knowledge of a
1
connected sequence of fact. The point has already been made, that while
historians often agree over the facts, they disagree over the relation of
the facts or, to put it differently, over their significance. They often
choose to describe the same fact in different ways and to explain it by
^'Dee Chapter IVill above.
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recourse to different material, at the sane time claiming that theirs is
the only acceptable way of doing so and rejecting rival accounts. Hie
result is that in this sense history cannot claim to be a science xor even
the experts, given the theoretical availability of the sane material, cannot
agree over the correct account to give of the matter in question. This
position arises because historians are often working at cross-purposes,1
They have failed to evolve a common descriptive procedure or a common con¬
ception of the standards to which an account of this sort should conform.
This in itself makes it difficult to think of their work as scientific.
The difficulty is exacerbated by the fact tSiat, in their very disagreements
they show that they do not recognise that this is the case, arguing as though
there were ..ays of settling disagree rents which, in the position they are in,
are. in principle unresolvable.
Now it is this latter difficulty which could be removed by Vice's
method of setting out the basic philosophical and sociological postulates
assumed by any account, i.e. by setting out one's conception of the nature of
the human activities, or whatever else it is that the historian is concerned
with, together with an account of the proper ways in which to describe and
explain this, and the way in which to interpret the materials which will sup¬
port 3uch accounts. A number of advantages would follow frt this. The his¬
torian should, if he has done his work well, be able to claim, that if one
accepts the type of account put forward one xnu3t accept as knowledge what
is actually put forward. Should one find the type of account acceptable but
not the actual account then either not enough evidence is available to support
a claim of knowledge or 30me mistake has been made which is in principle
^dee Chapter JCV1II above.
rectiflabia. In general, therefore, direct refutations should be available
for claims to knowledge, dn the other hand, where disagreement exists over
the acceptability of the kind of account to be offered, discussion of this
could be carried on without being confused with discussion of .hether or not
it is an adequate account of its type, in other words philosophy and history
will, not be confused.
History written under these conditions could, I think, claim to. be
scientific, uf course it might not follow that historians would find them¬
selves in the sane agreement a3 the natural scientists over how their material
should be described and explained. But it is only a contingent facts that
natural scientists are in such agreement any way. The claim that their
procedures find results are scientific does not therefore depend upon such
unanimity; so the claim of historians to be scientific would not be refuted
by failure to achieve it. The natural scientist's claim to knowledge rests
ui-.on his ability to give an account of the sufficient and necessary conditions
for the occurrence of certain phenomena, dven given different approaches to
the question of describing their material historians could make the same claim.
Their account of the causes of the facts could be on just as sure a footing as
their account of the facts themselves.
in ay view, therefore, /ico was entirely correct in trying to set out
the presuppositions of his account as they are contained in his discussions
of the nature of human activity and of the nature of historical method and
in his social philosophy. In doing this he showed an awareness of the problems
and a sophistication in hi3 conception of how to deal with them lacking in
many subsequent historians.
Seventh, however, although 1 think Vico could claim that his work was
a wo
scientific in the above three senses, we must reject its claim to be scientific
in a yet stronger sense. For even if the first claim is accepted, that we
can have sociological laws, it doe3 not follow from that that we can have
laws for the history of any society as a whole, laws which enable us to predict
its future as a whole. The reason for this is that while a law gives us know¬
ledge of what will happen given certain conditions it does not give us know¬
ledge that these conditions will obtain, .»e might thin :, as did Vico, that
we can satisfy the latter requirement by showing that we have knowledge of
laws which state the conditions under which these conditions will obtain,
but ultimately Vico was driven back to provide an element in eaqplanation which
itself could not be explained - his basic kind of human nature. If this is
taken to be ultimata, i.e. inexplicable by reference to other conditions, it
follows that we cannot discover the laws which govern it3 history and so
cannot claim to know in any scientific manner that any society whatsoever
;.iUst develop in a particular way. lo employ a distinction made by professor
Poppert we may have laws establishing the dependence of some idlnds of social
phenomena upon others, but when it comes to a law for the whole pattern of
social change, or a law for a basic Icind of change on which all the others
depend, here at best we can only find a trend, and a trend is not a sufficient
basis for claiming knowledge in any other case.
^""'ihe Poverty of historiciam", pp. 115-116.
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